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Summary 
This thesis argues that the role played by the concept of remembrance (Eingedenken) 
in Walter Benjamin's 'theory of the knowledge of history' and in his engagement with 
Enlightenment universal history, is a crucial one. The implications of Benjamin's 
contention that history's 'original vocation' is 'remembrance' have hitherto gone 
largely unnoticed. The following thesis explores the meaning of the concept of 
remembrance and assesses the significance of this proposed link between history and 
memory, looking at both the mnemonic aspect of history and the historical facets of 
memory. It argues that by mobilising the simultaneously destructive and constructive 
capacities of remembrance, Benjamin sought to develop a critical historiography 
which would enable a radical encounter with a previously suppressed past. In so doing 
he takes up a stance (explicit and implicit) towards existing philosophical conceptions 
of history, in particular the idea of universal history found in German Idealism. 
Benjamin reveals an intention to retain the epistemological aspirations of universal 
history *whilst ridding that approach of its apologetic moment. He criticises existing 
conceptions of history on the basis that each assumes homogeneous time to be the 
framework in which historical events occur. Insight into the distinctive temporality of 
remembrance proves to be the touchstone for this critique, and provides a paradigm 
for a very different conception of time. The thesis goes on to determine what is valid 
and what is problematic both in this concept of remembrance and in the theory of 
hi§torical knowledge which it informs, by subjecting both to the most cogent 
criticisms which can be levelled at them. What emerges is not only the importance of 
this concept for an understanding of Benjamin's philosophy but the pertinence of this 
concept for any philosophical account of memory. 
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Introduction 
'The Problem of Memory (and of Forgetting)' 
In April 1940, five months before his death whilst fleeing Nazi-occupied France, the 
German philosopher and literary critic Walter Benjamin wrote in a letter to his friend 
Gretel Karplus of a series of 'reflections' he had been composing, eighteen 'theses' 
which had been set down, some on old newspaper wrappers, and which he did not yet 
want published: 
The war and the constellation it brings with it have led me to put down 
some thoughts of which I can say that I have kept them in safekeeping, 
yes, safekeeping, with me for some twenty years .... Even today I am 
handing them over to you more as a bunch of whispering grass 
gathered on pensive walks, than as a collection of theses .... They make 
me suspect that the problem of memory (and of forgetting) which 
appears in them on different levels, will occupy me for a long time 
yet. ' 
The tragic irony of this 'long time yet' is brought into relief when we bear in mind a 
phrase of Balzac's quoted approvingly by Benjamin: 'memory has value only as 
foresight'. But what is the 'problem of memory (Erinnerung] (and of forgetting)' 
which was to detain Benjamin's time had he lived longer? The following thesis sets 
I Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften (7 vols. ) ed. Rolf Tiedemann & Hermann Schweppenh5user 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974-85), vol. 1, pp. 1226-7. Hereafter all references to this work are 
abbreviated as GS followed by volume and page number. Where available, a reference to the 
appropriate English translation is given. Existing translations have been modified or amended where 
necessary. In the case of quotations from authors other than Benjamin (for instance, Adorno or 
Nietzsche) a reference to the original language work is given only where the translation of particular 41 
words or passages raises relevant issues. 
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out to answer this question. Fortunately, in taking this problem as its subject matter 
this thesis is not destined to speculation about what might have been said or written 
had Benjamin not taken his own life. A preoccupation with the problematic of 
memory and forgetting runs throughout Benjamin's writing; indeed if there is one 
theme which could be said to crystallize his diverse concerns and influences it would 
be this. Where then to, X begin studying this problem? Benjamin's intimation of a 
collection of 'theses' which deal with the problem of memory and forgetting suggests 
that it is there that the nature of this problematic will become clearer. The reference is 
to what is arguably his most important and yet most enigmatic work, the eighteen 
theses 'On the Concept of History' ('Ober den Begriff der Geschichte'), and 
appropriately it is this brief but richly allusive set of aphorisms which will be the 
recurring focus of what follows. There, however, one finds a discourse not so much on 
'memory' (Erinnerung) as on 'remembrance' (Eingedenken), a particular form of 
memory to which Benjamin ascribes distinctive characteristics and significant powers. 
It is this particular concept of memory which appears to raise the many 'problems' 
that Benjamin planned to address. 
The following thesis begins not with 'On the Concept of History' though but with 
a text to which it refers back and which in important respects provides the key to 
understanding it: an exchange between Benjamin and Horkheimer from 1937 over the 
completeness or incompleteness of the past, an exchange in which Benjamin develops 
the concept of remembrance (Eingedenken) as pivotal to his conception of historical 
time. The first two chapters reconstruct this exchange and highlight the stakes 
involved, proceeding to look at its implications both for Benjamin's philosophy at 
large and for any philosophical account of history and temporality. The upshot of the 
exchange with Horkheimer - that remembrance is for Benjamin 'redemptive' or 
4messianic' - calls, however, for a clarification of Benjamin's own messianism and an 
elucidation of the meaning of redemption. To this end the third chapter looks at the 
way Benjamin's conception of historical time develops out of a recurring engagement 
with the Kantian critique of Heilsgeschichte or 'redemptive history' and in particular 
with Hermann Cohen's restatement of this critique. It argues that Benjamin's thinking 
emerges just as much in opposition to, as in indebtedness to, neo-Kantianism, a fact 
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which commentators have often downplayed with misleading results. This oversight 
will have important repercussions for the attempt to found an ethics - Kantian in 
character - in Benjamin's name, an interpretation which is assessed in the final 
chapter. The fourth and fifth chapters deal with the difficulties and problems raised by 
Benjamin's attempt to express his redemptive criticism in terms of an act of 
remembrance, the attempt to use Eingedenken to reinterpret and revitalize universal 
history and to develop a critical historiography. These two chapters assesses the most 
persuasive criticisms which can be levelled at his project: Chapter Four evaluates 
Adorno's opposition to Benjamin's 'monadological' method and looks at how these 
criticisms impinge upon Benjamin's theories of memory and history; Chapter Five 
subjects Benjamin's privilege of memory to a genealogy and asks whether the element 
of forgetting in 'the problem of memory and forgetting' has in fact been neglected. 
Chapter Six draws together the preceding discussions, bringing them to bear up the 
legacy of Benjamin's philosophy of memory, its appropriation by contemporary 
theologians and critical theorists in the form of an ethic of commemoration and a 
model of Holocaust remembrance. 
Benjamin's Philosophy: a Preamble 
The difficulties as well as the stakes involved in writing philosophically on Benjamin 
are considerable. Benjamin's was, in Adomo's words, 'a philosophy directed against 
philosophy'. 2 According to Adorno, Benjamin 'chose to remain completely outside of 
the manifest tradition of philosophy. Despite its great culture, the elements of that 
tradition enter his labyrinth scattered, submerged, obliquely. 13 This comment points 
out the problem of Benjamin's philosophical eclecticism, his conscious incorporation 
of diverse and seemingly incompatible ideas, ideas often drawn from less familiar 
regions of the philosophical tradition. However, it also suggests that the more 
manifest tradition may have touched upon Benjamin's work in ways he was not fully 
2 Theodor Adorno, 'A Portrait of Walter Benjamin', in Prisms, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber 
(London: Neville Spearman, 1967). p. 235. 
3 Ibid., pp. 239-40. 
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aware of, ways which may in fact be of equal or greater interest. For a study such as 
this it serves as a useful working hypothesis: on the one hand it allows - against those 
who deny the value of tracing Benjamin's philosophical heritage4 - an assessment of 
his thought within the framework of philosophy and by means of philosophical 
concepts and arguments; on the other hand it allows his work to be discussed in terms 
of traditions whose influence may be more implicit than explicit but which clarify the 
structure of his thinking. The approach advocated in the following thesis is that it js 
not only possible but necessary to understand Benjamin in terms of certain 
philosophical lineages: not just the figures of his own apprenticeship (neo-Kantians 
such as Hermann Cohen, for instance) but also thinkers who he may invoke only 
briefly but with whom he shares many common concerns (Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, 
for example). Adomo's characterisation also allows reflection upon the lacunae in 
Benjamin's relation to the manifest tradition of philosophy: one such figure to whom 
he relates, if only by glaring omission, is Hegel. But Adorno's portrait also reminds us 
of the limitations of any philosophical reading of Benjamin and that, because this 
tradition passes through Benjamin's writing only at a tangent, one must be wary of 
judging him too hastily in terms of frameworks alien to his thinking. Recognition of 
both the possibility and the limits of writing philosophically on Benjamin frames a 
particular critical approach, one which is both immanent in its reference to his own 
sources and more distanced or reflective in its greater familiarity with the manifest 
tradition of philosophy. The difficult route between an immanent and a reflective 
critique is one which this thesis attempts to follow. 
Although Adorno, more than any other critic, brings out the philosophical content 
of Benjamin's thinking, his understanding of that content paradoxically threatens to 
curtail the project of a philosophically-guided criticism: for Adorno 'the idea of 
Benjamin's work, rigorously conceived, excludes not just fundamental themes but all 
analytic techniques of composition, development, the whole mechanism of 
presupposition, assertion, and proof, of theses and conclusions. 15 If this were 
4 For example Pierre Missac, Walter Benjamin's Passages, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen 
(Cambri. dge, MA & London: MIT Press, 1995). Ch. 2. 
5 Adorno, 'Introduction to Benjamin's Schriften' in Gary Smith (ed. ), On Walter Benjamin (Cambridge, 
MA & London: MIT Press, 1988), p. 13. 
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unequivocally true then to write on Benjamin in a manner faithful to his own thinking 
would require dispensing with such philosophical techniques. That Adomo's portrait 
is not unreservedly accurate will be an assumption upon which the present thesis rests. 
In its aim of identifying a 'fundamental theme' to Benjamin's work and by retaining 
something of an assertive and conclusive procedure, the thesis will show, along the 
way, the limits of Adorno's characterisation. To agree with Adomo's interpKetation 
immediately begs the question of what is philosophical about Benjamin's thinking if 
indeed such procedures have been renounced. Adorno's response is to describe an 
approach which 'delivers itsdlf over to luck and the risk of betting on experience and 
striking something essential. 16 The germ of accuracy in this otherwise uncharitable 
statement is a recognition of the fact that for Benjamin 'the essential', that is, 
philosophical truth, is to be found not by a purifying process in which the complexity 
and variety of experience is bracketed-out, but on the contrary may appear only when 
thought immerses itself in experience's particularity, contingency and contradiction. 
Again this impinges upon any attempt to write on Benjamin: an immanent exposition 
and critique of Benjamin's thinking entails that experience and its contextual 
background, the historical and social formation he calls 'modernity', cannot be 
excluded from the arena of philosophical study. 
Commentary and Criticism 
Benjamin's philosophy (Adorno again) 'invites misreading'. 7 This comment makes 
comprehensible George Steiner's view that most of the critical literature on Benjamin 
is of 'tedious nullity'. 8 Taking this judgment to its hyperbolical. extreme Pierre Missac 
has suggested, in Humean fashion, that all translations of, and commentaries on, 
6 Adorno, 'Benjamin's Einbahnstraj3e' in Notes to Literature, vol. 2, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Shierry 
Weber Nicholson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 324. 
7 Adorno, 'Introduction to Benjamin's Schriften' in Gary Smith (ed. ), On Walter Benjamin, op. cit., p. 
5. 
8 George Steiner, 'The Remembrancer: Rescuing Walter Benjamin from his Acolytes', Times Literary 
Supplement, October 8,1993, p. 37. 
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Benjamin be consigned to the flarnes. 9 But given that Benjamin's thought cannot be 
completely disentangled from its reception in the secondary literature, the 'received 
wisdom' which has emerged through the rehearsal and consolidation of particular 
interpretations, such a request appears naive. Moreover, such book-burning might 
prove an endless task: the burgeoning output of secondary literature now constitutes a 
veritable 'Walter Benjamin industry' (Steiner), cutting across many disciplines and 
theoretical frameworks; a recent bibliography of material from the period 1983-1992 
listed well over two thousand entries. 10 With the centenary of Benjamin's birth 
coming at the end of this period, a string of commemorative studies has now swelled 
this number. 
The sheer amount and variety of these works is daunting, and yet amongst the 
vast secondary literature it is possible to delineate trends and tendencies, running 
themes and dominant approaches. One strand which has become influential in recent 
commentaries is a criticism informed by poststructuralism. and deconstruction. The 
influence of this particular approach has led to a shift not only in the terms and 
parameters within which Benjamin's work is discussed but also in what is deemed at 
stake in commentary or criticism. The character of present debates is revealing. It calls 
to mind the very different atmosphere in which Benjamin's writings were first 
received. The initial wave of interest coincided with the publication of his Schriften 
and was split along Marxist (typically atheological) and theological (typically 
*apolitical) lines, each side seeking to appropriate the writer to their own camp. 
Although dogged by vociferous polemic, fuelling the suspicion that it had been, in 
Steiner's words, 'skillfully orchestrated', this debate had an urgency which seems to 
have been lost in present-day criticism. It is noteworthy that the attempt made during 
this first wave of critical reception by those of the theological camp to downplay and 
discredit Benjamin's overtly political writings has been realised today in more subtle 
and sophisticated form. The antinomies and contradictions in Benjamin's thought 
(exemplified in his simultaneous appropriations of both theology and Marxism), the 
source of the liveliness of many past debates, are now deconstructed where they might 
9 Pierre Missac, Walter Benjamin's Passages, op. cit., p. 40. 
10 Reinhard Markner & Thomas Weber (ed. ), Literatur Uber Walter Benjamin: Kommentierte 
Bibliography 1983-1992 (Hamburg: Argument, 1993). 
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have been dialectically thernatised, their tensions and their dynamic explored. 
Deconstruction has not removed these contradictions but has merely rendered them 
'undecidable'll; it has produced, in effect, an impasse. To elucidate Benjamin's own 
understanding of dialectics (and why he believed it did not preclude holding to both 
theology and communism) would help to set this debate in motion once again. 
Dialectics properly understood - and Benjamin's 'destructive' version is exemplary in 
this respect - does not rest content with talk of the undecidable or irresqlvable. It 
impatiently seeks to remove obstacles placed in front of it. It would never be without a 
path. 12 
As this reference to dialectics suggests, it is against the grain of contemporary 
criticism that the present thesis sets out, both in its intent to approach Benjamin 
philosophically and to revive something of the spirit and the stakes of earlier 
commentaries and debates. This in turn is to engage indirectly with the wider 
intellectual trends which are registered in the changing shape of Benjamin-criticism. 
The shift away from philosophical (and, implicitly, political) interpretations such as 
Adorno's towards more exclusively 'literary' readings no doubt reflects something of 
the wider intellectual climate. By implication, to critically engage with the. 
II This term is a recurring motif in Jacques Derrida's essay on Benjamin, 'Force of Law: The 'Mystical 
Foundation of Authority" in Drucilla Cornell & David Gray Carlson (eds. ), Deconstruction and the 
Possibility of Justice (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 3-67. It reappears in a highly Derridean 
commentary given by Jeffrey Mehlman, Walter Benjamin for Children: An Essay on His Radio Years 
(Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1993), esp. pp. 16 & 26. Again with the influence of 
deconstruction clearly in the background Rainer N5gele has insisted on the 'radical otherness' of 
Benjamin's 'oppositional terms and positions' [Theatre, Theory, Speculation: Walter Benjamin and the 
scenes of modernity (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 661. 
12 GS 4, p. 398; 'The Destructive Character' in One-Way Street and Other Writings, trans. Edmund 
Jephcott & Kingsley Shorter (London: Verso, 1979), p. 159. 
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predominant readings of Benjamin is to ask more fundamental questions of the 
intellectual culture of the present. 
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I 
Opening the Past 
Introduction 
'... For nothing takes you deeper and binds you more closely than the attempt to 
'redeem' the writings of the past, as I intend to do. " These words of Benjamin written 
in 1923 in a letter to Florence Christian Rang were designed to convey the aims of his 
work on the German 'mouming-play', the Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspiels. 
However they also say something more fundamental about his thought in general, and 
reveal an affinity between early works such as the Trauerspiel book and later writings 
such as the Passagen-Werk and the theses Tber den Begriff der Geschichte'. 
Benjamin's description of his own project raises an immediate question: what does it 
mean to 'redeem' something from the past? Or, perhaps more appropriately, what 
does it mean to 'redeem' the past itself? To understand what is meant by this notion of 
redemption and just why it is so central to any comprehension of Benjamin's thought, 
it is necessary to recognise something further - that it is memory which he thinks 
capable of redeeming not only 'writings' or 'works' of the past but historical time 
itself. Benjamin calls this 'the theological link between remembrance and 
redemption. '2 It is not coincidental that an explanation of the term 'redemption', a 
reflection upon the completeness or incompleteness of history, and an exposition of 
the capacities of memory, all occur at the same point in Benjamin's writings - an 
exchange with Horkheimer which dates from 1937, and it is with this exchange that 
Benjamin, Briefe, ed. Gershom Scholern & T. W. Adorno (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1966), p. 
309 (hereafter cited as Briefe); The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin 1910-1940, trans. Manfred R. 
Jacobson & Evelyn M. Jacobson (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 994), p. 214 
(hereafter cited as Correspondence). 
2 GS 1, p. 1258. 
the present thesis begins, and to which it will return again and again. Although a small 
number of critics have recognised the importance of this exchange - Rolf Tiedemann 
writes of its 'explosiveness'3 for historical materialism; Helmut Peukert (from a very 
different standpoint) sees it as 'one of the most theologically significant controversies 
of this century14 - it has rarely been taken seriously enough and never examined in 
sufficient detail. It is this oversight which the present chapter, and indeed the thesis as 
a whole, seeks to redress. 
Ilk w 
3 Rolf Tiedemann 'Historical Materialism or Political Messianism? An Interpretation of the Theses "On 
the Concept of History" 
.1 
in Gary Smith (ed. ) Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics, History (Chicago & 
London: Chicago University Press, 1989), p. 183. 
4 Helmut Peukert, Science, Action, and Fundamental Theology: Toward a Theology of Communicative 
Action, trans. James Bohman (Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, 1986), p. 206. 
14 
'A power able to bring about such a number of important results is to my 
mind wholly divine. For what is the memory of things and words? What 
further is invention? Assuredly nothing can be apprehended even in God of 
greater value than this. ' 
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 
Autarky and Affection 
When in February 1937 Benjamin submitted his essay 'Eduard Fuchs, Collector and 
Historian' to the Frankfurt School's Journalfor Social Research, amongst the pages 
of critical comments from the journal's editor Max Horkheimer, one particular 
criticism stands out. Horkheimer draws attention to a passage in which Benjamin 
argues that 'for historical materialism the work of the past is incomplete', 5 and offers 
the following reflection: 
I have long been thinking about the question of whether the work of the 
past is complete. Your formulation can certainly stand as it is. I have 
but one personal reservation: that I think this a relationship only to be 
perceived dialectically. The pronouncement of incompleteness is 
idealistic if it does not incorporate completeness as well. Past injustice 
is done and finished. Those who have been beaten to death are truly 
dead. Ultimately you are making a theological statement. If one takes 
incompleteness absolutely seriously, then one must believe in the Last 
5 GS 2, p. 477; 'Eduard Fuchs, Collector and Historian' in One- Way Street and Other Writings, op. cit., 
p. 360 (amended). 
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Judgement. My thinking is too contaminated with materialism for that. 
Perhaps there is a distinction between positive and negative 
incompleteness, so that injustice, the terror, the pain of the past are 
irreparable. Justice in practice, pleasures and works behave differently 
in relation to time, since their positive character is largely negated by 
their transitoriness. This is indeed true for individual life, for which 
death validates its unhappiness, but not its happiness. Good and evil do 
not relate to time in the same way. Thus discursive logic is inadequate 
to these categories as well. 6 
Benjamin responded: 
I find your excursus on the completeness or openness of the work of 
the past very significant. I think I understand it thoroughly, and if I am 
not mistaken, your idea corresponds to a theme that has often 
concerned me. To me, an important question has always been how to 
understand the odd figure of speech, 'to lose a war or a court case. ' The 
war or the trial are not the entry into a dispute, but rather the decision 
concerning it. Finally I explained it to myself thus: the events involved 
for a person who has lost a war or a court case are truly concluded 
[abgeschlossen] and thus for that person any avenue ofpraxis has been 
lost. This is not the case for the counterpart, who is the winner. Victory 
bears its fruit in a way much different from the manner in which 
consequences follow defeat. Thiý leads to the exact opposite of Ibsen's 
phrase: 'Happiness is bom of loss, / only what is lost is etemal'. 7 
Although the 'works of the past [Werke der Vergangenheitl' which Benjamin believes 
to be incomplete are artworks, literary works, etc., Horkheimer's criticism and 
subsequently Benjamin's response extend the compass of the debate to the realm of 
6 GS 2, p. 1332-3; cited in Rolf Tiedemann 'Historical Materialism or Political MessianismT, in Gary 
Smith (ed. ), op. cit., p. 181-2. 
7 GS 2, p. 1338; ibid., p. 182. 
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history in general. Benjamin makes it clear that he thinks these points concern the 
nature of history and temporality as such. The significance of Horkheimer's criticism - 
that 'completeness' (Abgeschlossenheit) be perceived 'dialectically' - thus becomes 
clear. 'Materialism' dictates that the past be construed as complete, as unalterable; on 
this view the notion of an actual redemption of the past could only be 'idealistic' or 
'theological'. The question asked by Horkheimer of Benjamin's original formulation 
is this: what is the meaning of materialism in 'historical materialism' if it is capable of 
asserting the (apparently theological) idea that the past is alterable? Benjamin's 
response proceeds by contrasting 'completeness' (Abgeschlossenheit) and 'openness' 
(Offenheit). The term abgeschlossen means 'discrete' or 'self-contained', 'complete in 
itself (the translators of the Fuchs essay render it as 'autarky'8), so that the terms of 
the debate are drawn around whether the past relates to, or is affected by, the present. 
Where 'completion' implies self-sufficiency, 'openness' involves a relation or 
mediation between the past and the present. To Benjamin's distinction Horkheimer 
then adds a further qualification by distinguishing between 'positive and negative 
incompleteness' which pertain respectively to acts of justice and injustice. This 
distinction introduces a question of conflict and perspective into the idea of openness 
or mediation already asserted. Benjamin corroborates Horkheimer's distinction by 
referring to a mundane example, 'the odd figure of speech, 'to lose (verlieren] a war 
or a court case. " For him the example shows the way openness and completion are 
often viewed as unequally distributed between victor and vanquished: whereas defeat 
guarantees that 'any avenue of praxis' (that is, any recourse or redress) is closed off, 
the victor emerges from the contest differently. Evil, injustice and pain on the one 
hand, and justice and happiness on the other, relate differently to time' and to 
transience. 
Whilst Horkheimer's objection appears searching and compelling, it is flawed in 
an important respect. His charge that to view the past as alterable is a necessarily 
theological statement is insensitive to Benjamin's particular use of theological 
categories and models. It overlooks the fact that what is being proposed here, like 
many other instances in which Benjamin invokes theological concepts, can also be 
'Eduard Fuchs, Collector and Historian' in One-Way Street, p. 359. 
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construed secularly. Understood thus, the idea of the incompleteness of history 
amounts to an assertion that the historical past is 'open' because it is always being 
reconstituted in the present, that the past is not self-contained but is just as much a 
creation of the present and that, moreover, the constitutive motor of this process is 
conflict. 
When the time came to make a more considered response to Horkheimer's 
criticism, Benjamin chooses not to downplay the theological motifs but to clarify the 
manner in which he is using them. His supporting evidence this time is not the judicial 0 
process but something else -a description of the act of memory - adding a new 
dimension to what he calls 'the question of the incompleteness of history'. 
The corrective to [Horkheimer's] line of thought lies in the reflection 
that history is not only a science [Wissenschaft], but no less a form of 
remembrance [Eingedenken]. What science has 'established, ' 
remembrance can modify. Remembrance can make the incomplete 
(happiness) into something finished, and that which is finished 
(suffering) into something incomplete. That is theology; but in 
remembrance we have an experience which forbids us to conceive of 
history as fundamentally atheological, just as little as we are allowed to 
attempt to write it in terms of immediately theological concepts. 9 
Benjamin makes it clear that what he thinks gives the lie to the autarky of the past is 
an understanding of the phenomenon of remembrance. His belief is that in memory 
one finds a remarkable power to transform the past, to dislodge past events from their 
original context and to reactivate them. In memory the present can be seen to act upon 
the past and alter its character. What is interesting as an observation of individual 
psychological memory becomes highly significant when it is recognised that 'the same 
applies to our view of the past, which is the concern of history'. 10 Individual memory 
9 GS 5, p. 589 (N8, I); 'N [Re the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress]' in Gary Smith (ed. ) C, 
Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics, History, op. cit., p. 61 (amended). Hereafter this work is cited as 
'Konvolut'N". 
10 GS 1, p. 693; 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. 
Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 1968), p. 254. 
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is mirrored by history because history is itsey a fonn of remembrance, or in 
Benjamin's words, remembrance is history's 'original vocation'll - to study the past 
on the level of collectives, societies or cultures is just as much to engage in 
remembering as when an individual's past is recollected. 
But what is 'remembrance' (Eingedenken) and how is it able to render complete 
or incomplete the past itself? The term performs considerable conceptual labour in 
Benjamin's response and further examination of it seems necessary. Having no single 
English equivalent, the German noun Eingedenken corresponds to a more commonly 
used verb, eingedenk, 'to bear in mind', deriving from the root denken, 'to think', a 
root shared by Gedenken, 'memory' or 'commemoration'. Eingedenken captures the 
sense both of an act of memory, a 'calling to mind, and a state of 'Mindfulness', 12 but 
because of the lack of a sense of temporality in these phrases (a sense that what is 
called to mind is the past), it is perhaps more helpfully rendered as 'remembrance' 
(thus Tage des Eingedenkens: 'days of remembrance'). The weakness of such a 
translation is that the English prefix'implies just that duplication of the past which the 
concept is meant to avoid. However, as will become clear, there is a necessary 
repetition-in-difference involved in Eingedenken, a paradox which should be borne in 
mind whenever the term is used. The problem of translation is compounded when it is 
seen that Benjamin's term may itself be a translation, that Eingedenken may 
correspond to the Hebrew Zakhor, the Jewish commandment to remember. 13 
However, Benjamin's comments on the simultaneously 'atheological' and 
11 GS 1, p. 1231. 
12 The first of these is used by the translator of Pierre Missac's Walter Benjamin's Passages, op. cit., p. 
95; the second is suggested by Aris Fioretos in his 'Contraction (Benjamin, Reading, History)', Modern 
Language Notes, vol. 110, no. 3 (April 1995), pp. 548, n. 15. The present discussion follows the lead of 
Irving Wohlfarth in translating the term as 'remembrance'. See Wohlfarth, 'On the Messianic Structure 
of Walter Benjamin's Last Reflections', Glyph 3 (1978), p. 197, n. 4. The sense of memory as 'bearing 
in mind' appears already in Augustine who observed that 'we even call memory the mind, for when we 
tell another person to remember something, we say 'See that you bear this in rrund', and when we forget 
something, we say 'It was not in my mind' or 'It slipped out of my mind'. ' [Augustine, Confessions, 
trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), p. 220]. 
13 Susan Handelman, Fragments of Redemption: Jewish Thought and Literary Theory in Benjamin, 
Scholern and Levinas (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana U. P, 1991) p. 150; Gillian Rose, 'Walter 
Benjamin: Out of the Sources of Modern Judaism' in Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), p. 207. On the history of this term see Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, 
Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory (Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 
1982). 
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'theological' character of the concept should entail caution in the face of any 
genealogy which might reduce both the originality and complexity of its usage. The 
concept will be shown to exceed a sheerly theological meaning and to nowhere carry 
the force of an imperative or injunction. As these brief points suggest, the problem of 
translating Benjamin's term raises decisive philosophical questions. 
In the same letter in which he describes his project as a redemption (Rettung) of 
works of the past, Benjamin clarifies this quality of historical incompleteness which 
allows for the past's transformation: 'We know of course that the past consists not of 
crown jewels in a museum, but of something always affected [betroffen] by the 
present. '14 He takes it as axiomatic that this antiquarian model of the past together 
with the historiographical practice to which it gives rise is fundamentally mistaken 
because it ignores the relation between the past and present which constitutes the past 
as past. A rescue or redemption of historical phenomena is possible because of this 
'affection' by which the past is continually constituted and reconstituted. It is this 
paradoxical relation of determination which gives the lie to past's self-sufficiency. 
From this insight into the mediation of the past follows an historical and 
historiographical task very different from the antiquarian model evoked above. By 
exploiting this affective relation historiography can hope to dispel the illusion of 
autarky and to articulate the past in a critical manner. 
The Temporality of Remembrance 
To understand why it is the phenomenon of remembrance which performs the 
privileged feat of opening up the past from its apparent self-sufficiency it is necessary 
to observe what happens to time in the act of remembering. It requires recognition that 
'the way the past is experienced [Erfahren] in remembrance [Eingedenken]' is 
'neither homogeneous nor empty'. 15 Benjamin finds in the phenomenon of 
remembering an experience of time which corresponds neither to an 'eternal image of 
14 Briefe, p. 311; Correspondence, p. 215 (amended). 
15 GS 1, p. 704; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 264. 
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the past' nor to a sequential and chronological continuum. Memory has the unusual 
characteristic of contracting the past, of compressing a massive wealth of material into 
the temporal present. The process which memory enacts is neither eternal (because 
what is remembered threatens to be lost once recalled - all memories suffer this risk) 
nor homogeneous (because remembrance isolates past moments according to their 
significance, juxtaposing them with scant regard for their logical sequence. 16 
Remembrance, in other words, does not occur in homogeneous time. On the contrary, 
remembrance proceeds as the structuring of time; time becomes configured around the 
significance of a particular memoryfor us. 'Experience [Erfiahrung] accompanies one 
back into the far reaches of time, fulfilling and structuring [gliedert] it. ' 17 What is true 
as a phenomenological description of time experienced in memory is for Benjamin 
also true of time experienced historically, socially and communally. The example he 
often chooses to illustrate this is the temporality of the calendar. 'The inaugural day of 
a calendar functions as an historical time-lapse camera. And it is essentially the same 
day that keeps recurring in the form of holy days [Feiertage], which are days of 
remembrance [Tage des Eingedenkens]. Thus calendars do not tell time like clocks. ' 18 
The characteristics of psychological memory have a correlate on the social level, the 
4 massive abridgement'19 of historical time which the festival day of remembrance 
represents. Remembrance re-collects past time as if the intervening years had not 
occurred, as if the past were not over and done with. 
Memory could represent the past 'as it really was' only if it could establish an 
unbroken homogeneous chain between past and present. Benjamin understood this 
insight to impinge not only upon any theory of memory but also upon the 
comprehension of history. The realism Benjamin finds in (particularly Ranke's) 
'historicism' assumes this homogeneous chain as the medium in which historical 
events take place; homogeneous time becomes the hidden precondition of 
historiographical objectivity. To question such a view of time is to the question any 
16 Cf. GS 5, p. 602 (N 15,1); 'Konvolut 'N" in Gary Smith (ed. ) Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics, 
History, op. cit., p. 74. 
17 GS 1. P. 635; Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in The Era Of High Capitalism, trans. Harry Zohn 
(London: Verso, 1973), p. 136. 
18 GS 1, p. 701-2; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 261. 
19 GS 1, p. 703; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 263. 
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realist pretension within historiography: 'History is the subject of a construction 
[Konstruction] whose site is not homogeneous and empty time, but time filled by the 
now [Jetztzeit]. 120 The argument against seeing time as a purely quantitative 
(homogeneous) continuum rests upon insight into the equally qualitative nature of 
time, something for which Benjamin finds evidence in the phenomenon of 
remembering. It is this process'by which the qualitative aspect of a quantitative series 
makes itself manifest that he terms variously 'now time' or 'the messianiC1.21 The idea 
of quantity passing over into quality, a familiar theme within dialectical philosophy, is 
ascribed here the character of an interruption or subversion. Benjamin finds it in even 
the most mundane experiences of time. 
The temporal order which places its homogeneity above duration 
cannot prevent heterogeneous, outstanding fragments from remaining 
within it. To have combined recognition of a quality with the 
measurement of quantity was the work of the calendars in which places 
of remembrance [Stellen des Eingedenkens] are left blank, as it were, 
in the form of holidays [Feiertagen]. 22 
For Benjamin the experience of time, both in individual, phenomenal terms, in social 
terms and at the level of history, always involves this conflict or contradiction. The 
order of homogeneous time, whilst seemingly given and natural, has in fact only come 
to assume predominance by concealing the equally qualitative character of a temporal 
series. Moreover, Benjamin suggests, this reduction of time to pure quantity has its 
own genesis and history, and his identification of chronology as 'the regulative idea of 
20 IGS 1, p. 701; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 261 (amended). For a discussion of the meaning and 
philosophical status of Benjamin's term Jetztzeit see Peter Osborne, 'Small-scale Victories, Large-scale 
Defeats: Walter Benjamin's Politics of Time' in Andrew Benjamin & Peter Osborne (eds. ), Walter 
Benjamin's Philosophy: Destruction and Experience (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 85-9; also his The 
Politics of Time: Modernity and A vant-Garde (London: Vcrso, 1995), pp. 143-59 
21 The philosophical moment of this messianic model of collective time was already set out in the 
doctoral dissertation on 'The Concept of Art Criticism in German Romanticism' where Benjamin 
contrasts the romantics' 'qualitative (qualitativ]' conception of time with the 'empty infinity [leeren 
Unendlichkeit]' of 'progress', and suggests that this conception of time typifies the romantics' 
'messianism'. (GS 1, p. 91-2). 
22 GS 1, p. 642-3; Charles Baudelaire, p. 144 (amended). 
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wage labour'23 suggest that it is here in the generalisation of the labour process that 
the origins of this reduction will be found. Significantly, the manifestation of the 
qualitative is equated with a liberation from the confines of the abstraction of time; 
both the abstraction and that which points beyond it are thus seen to have political as 
well as philosophical implications. Calendar time manifests this enduring and 
ineradicable presence of the qualitative in the phenomenon of the holiday (literally 
'holy day'), a day which is often itself (Benjamin is thinking particularly of the Jewish 
calendar) a day of remembrance: its situation in the register of social time marks out a 
suspension of temporal and historical homogeneity. But the ambivalent character of 
the calendar also expresses something of the forces which structure the experience of 
time in any given society: thus whilst festivals may constitute 'interruptions' 
(Unterbrechungen) in the normal pattern of lived time, when set against the rhythm of 
the labour process they often function as mere 'palliatives for monotony'. 24 
The exposition of remembrance proceeds in tandem with a diagnosis of the 
'atrophy of experience' (Verkiimmerung der Erfahrung) Benjamin thinks 
characteristic of modernity. 25 These irruptive moments of remembrance transcend 
23 GS 1, p. 636; Charles Baudelaire, p. 137 (amended). 
24 GS 1, p. 1176. It is likely that this anthroplogy of the festival as a 'suspension of marked time' was 
informed by Roger Callois whose paper 'Festival' given to the College de Sociologie in 1938 Benjamin 0 
attended. See Briefe, p. 843; Correspondence, p. 626; also Callois, 'Festival' in Denis Hollier (ed. ), The 
College of Sociology 1937-39 trans. Betsy Wing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 
bsp. pp. 291-2, & p. xxi. 
25 GS 1, p. 611; Charles Baudelaire, p. 113. Critics have noted the importance of Benjamin's 'theory 
of experience' to any understanding of his work but have often overlooked the philosophical heritage of 
the two terms Erfahrung and Erlebnis which frame that account of experience. The term Er ahrung 
gained currency within the Kantian tradition where it represented the subject matter and starting point 
of transcendental philosophy. For Kant, although knowledge begins in Erriahrung, it does not 
exýIusively derive from it. Kant's philosophy sought to address the following question: taking 
experience as given, what are the conditions of its possibility, what conceptual and categorial structures 
make experience possible in the first place? Kant's term is subsequently taken up by Hegel for whom it 
designates the experience which, in its contradictions (including those hypostasised by Kant), 
phenomenology seeks to criticallYe-Ithematise. The etymological root of Erfahrung, Jahren, carries a 
sense of 'to fare, go, or wander', hence the phrase 'to fare well'; it has overtones of an experience 
which is educative rather than merely passive. Erlebnis or 'lived experience' has, by contrast, a more 
recent lineage, gaining currency in twentieth century phenomenology and particularly within the 
tradition of Lebensphilosophie (e. g. Dilthey, Bergson) where it referred to an experience which is 
immediate and unreflective. In German you 'make' an Erfiahrung whereas an Erlebnis 'happens' to you. 
Benjamin takes up this distinction and in turn grounds it in a diagnosis of modernity as the gradual 
substitution of the former by the latter. This, in turn, is understood as a question of the relation between 
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(however temporarily) the isolation and privatisation characteristic of a specifically 
modem form of experience and fuse a social group by means of a common project, 
generating not just a collective remembrance but a remembrance of collectivity. Days 
set aside to commemorate past revolutions are what Benjamin has in mind here. Such 
days involve a doubled remembrance because the events they commemorate were 
themselves acts of remembering: it is in these terms, as a revivification of earlier 
times, that Benjamin describes the French Revolution's leap into the classical past. 
What Marx saw as an unfortunate tendency of revolutions to conjure up the dead of 
world history is portrayed more favourably by Benjamin as an interruption of history's 
flow, evinced in the Revolutionaries' establishment of a new calendar. 26 Benjamin 
finds in such events not simply a politically retarding repetition of past failures but an 
element of novelty, a transformative use of the past in the cause of distancing and 
criticising the present. This dialectic of repetition and novelty in the phenomenon of 
remembrance will have important ramifications for Benjamin's own politicisation of 
the concept. 
It becomes clear that the role played by remembrance in the argument that 
historical time is both quantitative and qualitative is crucial. Indeed it is possible to 
say that remembrance provides the key to Benjamin's critique of homogeneous time. 
This is shown most clearly in the last of the theses 'On the Concept of History' where 
Eingedenken is aligned with a Judaic presentation of history, and both are seen to 
exhibit a structured temporality which contrasts sharply with the prevailing 
homogeneous model. Here remembrance is said to be messianic by virtue of its 
orientation towards the redemptive moments which structure historical time. It holds 
the future open by paradoxically looking to the past, to as-yet-unrealised possibilities. 
Significantly, the final sentence of Benjamin's draft fails to appear in the completed 
version of the 'Theses' - an unaccountable omission because it underlines the 
importance of Eingedenken, showing clearly its fundamental role in articulating the 
messianic conception of historical time. 
experience and tradition: whereas Erfahrung names experience embedded in tradition and collectivity, 
experience learned-from and capable of being passed-on, Erlebnis denotes an experience which is de- 
traditional ised, atomised, it is lived in a present devoid of a past. 
26 GS 1, p. 701-2; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 261-2. 
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Those soothsayers who found out from time what it had in store for 
them did not experience time as either homogeneous or empty. Anyone 
who keeps this in view will get an idea of how the past was 
experienced in remembrance [Eingedenken]: namely in just the same 
way. We know that the Jews were prohibited from investigating the 
future. The Torah and prayers instruct them in remembrance 
[Eingedenken], however.... Remembrance, in which lies the 
quintessence of the Jews' theological presentation of history, 
disenchanted the future of its enslavement to magic. But it did not 
thereby render time empty. For each second of time is the small door 
through which the Messiah might enter. The hinge upon which this 
door turns is remembrance [Eingedenken]. 27 
The 'soothsayers' who found out what time had in store for them did not experience 
time as homogeneous or empty, that is, as predetermined, because they substituted 
retrospection for expectation, and reoriented their sense of history accordingly. 
Prohibited from trying to predict the future they looked instead to the past and found 
in the experience of remembrance a very different model of time than that of 
predetermination. 'Soothsaying', that is, prediction, can take place only where 
successive instants follow one another with causal regularity, where there exists an 
unbroken chain between present and future. To relinquish the attempt to foretell is to 
disenchant the future of its seemingly 'magical' predictability. Remembrance 
disenchants the future by finding hope instead in the past. It yields a conception of 
time and history which is neither linear nor empty but eschatological and messianic. 
Each second of time is found to contain messianic possibilities, the potential for the 
redemptive transformation of the past. This is what Benjamin means in saying that 
'remembrance can make the incomplete (happiness) into something finished, and that 
which is finished (suffering) into something incomplete. ' This ability to give a sense 
of both completeness and of incompleteness to past time is what was contained in the 
27 GS 1, p. 704 & 1252. 
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theological idea of judgement and redemption - eschatology - but here it is rewritten in 
decidedly this-worldly terms. Benjamin concurs with Horkheimer that the question of 
whether or not the past can be redeemed is nothing less than the question of 
'happiness' (GUick) and 'pain' (Schmerz) - this is confirmed in works such as the 
'Theologico-Political Tract' and the 'Theses' where it is argued that 'our image of 
happiness is indissolubly bound up with the image of redemption'. 28 Here the 
experience of time, even on the level of an individual life history, is seen to have a 
dynamic which mirrors the temporal structure found in the theological idea of 
redemption - not only does it Project fulfilment, that projection finds its most eloquent 
expression in the wish to make reparations for the past. The way an individual views 
his or her own past is therefore highly revealing. Benjamin challenges his readers to 
acknowledge that what is stored up in the theological idea of redemption is in fact 
shared by our most intimate conceptions of happiness. Moreover, he urges, it is 
remembrance which is peculiarly privileged to reveal to us the complete or incomplete 
character of that happiness. The internal relation between history and memory is 
expressed here in terms of a common dynamic and a mutual orientation. Not that this 
amounts to a simple teleology, something against which, particularly in its historicist 
form, Benjamin explicitly protests. This dynamic (compared at one point to 
heliotropy) is better understood as an entelechy, which, rather than denoting a 
progressive and linear schema, says only that the present qua unfulfilled projects 
fulfilment. The past experienced in memory has this essentially dynamic, because 
inadequate, character. Benjamin makes it clear that this fulfilment is to be understood 
as an interruption rather than a culmination, a view for which he a finds a precedent in 
the messianic idea where the time of redemption actually differs markedly from 
teleology: there, 'the Messiah breaks [bricht] history; the Messiah does not appear at 
the end of a development'. 29 
A Taxonomy of Memory 
28 GS 1, p. 693; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 254. 
29 GS 1, p. 1243. 
26 
To understand further the distinctive role played by remembrance (Eingedenken) in 
Benjamin's work it is important to note the characteristics which distinguish it from 
the other concepts he uses to categorise memory, and the varying contexts and senses 
in which each are used. Although a recurring theme of works from this later period of 
Benjamin's intellectual career, it is not employed univocally. Whilst continuities exist 
between its use in the 1929 essay on Proust and later works such as the Arcades 
Project and the 'Theses', its invocation in the 1936 essay on Nikolai Leskov, 'The 
Storyteller' appears as something of an anomoly, not least because of the subsidiary 
role it plays with respect to other forms of memory. Memory (Erinnerung) taken in its 
widest sense is there understood to be the mediating factor between experience and 
tradition, it 'establishes the chain of tradition that hands events down from generation 
to generation. 130 Likewise it serves as the means by which the historical past is 
transmitted: historiography is nothing other than 'the record which memory keeps'. 31 
Benjamin proceeds to subdivide memory according to the manner in which it 'passes 
on' experience. His particular preoccupation in this essay is (following Lukdcs' 
Theory of the Novel) 'epic forms' and the relation each holds to tradition: informed by 
Lukdcs' temporally-grounded aesthetic distinctions, Benjamin contrasts the form of 
tradition in the novel with that transmitted in the story. Eingedenken is equated here 
with the 'muse-derived element of the novel, ' it is 'dedicated to the one hero, one 
6dyssey, one battle' in contrast to 'the many diffuse occurrences' which the 
storyteller's memory (Geddchtnis) records. 32 Taken together the two form a unity 
Erinnerung which preserves something of the 'creative indifference' of the various 
epic forms but which, with the decline of the epic, is already on the point of 
disappearance. Benjamin's play on the ein of Eingedenken is not theorised here or 
followed-through in detail elsewhere, and when the term is mentioned again its sense 
has shifted. 
In a work from 1932 both Geddchtnis and Erinnerung appear in slightly different 
guise. 'A Berlin Chronicle' theorises and thernatises memory in the form of 
30 GS 2, p. 453; 'The Storyteller' in Illuminations, p. 98 
31 GS 2, p. 453; 'The Storyteller' in Illuminations, p. 97 (amended). 
32 GS 2, p. 453-4; 'The Storyteller' in Illuminations. p. 98 
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autobiographical recollections of Benjamin's own childhood. Here it is not so much 
the temporal as the spatial dimension of mnemonic concepts which is highlighted, 
memory's internal topography taken together with the external geography which it 
invests: 
Language shows clearly that memory [Geddchtnis] is not an instrument 
for exploring the past but its theatre [Schauplatz]. It is the medium of 
past experience, as the ground is the medium in which dead cities lie 
interred. He who seeks to approach his own buried past must conduct 
himself like a man digging. This confers the tone and bearing of 
genuine recollections [Erinnerungen]. He must not be afraid to return 
again and again to the same matter; to scatter it as one scatters earth, to 
turn it over as one turns over soil. For the matter itself is only a deposit, 
a stratum, which yields only to the most meticulous examination what 
constitutes the real treasure hidden within the earth: the images, 
severed from all earlier associations, that stand - like precious 
fragments or torsos in a collector's gallery - in the prosaic rooms of our 
later understanding. True, for successful excavations a plan is needed. 
Yet no less indispensable is the cautious probing of the spade in the 
dark loam, and it is to cheat oneself of the richest prize to preserve as a 
record merely the inventory of one's discoveries, and not this dark joy 
of the finding itself. Fruitless searching is as much a part of this as 
succeeding, and consequently recollection [Erinnerung] must not 
proceed in the manner of a narrative or still less that of a report, but 
must, in the strictest epic and rhapsodic manner, assay its spade in 
ever-new places, and in the old ones delve to ever-deeper layers. 33 
The use of Geddchtnis and Erinnerung is of particular interest here. Geddchtnis is 
described as the ground or the 'theatre' in which the past is to be found; Erinnerung as 
an archaeological find. Employing metaphors similar to those used by Freud, 
33 GS 6, p. 486-7; trans. 'A Berlin Chronicle' in One-Way Street, p. 314 (amended). 
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Benjamin describes memory as 'a deposit [Lagerungen], a stratum [Schichten]' which 
must be 'scattered' or 'turned over' in recollection much as one turns over soil. The 
excavation of recollections from the ground of memory entails that they be 'severed 
from all earlier associations', a description which indicates the destructive character of 
recollection, and points towards a technique of temporal juxtaposition which 
Benjamin would employ elsewhere. It is as if the disturbing of the ground, the 
destruction of the original context in which an object lies buried, is inevitable if that 
object is to be unearthed. But it is not simply the process of excavation which is 
important here; what subsequently occurs to the archaeologist's find is also cruciaL 'It 
is to cheat oneself of the richest prize to preserve as a record merely the inventory of 
one's discoveries, and not this dark joy of the finding itself. ' What the 'inventory' 
names here is a particular way of encountering the past such that what is remembered 
is to be preserved in strictly factual and (thus inviolable) form. Benjamin suggests that 
such a distanced, positivist attitude may in fact militate against a 'genuine' encounter 
with the past. By implication, if it is to succeed in its task, the interest or the will 
behind memory must be acknowledged. 
As the field upon which recollection takes place Geddchtnis names a largely 
passive medium. In Irving Wohlfarth's words it 'represents memory as a noun, a 
substantial, quasi-spatial, dextensive' entity. 134 As its active partner, Erinnerung 
denotes an act of interiorisation or gathering-together ('re-collection' is a reasonably 
kcurate translation. )35 The passive sense of Geddchinis, expressed here by means of 
spatial metaphors, along with the more active, 'destructive' role ascribed to 
Erinnerung is repeated in Benjamin's writings on Baudelaire. At one point he pauses 
to examine the model of memory at work in Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
and compares it with those of a pupil of Freud, Theodor Reik: "The function of 
34 Irving Wohlfarth, 'On the Messianic Structure of Walter Benjamin's Last Reflections', op. cit., p. 
197. The idea of memory as a 'theatre' and the account of space and time it implies has a long history 
within traditions of thought (such as neo-Platonism) with which Benjamin was familiar. On the history 
of this idea see Frances Yates, The Art of Memory (London: Pimlico, 1992). 
35 Various critics have noted the Hegelian resonances of this term. However, Benjamin nowhere 
appears to engage with Hegel's view of knowledge as recollection, and it would be hasty to view - as do 0 
Wohlfarth, ['The Messianic Structure', op. cit., p. 191] and subsequently Rebecca Comay ['Benjamin's 
Endgame' in Andrew Benjamin & Peter Osborne (eds. ), Walter Benjamin's Philosophy, op. cit., p. 2551 
- the preference of Eingedenken over Erinnerung as an implicit criticism of Hegel. 
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memories [Geddchtnisses], ' Reik writes, 'is the protection of impressions; 
recollection (Erinnerung] aims at their disintegration. Memory is essentially 
conservative, recollection is destructive. " 36 Reik's opposition serves to clarify what is 
for Benjamin the mnemonic component of a specifically modem form of experience, 
one in which fleeting and disconnected stimuli and unassimilated shocks have become 
the norm. In this way Reik's distinction mirrors Proust's contrast between 
'involuntary and voluntary remembrance [Eingedenken]'37, where the voluntary 
memory actually destroys impressions in bringing to consciousness what were 
originally unconscious stimuli. Benjamin quotes Freud: 'memory fragments are 'often 
most powerful and enduring when the incident which left them behind was one that 
never entered consciousness'. Translated into Proustian terms, this means that only 
what has not been experienced explicitly and consciously, what has not happened to 
the subject as an experience [Erlebnis] can become a component of the memoire 
involontaire. 138 The unconscious in fact preserves memory traces more thoroughly 
than consciousness, because this process of neutralisation has never had a chance to 
occur. However, because they entered the psyche surreptitiously, these shock-like 
experiences may be revived only by another involuntary association. 
One more concept should be noted before this outline of Benjamin's taxonomy of 
memory is complete. It is to be found in a set of fragments from 1938-9 entitled 
'Central Park' and, although it was gestured towards in the image of the 'inventory', it 
iepresents a distinct form of memory. It is termed Andenken, the 'memento' or 
$souvenir' (again the etymological root denken is noteworthy) and whilst implying a 
particular object of memory it also denotes a specific manner in which the subject 
relates to his or her past, a relation which assumes an appropriative, commodified 
form. 'The souvenir [das Andenken] is the complement of 'experiences' [des 
'Erlebnisses']. It crystallises the increasing self-alienation of the man who inventories 
his past as dead possessions. ' In cultivating this acquisitive memory the subject has 
'evacuated the surrounding world in order to settle in the inner world. ' The souvenir 
'derives from deceased experience [Erfahrung] which calls itself, euphemistically, 
36 GS 1, p. 612; Charles Baudelaire, p. 114 (amended). 
37 GS 1, p. 612; Charles Baudelaire, p. 114. 
38 GS 1, p. 612-3; Charles Baudelaire, p. 114 (amended). 
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'lived' [Erlebnis]. 139 In Andenken, the subject's relation to their temporal past 
assumes the character of a lived experience, but more than this, the relation becomes 
ossified and acquisitive, the investment of memory in things becomes a spur to their 
ownership or 'collection': 'the distant is captured in the interior like the past in a 
cabinet of waxworks. 140 Although it appears as if the withdrawal of things from the 
realm of circulation strips them of their commodity character, in fact it also succeeds 
in ridding them of their use-value. Andenken consolidates the alienation of experience 
even in the attempt to transcend it. 
It is clear that this quaternary taxonomy - memory (Geddchtnis), recollection 
(Erinnerung), remembrance (Eingedenken) and the memento (Andenken) - is closely 
related to Benjamin's theory of experience. Erinnerung is typically used to describe a 
form of memory bound up with tradition and serving as the means by which that 
tradition is handed-on. Similarly, Eingedenken refers to a memory embedded in 
tradition, history, sociality, but one which exhibits a transformative and critical 
relation to that tradition. Geddchtnis is sometimes used in this sense also, as a memory 
destructive of the past, but more typically it refers to the sedimented ground deposited 
by tradition which is itself to be disturbed and excavated. Andenken appears as the 
objectified, reified form of an acqusitive tendency in memory, a tendency which 
Benjamin often expresses in terms of a corresponding character type, 'the collector', 
shorthand for an inwardly distended subjectivity. Evoking Marx's critique of 
commodity fetishism and Weber's genealogy of Innerlichkeit, Benjamin exposes the 
individualism and artificiality with which this subjectivity experiences time. 
Each of the four concepts of memory performs a specific function in Benjamin's 
theory of modernity and in the critical historiography which his writings both theorise 
and enact. Significantly, each is ascribed particular spatial or temporal characteristics, 
something which links them (even if negatively, as with Andenken) to history and to 
39 GS 1, p. 681; 'Central Park', trans. Lloyd Spencer, New German Critique 34 (Winter 1985), p. 49 
(amended). 
40 GS 5, p. 1208. Adorno added a dialectical twist to Benjamin's argument by suggesting that the 
cultivation of 'inwardness' (Innerlichkeit) paradoxically 'rescues and actualises [the past] through 
. 
flerlichung)'. [Briefe, p. 681; Correspondence, p. 502 (amended)]. This idea 'externalisation' (Verdu 
that memory made one's 'ownmost' is also memory at its most externalised or alienated is reworked in 
an important passage in Adorno's Minima Moralia. For a discussion of its implications see Chapter Six, 
below. 
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tradition. What is noteworthy for the present discussion is the privileged role played 
by one of these concepts in accomplishing that redemptive encounter with the past 
which is so central to Benjamin's critical project. Typically it is Eingedenken which 
plays this (literally) pivotal role of articulating the past, of providing a unique 
engagement with historical events such that their affinity with the present is made 
manifest. To understand the significance of Eingedenken means recognising this 
privilege it assumes within the taxonomy of memory. 41 It is revealing therefore that it 
appears frequently in Benjamin's philosophical statements of and reflections upon his 
own critical practice, works such as 'Konvolut 'N", the set of notes on the 'theory of 
the knowledge of history', and the similarly 'erkenntnistheoretischen'42 theses 'On the 
Concept of History'. The concept of remembrance performs much of the labour of 
Benjamin's attempt to establish a critical 'method' by which historiography and the 
philosophy of history might be radicalised. The philosophical difficulties this method 
subsequently encounters and the questions it raises will be crucial for the success of 
his project more generally. 
History as Remembrance 
The fact that the concept of Eingedenken, as one commentator has noted, 'is given 
sustained theoretical consideration only toward the late 1920s'43 is significant in that it 
indicates that it will bear the hallmarks of the shifting emphasis of Benjamin's work 
which occurred during the mid-1920s, namely the qualification of his Jewish 
messianism with elements of Marxism. The concept can with justification be expected 
41 Whilst the present discussion is indebted to Wohlfarth's excellent study of these concepts of 
memory, it takes issue with the relative privilege he accords to each. The fact that he reads Benjamin's 
reflections on memory through the lens of the essay 'The Storyteller' leads him to see Geddchtnis and 
Eingedenken as playing an equally important role. In fact that essay is the only place in which 
Geddchtnis plays any. significant part; elsewhere it is Eingedenken which performs the critical task of 
redemptively articulating the past. 
42 Adorno, 'Charakteristik Walter Benjamins' in Prismen, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann 
(Frankfurt am Main, 1970-), vol. 10, part 1, p. 250; 'A Portrait of Walter Benjamin', in Prisms, op. cit., 
p. 238. 
43 Aris Fioretos, 'Contraction (Benjamin, Reading, History)', loc. cit. 
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to carry the simultaneously 'theological' and 'materialist' characteristics which 
distinguish his thought more generally from that point onward. 44 And such a view 
finds confirmation in the exchange with Horkheimer. That remembrance outlines a 
view of history which is both theological and atheological points out the weakness 
both of Horkheimer's objection as well as more recent attempts to construe the 
concept in exclusively theological terms. It seems as if Horkheimer unaccountably 
neglects the dual character of Benjamin's thought or wishes him to relinquish one 
element of it. Whichever it is, the criticisms miss their mark. As Rolf Tiedemann 
comments, 'the fact that the theorem of the incompleteness of the work of the past is 
theological is thus, for Benjamin, no basis for criticism. 145 It is no basis for criticism 
because of the manner in which he employs theological concepts, a way which always 
exceeds an exclusively theological meaning. The idea of historical incompleteness is 
one such idea which is not limited to an exclusively theological context. Horkheimer's 
objection is met because the redemption of the past in remembrance can equally be 
expressed in materialist terms, as the action of collective forms of memory or of an 
historiographical practice. The incompleteness of the past can be articulated without a 
discourse of God and without an eschatology (at least as traditionally understood). 
In responding to Horkheimer, Benjamin not only clarifies his own peculiar mix of 
theology and materialism but implicitly distinguishes his own approach to history 
from that of an historical science. 'The corrective to [Horkheimer's] line of thought 
44 Benjamin's second reply to Horkheimer pre-empts the running debate in the secondary literature 
over the continuit or discontinuity of his own ouevre, a dispute over whether something like an y0 
epistemological break occurs in his writings during the mid-1920s. The more perceptive commentators 
have recognised that his 'early' 'theological' framework is not ultimately incompatible with his 'later' 
'Marxian' framework. Thus Michael Ldwy argues that 'communism and historical materialism did not 
supplant his old spiritualist and libertarian-romantic convictions; rather, they amalgamated with them 
and, in so doing, constituted a singular and unique form of thought. ' (Michael L6wy, Redemption and 
Utopia: Jewish Libertarian Thought in Central Europe: A Study in Elective Affinity trans. Hope 
Heaney (London: AthIone, 1992), p. 97). In similar terms Irving Wohlfarth contends that 'nowhere in 
Benjamin's writings are theology and materialism ... ultimately at odds with one another. 
' (Irving 
Wohlfarth, 'On Some Jewish Motifs in Benjamin' in Andrew Benjamin (ed. ), The Problems of 
Modernity: Adorno and Benjamin (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 202). Bernd Witte writes of 
'Benjamin's more radical nihilism ... charging worldly actions with religious meaning while at the same 
time destroying religion's theological content... ' (Bernd Witte, Walter Benjamin: An Intellectual 
Biography, trans. 1. Rolleston (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 199 1), p. 17 1). 
45 Rolf Tiedemann, 'Historical Materialism or Political Messianism? ', in Gary Smith (ed. ), op. cit., p. 
182. 
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lies in the reflection that history is not only a science [Wissenschaft], but no less a 
form of remembrance [Eingedenken]. ' By 'science' Benjamin appears to intend 
several things - not only the assumptions behind Horkheimer's view of the 
completeness of the past, but also the positivism of an historical methodology drawn 
from the natural sciences. The so-called 'scientific character' of history is established 
only by the 'complete eradication of everything that recalls its original vocation as 
remembrance'. 46 History fails to correspond to a science because of the essential part 
played by memory in articulating past time. To recognise that history, like an 
individual past, can be viewed only by a transformative process of remembering is to 
acknowledge both the interests and the situation of the historian, and to relinquish, any 
attempt to bracket-out subjectivity from the act of apprehending the historical object: 
'the historian is bound to explain in one way or another the happenings with which he 
deals. 147 It follows that 'to articulate the past historically does not mean to recognise it 
'the way it really was' [wie es denn eigentlich gewesen ist] (Ranke). 148 Indeed the 
supposed objectivity and neutrality of historical facts typically conceals an 
unacknowledged set of values or an unintended allegiance. This can occur even when 
the subjective component is made explicit, as in Dilthey's contention that 'empathy' is 
a transcendental condition of the 're-creation' of the past. 49 Dilthey's insight certainly 
takes historiography further than the dogmatic realism of Ranke, but only to raise a 
more. serious question of exactly with whom the historian empathises. Whilst 
something of the subjective dimension introduced by hermeneutics is paralleled in 
Benjamin's equation of history and memory, his awareness that empathy may 
unwittingly consolidate the repression of particular pasts highlights his divergence 
from that approach; here recognition of the role of subjectivity aims at historical truths 
unavailable to a conflict-free hermeneutics, and the acknowledgement of perspectives 
46 GS 1. p. 123 1. 
47 GS 2, p. 45 1; 'The Storyteller' in Illuminations, p. 96. 
48 GS 1, p. 695; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 255. Benjamin alludes to a programmatic statement of 
Ranke's: 'History has had assigned to it the office of judging the past and of instructing the present for 
the benefit of the future ages. To such high offices the present work does not presume: it seeks only to 
show what actually happened [wie es eigentlich gewesen]. ' [Leopold von Ranke, excerpt from History 
of the Latin and Teutonic Nations in Roger Wines (ed. ), The Secret of World History: Selected Writings 
on the Art and Science of History (New York: Fordharn University Press, 198 1), p. 5 8]. 
49 GS 5, p. 587 (N7,6). 
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does not lead to perspectivism. The notion of 'construction' as a critical 
historiographical method (of which more will be said in Chapter Two) is designed to 
circumvent the relativism which his critique of historical science appears to court. 
In one respect it appears plausible to counter that the equation of history and 
remembrance has merely subjectivised history. If, as was argued above, it is this 
alignment which grounds Benjamin's critique of homogeneous time, then it does seem 
as if the phenomenal experience of time (as structured, heterogeneous, etc. ) has 
merely been substituted for the real (sequential, homogeneous) time of the natural 
sciences with the result that time becomes in its sheerly phenomenal character, 
arbitrary. A defence of Benjamin on this point requires that his argument be 
understood more dialectically, as an awareness of time's simultaneously quantitative 
and qualitative character. The natural sciences and the practice of time measurement 
hypostasise or abstract from the former thereby neglecting its derivative nature, they 
overlook the fact that measurement itself is an (inter-) subjective project with 
qualitative aims and repercussions: this is clear both in terms of the instrumental 
reasoning of a natural science with respect to its object, the natural world; it is equally 
true of the labour proces s, as Benjamin is keen to underline. But he takes the dialectics 
of quantity further by giving it a materialist twist: with the predominance of a 
scientific rationality and the extension and generalisation of the labour process the 
quantitative character of time takes on a significant reality. The experience of time in 
such a world is, in many respects uniform, continuous, repetitive. 50 Homogeneous 
time can be said to represent a real or 'determinate abstraction' in just the sense Marx 
understood the categories of political economy such as labour and money: they 
express (albeit uncritically) a contingent historical reality. It is in this way that 
Benjamin's view of time avoids arbitrariness, and the charge of phenomenalism may 
be countered. 
This sheds light on the difference between Benjamin's reflections and Bergson's 
criticism of 'spatialised' conceptions of time. Whilst the two share much in common, 
notably the idea that memory 'is decisive for the philosophical structure of 
50 Cf. Irvina Wohlfarth, 'On The Messianic Structure of Walter Benjamin's Last Reflections'. op. cit., 0 
p. 207, n. 34: 'The "continuity" of the past is both historicist ideology and historical reality. Each 
cements the other. ' 
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experience', 51 there is an important difference between them, and Benjamin's 
argument that Bergson's philosophy remains unaware of its own social preconditions, 
is telling. Where Bergson errs is in seeing spatialised time as a mere category mistake 
since this overlooks its contingent reality, recognition of which gave Benjamin's 
critique its dialectical, critical character. The historical determination of experience, 
this real process of abstraction, appears in Bergson only negatively, as that against 
which he reacts in privileging a preconscious temporal becoming - duree - 
subsequently constrained and misrepresented in the form of spatialised time. 
It was important for Benjamin to distinguish his own reflections on the 
interrelation of time, memory and experience from those found in Lebensphilosophie, 
and highlighting the dimension of tradition concealed in each was the chief means by 
which this was to be achieved. His criticisms of (particularly Bergson's) life- 
philosophy clarify Benjamin's own understanding of these phenomena, underlining 
the fact that whilst history is a form of memory, memory is equally historical in its 
implicit reliance upon tradition, even in its most subjective and spontaneous 
expressions. Incognizance of tradition is exemplified in Bergson's view of the relation 
of memory to time, and in his distinction between a 'vita activa' and a 'vita 
contemplativa' in the apprehension of the past. Bergson assumes that access to the 
stream of life can be freely undertaken, something which sets him apart from Proust's 
subsequent use of the dualism. The distinction between 'learned' and 'spontaneous' 
memory, between the conscious representation of the past and mere habit or 
association, 52 is adopted by Proust but with a privilege accorded this time to latter, 
now redefined as mimoire involontaire. For Proust the reactivation of 'lost time' will 
typically come only with an involuntary encounter with some previously known 
sensory object; 53 the voluntary memory is reserved for processing and recording the 
associational. chain initiated by that encounter. 
Benjamin offers criticisms of both views of memory but his greater sympathies 
lie with Proust, something which will have far-reaching implications for his own 
51 GS 1. P. 608; Charles Baudelaire, p. 110 (amended). 
52 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul & W. Scott Palmer (New York: 
Zone, 1991), pp. 81-3. 
53 See for instance Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, vol. 1, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff & 
Terence Kilmartin, revised by D. J. Enright (London: Chatto & Windus, 1992), p. 51. 
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historical and historiographical translation of this mnemonic dualism. Benjamin 
thinks that Bergson's search for a pure temporal substrate, like Proust's assumption 
that the subject can receive their past only involuntarily, are in fact two sides of the 
same experiential coin, and the lack of awareness of history in each approach is 
tellina. A common mode of experience forms the backdrop against which each of 
these two models of memory become plausible, so that the philosophical task 
becomes not one of determining the respective priority of the voluntary or the 
involuntary but of historically and genealogically tracing the formation of this dualism 
and recognising the will behind it. Thus Bergson's durie is described as 'the 
quintessence of a passing moment [Erlebnis] that struts around in the borrowed garb 
of experience [Erfahrungll, 54 implying that if experience is to be learned-from rather 
than merely lived-through in preconscious manner then it must become cognizant of 
its own tradition, the historical frame within which even the most intimate and 
apparently immediate experiences occur. Similarly, in the attempt to ground 
temporality in 'life' there lies a wilful refusal of the finitude of mortality: 'The durle, 
from which death has been eliminated, has the bad infinity [schlechte Unendlichkeit] 
of an ornament. '55 Here awareness of history is also awareness of finitude, something 
which both explains and yet ultimately frustrates the wish for some permanent 
substratum to experience. Proust, more aware of tradition and its deterioration 
4attempts to produce experience (Erfahrung) synthetically' because 'under today's 
donditions ... there is less and less hope that 
it will come into being naturally. 156 His 
writing attempts to synthesise Erfahrung out of isolated Erlebnisse, because the 
tradition by which experience was once handed-on has been all but destroyed. But it is 
only in the form of a solitary 'life history' that the past is thereby granted to the 
present: 'there is nothing more ingenious or more loyal than the way in which he 
nonchalantly and constantly strives to tell the reader: Redemption is my private 
show. 157 
54 GS 1, p. 643; Charles Bdudelaire, p. 145. 
55 GS 1, p. 643; Charles Baudelaire, p. 145 (amended). 
56 GS 1, P. 609; Charles Baudelaire, p. I 11. 
57 GS 1, p. 643, n.; Charles Baudelaire, p. 145, n. 80. 
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Both the Bergsonian and the Proustian accounts of memory can only gesture 
towards an emphatic sense of experience, and it is here that the concept of 
remembrance serves to bridge the divide set up by each, allowing critical evaluation of 
their ahistorical and individualist presuppositions. 
Where there is experience [Erfahrung] in the strict sense of the word, 
certain moments of the individual past come into conjunction in 
memory [Geddchtnis] with material of the collective past. The rituals 
with their ceremonies, their festivals (quite probably nowhere recalled 
in Proust's work), kept producing the amalgamation of these two 
elements of memory [voluntary and involuntary] over and over again. 
They triggered remembrance [Eingedenken] at certain times and 
remained handles of memory for a lifetime. In this way, voluntary and 
involuntary remembrance lose their mutual exclusiveness. 58 
Passages such as this show the extent to which, despite his criticisms, Benjamin 
accepts the terms of debate established by Bergson and Proust, and seeks only to show 
the possibility of their reconciliation. It also implies that the diagnosis of a 
deterioration of experience -a development he sees uncritically recapitulated in 
Lebensphilosophie and parried in Proustian life history - has to be understood in a 
4ualified way if it is to be sustained. It is not just that a personalised and de- 
traditionalised conception of memory is uncritical; it can only provide part of the 
picture. What it leaves out is the fact that memory is not wholly restricted to working 
with immediate and spontaneous experiences but, when occurring in a social or 
collective form, can be brought (at least partly) within the realm of deliberation. By 
implication, the atrophy of experience attendant upon modernity, though pervasive, is 
not complete or total; whilst remembrance may appear interstitial and threatened it 
retains considerable powers. The encounter with an historical past at the level of the 
collective is not entirely dependent upon chance, even if the atornisation of experience 
will make fortuitous events of reminiscence the norm. The extent to which Benjamin 
58 GS 1, p. 611; Charles Baudelaire, p. 113 (amended) 
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sees this deterioration of experience as entrenched is indicated by his own acceptance 
of an element of the involuntary in collective remembrance and in historiographical 
practice. This emerges more clearly in his attempt to use the surrealist technique of 
montage as a method of historical construction and as a means of historical 
knowledge. It implies that the fusion of voluntary and involuntary has a counterfactual 
aspect to it: it is just as much the goal of Benjamin's critical practice as it is one of its 
axioms. 
This lends an embattled quality to remembrance since that which allows critical 
reflection upon the atrophy of experience is itself threatened by that very process of 
atrophy. Whilst experience in its emphatic form persists in Eingedenken, 59 it remains 
as marginalised as days of remembrance in an otherwise forgetful calendar. Yet 
despite this, the power Benjamin finds in remembrance is considerable: 'our life is, as 
it were, a muscle strong enough to contract the whole of historical time'. 60 Insight into 
the capacity of Eingedenken to confer a character of both completeness or of openness 
to historical time, to highlight the affection by which the past is constituted, makes it 
possible in turn to cultivate a critical practice (historico-philosophical, 
historiographical) which can replicate these effects of opening or fulfilment, can 
subject the past to destruction or, equally, construct it in a new way. From Benjamin's 
insight into the transformative capacities of remembrance follow the fundaments of 
his critical practice. 
It is in this way that the exchange with Horkheimer over the complete or 
incomplete, the closed or open character of the past, proves decisive for Benjamin's 
project as a whole, setting out the philosophical preconditions for his redemptive 
criticism. It, is now clear that it is remembrance which realises this open or incomplete 
character of the past, the capacity for the past to be affected (betroffen) by the present. 
The exposition of remembrance meets Horkheimer's demand that incompleteness be 
perceived dialectically, that completeness be contained within it. It is precisely 
because history's original vocation is remembrance that it exhibits this 'paradoxical 
structure of completenessfincompleteness. 61 Whilst Horkheimer's reservation that the 
59 GS 1, p. 637; Charles Baudelaire, p. 139. 
60 GS 5, p. 600 (N I 3a, 1); 'Konvolut 'N", op. cit., p. 7 1. 
61 Peter Osborne, 'Small-scale Victories, Large-Scale Defeats... ', op. cit., p. 88. 
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notion of incompleteness is 'idealistic' or even 'theological' is understandable, it can 
be seen to have overlooked the more subtle interweaving of theological and secular 
ideas in the 'Theses' in particular and in Benjamin's philosophy at large. Reading the 
invocation of theologic4l motifs in this dialectical sense, as an equally secular attempt 
to understand historical change and discontinuity as well as the retroactive effect of 
memory, it is possible to construe the Benjamin-Horkheimer debate as setting out 
something very significant: an account of the openness of historical and temporal 
concepts which would avoid the closure of a crude materialism, but also. the spurious 
indeterminacy of categories such as infinity and progression. 
More will be said of this attempt to differentiate the paradoxical openness of 
history from a 'bad infinite' in Chapter Three; there it is shown how the dialectic of 
openness and completion necessitates a revaluation of eschatology, and a critical 
engagement with 'rational messianism' (Scholem). Firstly, however, Chapter Two 
examines further the simultaneously destructive and constructive qualities Benjamin 
ascribes to memory, looking more closely at the development of Eingedenken in the 
essay on Proust and in the Passagen-Werk, and the question of just how the past is to 
be constructed in a way which will avoid the complicity Benjamin finds in existing 
historiography and philosophies of history. 
40 
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The Construction of Imperfection 
Introduction 
The concept of history which appears in Benjamin's late work is formulated in the 
imperfect tense. It is staked upon the belief that nothing historical can be said to have 
passed unequivocally into perfection, into completion: 'nothing that has ever 
happened should be regarded as lost for history. " The recurring theme of these late 
writings is an attempt to formulate historical and temporal concepts which would do 
justice to this openness of the 'historical object'. Benjamin understood this idea of 
history's openness to have considerable implications for both historiography and the 
philosophy of history, and to pose a serious challenge to each of these disciplines. 
When commentators have recognised the philosophical challenge posed by these last 
works, they have usually been interpreted as an indictment of the Enlightenment idea 
6f universal history, and lauded or discredited accordingly. In what follows it will 
become clear that, on the contrary, Benjamin's reflections continue an Enlightenment 
preoccupation with attempting to understand history as a totality, and that 
consequently they do not diverge as fundamentally as might be thought from the 
concepts of history found in German Idealism. But Benjamin's intent is not simply to 
restate the fundaments of an Enlightenment view of history but to radicalise them by 
subjecting them to criticism. What this criticism or 'destruction' of universal history 
achieves is to clear a space for a construction in which the universal can appear, but, 
crucially, by dispelling a historiographical illusion in which existing universal history 
was itself complicit. Both moments of this project, the destructive and the 
I GS 1, p. 694; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 254. 
constructive, are vital to the revaluation of universal history; "construction' 
presupposes 'destruction". 2 Benjamin's distinctive contribution to the philosophy of 
history is therefore to be found in his characterisation of universal history as the 
fiection, 'imperfection' here understood in its double sense as construction of imper 
denoting a still-active and yet fragmentary past. The precise nature of this destruction 
is 
and construction remains to be examined and assessed, and it 4 this which forms the 
central concern of the present chapter. It will be shown that again it is remembrance 
which assumes a pivotal role in effecting both that destruction and construction of the 
past which Benjamin seeks, and which in turn allows the development of an 
alternative conception of universal history. Accordingly, an examination of the 
simultaneously destructive and constructive powers of memory will be paramount 
here. Because it is destruction which, as construction's 'presupposition', takes logical 
priority, it is appropriate for it to assume temporal priority in the exposition and 
evaluation that follows. 
-bk ger 
2 GS 5, p. 587 (N 7,6); 'Konvolut'N", p. 60. 
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'the passionfor destruction is also a constructive passion' 
Mikhail Bakunin, Protestation of the Alliance 
The Destructive Character of Memory 
In the essay 'The Image of Proust' Benjamin writes of the peculiar manner in which 
Proust's reminiscences apprehend the past. 'We know that in his work Proust did not 
describe a life as it actually was [wie es gewesen ist], but a life as it was remembered 
by the one who had lived it. 13 The distinction between a past represented 'as it was' 
and 'as it was remembered' is crucial for Benjamin because it captures something not 
only about individual reminiscence but about the way the historical past is 
encountered too. An examination of the phenomenal character of memory can 
illuminate much concerning how history is represented and conceptualised. What can 
be predicated of memory can equally be predicated of history, not by mere analogy but 
because of the internal relation between the two - history is itself a form of 
lemembrance. Benjamin's questioning of the desire to recall the past 'as it was' thus 
proceeds on two fronts, although in the last instance both are understood to be 
dialectically entwined. Proust's construction of a 'life history' exemplifies the former, 
psychological sense of anti-realism because it acknowledges the role of time in 
enabling yet also compromising the representation of the past. Proust observes that 
'memory by itself, when it introduces the past, unmodified, into the present - the past 
just as it was at the moment when it was itself the present - suppresses the mighty 
dimension of Time which is the dimension in which life is lived. '4 'Time' here refers 
to the interval between present and past which frustrates the wish to retrieve 
3 GS 2, p. 311; 'The Image of Proust', Illuminations, p. 202. 
4 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, Vol. 6. - Time Regained, trans. Andreas Mayor (London: Chatto 
& Windus, 1970), p. 450. 
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experiences in unadulterated form. To recognise time's effect means to acknowledge 
what Proust calls the 'weaving of memory', the 're-formation' of the past in 
reminiscence. This transformative characteristic of psychological memory is 
subsequently made thematic in Benjamin's own reminiscences, particularly in the way 
he distinguishes tho§e reminiscences from autobiography: 'For autobiography has to 
do with time, with sequence and what makes up the continuous flow of life. Here I am 
talking of a space, of moments and discontinuities. For even if months and years [i. e. 
chronology, measured time] appear here, it is in the form they have at the moment of 
remembrance [Augenblick des Eingedenkens]. This strange form - it may be called 
fleeting or eternal - is in neither case the stuff that life is made of. '5 The second front 
upon which this questioning of realism in memory proceeds is historical, and it shares 
much with the first. Benjamin's intent is again to show the concealed assumptions 
concerning time - in particular those concerning temporal sequence and continuity - 
which underlie a realist view of the past. The theoretical statements of his own 
historiographical practice set off sharply his own approach to 'articulating the past' 
from such realism. Thus in the theses 'On the Concept of History' he attacks any 
historical study which seeks to 'recognise' (erkennen) the past 'the way it really was' 
(wie es eigentlich gewesen). 6 Here his dispute is with the collusions involved in such 
attempts at authenticity and the naive apprehension of historical time upon which they 
rest; his concern is to highlight the interest concealed by the supposed 'objectivity' 
and 'neutrality' of historical facts. This objectivity, Benjamin contends, belies a 
deeper truth that the history which is handed down to the present is one in which the 
victorious in each social or ideological conflict have more or less effectively written- 
out those whom they have conquered. Any historical analysis - and the historicism 
targeted by Benjamin is exemplary in this respect - will remain hermeneutically 
uncritical until it appreciates this violently exclusive constitution of its object. The 
project of recalling the past 'as it really happened' can only recapitulate a history 
whose continuity is established by the erasure of anomalies and the elision of ruptures, 
the historiographical correlate of historical conflict. Historical interpretation, 
5 GS 6, p. 488; 'A Berlin Chronicle' in One- Way Street & Other Writings, p. 316 (amended). 
6 GS 1, p. 695; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 255 (amended). 
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Benjamin urges, is riven by the same conflicts which structure history itself, and 
historiography, if it is to have anything other than an apologetic character, must 000 
register such conflicts and the historical discontinuities to which they give rise. 
Benjamin often moves seamlessly between these two-senses of anti-realism, the 
psychological and the historical, indicating that he sees no unbridgeable divide 
between the spheres of 'personal' and 'collective' memory. The importance of a new 
conception of memory for each is clear: when applied to history the recognition of the 
impossibility of capturing in memory the 'authenticity' of the remembered experience 
has significant repercussions; but in the sphere of the personal or the psychological 
too it effects a shift in the terms within which memory is usually conceived. What 
sets-off the Proustian work of remembrance from realism is its affirmation of the 
transformative effect of remembrance upon the past, an acknowledgement that this 
transformation is a necessary condition of that past's re-presentation. Benjamin writes: 
'For the important thing for the remembering author is not what he experienced, but 
the weaving of his memory, the Penelope work of remembrance [Eingedenken]. Or 
should one call it rather the Penelope work of forgetting? Is not the involuntary 
remembrance [ungewollte Eingedenken], Proust's mJmoire involontaire, much closer 
to forgetting than what is usually called memory? 17 This reversal of the privilege 
normally accorded to the voluntary is Proust's significant advance over previous 
conceptions of memory, including those found in the philosophical tradition. To 
affirm a type of memory which in its involuntariness is closer to forgetting than to 
remembering is to question the alignment of memory'with an act of will or 
consciousness (both Proust's term mdmoire involontaire and Benjamin's translation 
ungewollte- or unwillkiirliches Eingedenken capture this), along with the 
corresponding equation of forgetting with a lapse of the will, a set of assum tions 0p 
common in attempts to theorise memory. Proust reversed this emphasis but without 
taking either remembering and forgetting completely out of the realm of deliberation. 
Proust does not subsume the voluntary under the involuntary (literally what is 'beyond 
the'will') but rather demonstrates the operation of both in remembering. He provides 
an extended phenomenological description of that experience whereby what is 
7 GS 2, p. 311; 'The Image of Proust' in Illuminations, p. 202 (amended). 
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consciously remembered mixes with and is informed by what is involuntarily aroused. 
His critique of the voluntarism with which memory is normally understoodconsists in 
showing that it is frequently an unpredictable encounter with an object which initiates 
a reminiscence. The voluntary is thereby reserved a subsidiary but not unimportant 
role; its task is to process and gather up all that such encounters spark-off. 
Metaphysically - and it should be noted that the metaphysical resonances of such an 
experience are of central concern to Benjamin - Proust sis an attempt to fuse the will 
with an openness to the play of chance or unpredictability. For Benjamin there is a 
particular socio-historical context which renders meaningful such a metaphysical 
experiment. That the capacity which allows for memories being initiated by chance 
has become largely stifled is closely linked to the routine and repetitive character of 
modem experience, with the result that any work of remembering has to swim against 
a tide of no less than historical proportions. 
The implicitly metaphysical and historical background to Proust's mnemonic 
peregrinations goes some way to explaining Benjamin's interest in him and the labour 
he expended in translating him, fbi Benjamin too is concerned to rescue the play of 
fortuna found in involuntary memory from its modem fate in an increasingly 
atrophied mode of experience. He believes that to achieve a renewal of experience 
would mean primarily to alter and renew the experience of time, and whilst the 
temporal facets of the voluntary and the involuntary memory may reflect and 
recapitulate that atrophy they also point beyond it. This deterioration of experience is 
often expressed by Benjamin in terms of the predominance of the twin temporalities 
of progress and repetition, temporalities which, under modem conditions of 
production come to take on the character of second nature, threatening to stifle 
anything unpredictable before it is even noticed. Like Freud, Benjamin sees an inverse 
relation between recollection and repetition: where there is repetition the past remains 
uncognised and unmastered. Recollection therefore corresponds to a temporality 
significantly different from that in which progression and repetition occur, and 
Proustian involuntary memory exemplifies this difference both in terms of its 
openness to chance, to the unpredictable, and by virtue of its cognitive aspect, the 
understanding it affords of a previously 'lost' past. As such it contains resources 
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which may work against repetition, offering a renewal of time and, by implication, of 0 
experience. 
In relinquishing the attempt to capture the past 'as it really was' Proustian 
memory implies a conception of time not as homogeneous and empty but as structured 
according to the significance of a particular reminiscence. Paying no heed to temporal 
sequence, the involuntary memory dislodges isolated events from the ground in which 
they have become sedimented and, in bringing them into the present, renews and 
activates them: 'this very concentration in which things that normally fade and 
slumber consume themselves in a flash is called rejuvenation'. 8 For Benjamin the 
value of Proust's project lies not simply in the immense labour of voluntary 
remembrance which it undertakes - this is secondary - but in the fact that by showing 
the enduring vivacity of past impressions in involuntary reminiscence it highlights the 
past's latent actuality. Involuntary memory provides a means for engaging with the 
past which is not restricted to the form in which that past has been consiously 
transmitted to the present, but on the contrary allows a unique engagement with events 
which may have become obscured or effaced in that act of handing-on. That 
methodological principle by which a hitherto concealed or forgotten past is made 
present is adopted by Benjamin for his own 'theory of the knowledge of history' as a 
means both of underlining the incomplete character of the past and of drawing-out the 
consequent affinities between past and present. Involuntary memory represents in 
psychological terms what a non-realist articulation of the past might look like in 
historical terms. It is no coincidence therefore that the 'moments' and 'discontinuities' 
which Benjamin mobilises in his own (highly Proustian) memoirs are just those which 
are theorised in his critical historiography. 
. Whilst Benjamin, drawing upon Reik's terms, characterises Proust's involuntary 
and voluntary memory as respectively 'conservative' and 'destructive', it can be seen 
that the involuntary also contains a destructive side. This is evident in the way it 
redemptively transforms the past (Benjamin elsewhere notes destruction's 
'rejuvenating' quality9) and in the process undermines the past's illusory continuity, 
8 GS 2, p. 320; 'The Image of Proust' in Illuminations, p. 211. 
9 GS 4, p. 397; 'The Destructive Character' in One-Way Street & Other Writings, p. 157. 
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the apparent homogeneity of temporal sequence. There are critical resources contained 
within Proust's privilege of involuntary memory which exceed the individualism of 
Proust's own project, resources which may be employed for the end of a radical 
encounter with the historical past, allowing previously hidden historical phenomena to 
be uncovered. 
The image of the past that flares up in the now of its 
recognizability ... resembles the images of one's own past that line up at 
a moment of danger. These images come involuntarily. Historiography 
[Historie] in the strict sense is thus an image taken from the 
involuntary memory [Eingedenken], an image that suddenly presents 
itself to the subject of history at the moment of danger .... What occurs 
to the involuntary memory is - and this distinguishes it from voluntary 
memory - never a course of events but solely an image. 10 
This formulation is significant not only for the privilege given to the 'image' as the 
form taken by the involuntary reminiscence, but also for the difficulty it raises 
concerning that memory's content. The difficulty, and it is one which Benjamin 
immediately recognised, is the arbitrary nature of the reminiscences which memory 
typically conjures up. Can such memories generate a deeper knowledge of the past 
fiierely by virtue of being involuntary? The answer is surely no, and it is here that the 
involuntary, whilst providing many resources for articulating a new form of historical 
memory, proves by itself inadequate. Here the project of a destruction of the past must 
be augmented by means of a methodological principle which can be applied with 
greater precision - that of construction. Both construction and destruction will prove 
essential for the mode of historical knowledge which is sought here. 
The Constructive Character of Memory 
10 GS 1, p. 1243. 
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'Historical materialism' according to Benjamin, 'presents a specific and unique 
engagement [Erfahrung] with the past. ' It does so, he argues, by means of an 'act of 
construction'. II That history is to be not merely recorded but constructed is an idea 
that runs throu-hout Benjamin's work. In the earliest essays this entails the 
representation of history in its messianic 'state of fulfilment [Vollkommenheit]', from 
which follows an 'historical task' of 'liberating, through understanding, the forms of 
the future from their distortions in the present'. 12 In his work from the 1920s and 
1930s he understands construction as a form of 'unmasking' (Entlarvung), drawing 
upon the aesthetic techniques of both surrealism and Brechtian 'epic theatre'. 13 The 
principle of construction here is that of montage, the juxtaposition of past and present 
in the cause of defamiliarising or estranging that present from itself. The Passagen- 
Werk theorises and practices a form of construction which involves 'carrying the 
montage principle over into history. Building up the large structures out of the 
smallest, precisely fashioned structural elements. Detecting the crystal of the total 
event in the analysis of the simple, individual moment'. 14 In the theses 'On the 
Concept of History' the idea of construction as unmasking is taken further, and the 
task of history now seen as a critical exposure of the exclusive manner in which the 
historical object is constituted. The historical task is now 'not only to give the 
oppressed access to tradition, but also to create it', 15 to configure historiography in an 
inclusive rather than an exclusive way. 
When Benjamin stresses that such a construction of the historical past needs to be 
distinguished from 'reconstruction' because "reconstruction' by means of empathy is 
one-sided', 16 he links the constructive principle to a critique of historical science. His 
comments are directed against Dilthey's belief that re-creation of the past is possible 
because of, and only through, empathy. 17 Implicitly he shows that Dilthey's concept of 
empathy is a normative rather than a descriptive category. In the case of 
II GS 2, p. 468; 'Edward Fuchs, Collector and Historian' in One- Way Street, p. 352 
12 GS 2, p. 75. 
13 GS 2, p. 384; 'A Short History of Photography' in One-Way Street, p. 255. 
14 GS 5, p. 575 (N2,6); 'Konvolut 'N", p. 48 (amended). 
15 GS 1, p. 1246. 
16 GS 5, p. 5 87 (N7,6); 'Konvolut 'N", p. 60. 
17 Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, 'Drafts for a Critique of Historical Reason' in H. P. Rickman (ed. ), Wilhelm 
Dilthey: Selected Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 226-8. 
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historiography, empathy all too easily amounts to empathy with a history from which 
many have been effectively erased. If it would be more than a mere 'apologia'18 
historiography must instead be simultaneously creative (that is, 'constructive') and 
refusing (or 'destructive'). On the one hand destruction is necessary in order to disturb 
the apparently closed or complete nature of what is past and to expose the 
complicitous manner in which history and tradition are handed-on. The destructive 
impetus 'is to be understood as a reaction to a constellation of dangers that threatens 
both that which is beina transmitted and those to whom it is transmitted. '19 On the 
other hand construction is essential because any engagement with history which was 
solely destructive would amount to a contradiction in terms: 'a no-saying form of 
historical knowledge is meaningless. 120 Destruction explodes the continuum of 
received history so that it may then be constructed in a way that reveals history's true 
character, and universal claims can be predicated of it. 'The destructive or critical 
impetus in materialist historiography comes into play in that blasting apart of 
historical continuity which allows the historical object to constitute itself. 121 It is a 
necessary but not a sufficient criterion of historical knowledge; only a combination of 
the destructive and constructive principles fulfils this criterion. 
If the historical object is to be blasted out of the continuum of the 
historical process, it is because the monadological structure of the 
object demands it. This structure only becomes evident once the object 
has been blasted free. And it becomes evident precisely in the form of 
the historical argument which makes up the inside (and, as it were, the 
bowels) of the historical object, and into which all the powers [Krdftel 
I and interests [Interessen] enter on reduced scale. 
The historical object 
by virtue of its monadological structure, discovers within itself its own 
fore-history [Vorgeschichte] and after-history [Nachgeschichte]. 22 
18 GS 5, p. 592 (N9a, 5); Tonvolut 'N", p. 64. 
19GS 5, p. 594-5 (NIOa, 2); 'Konvolut'N", p. 66-7. 
20 GS 3, p. 265. 
21 GS 5, p. 594 (N I Oa, 1); Tonvolut 'N', p. 66. 
22 GS 5, p. 594 (NIO, 3); Tonvolut'N", p. 66 (amended). 
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This destructive blasting of an object from its context serves as a prelude to the task of 
constructing history in a way which makes visible the powers and interests structuring 
it. It is only then that the true character of the historical object can appear. 'Sundering 
truth from falsehood is the goal of the materialist method, not its point of departure. In 
other words, its point of departure is the object riddled with error, with Bo4m The 
distinctions with which the materialist method, discriminative from the outset, starts 
are distinctions within this highly mixed object, and it cannot present this object as 
mixed or uncritical enough. 123 History, more than any other object of philosophical 
study, is riddled with untruth, with the conjecture or opinion which Socrates 
understood to denote incipient knowledge. The materialist method does not simply 
introduce its own truths in stark opposition to this error-ridden and confused 
(gemischten) object but proceeds, as the reference to Socrates implies, in a dialectical 
manner. Benjamin stresses not materialism's truth-content but its demystifying 
character, its force as a recurring questioning of untruth: 'Historical knowledge of the 
truth is only possible as the transcendence of illusion [Auj%ebung des Scheins]1.24 
The constructive moment in this critical engagement with history forms the 
central methodological principle of Benjamin's great uncompleted project of the 
3 1930s, the Passagen-Werk. Indeed he suggets that 'it has the same significance for this 
A 
book as the philosopher's stone has for alchemy. 125 The particular form which it takes 
in this work involves techniques borrowed from both psychoanalysis and the aesthetic 
use of psychoanalytic theory in surrealism and dada. Here construction entails 
surrealistically juxtaposing past and present in the cause of estrangement, so 
transcending the illusions which pervade naive apprehensions of the historical object. 
As the use of surrealism (and its methodological antecedent in psychoanalysis 
implies), the principle of construction aims to work upon the memory; through a 
montage of historical images it attempts to elicit a shock-like encounter with the past 
which may serve to defamiliarise the present. 
Both the methodological principles of destruction and construction can be seen to 
make use of specific characteristics of memory, destruction mobilising the 
23 GS 1, p. 1160; Charles Baudelaire, p. 103. 
24 GS 5, p. 1034. 
25 GS 5, p. 1139. 
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heterogeneous, construction the imaginative character of mernory. 26 Much of 
Benjamin's critical practice flows from the recognition that memory constructs the 
past in the same movement as it destroys its linear form. Where destruction isolates 
the historical object from its context, construction imaginatively draws out the 
massive wealth of past material locked up within it, searching for the trace of the 
universal contained therein: Benjamin describes this imaginative faculty as 'the gift of 
interpolating into the infinitely small, of inventing, for every intensity, an 
extensiveness to contain its new, compressed fullness. 127 
That memory exhibits an imaginative rather than a straightforwardly repetitive 
relation to the past impinges upon the way history (as itself a form of memory) is 
apprehended. In the methodological 'preface' to the Passagen-Werk Benjamin stresses 
the need 'to contrast the theory of history with Grillparzer's comment ... : "To read into 
the future is difficult, but to see purely into the past is even more so: I say purely, 
meaning without clouding that retrospective gaze with everything that has happened 
in the meantime. " The "purity" of the gaze is not so much difficult as impossible to 
attain. 128 The presentation of the historical object in its most 'Mixed' and error-ridden 
form undermines any desire for historiographical purity, any naive attempt to bracket- 
out the present from the apprehension of the past. 
The difficulty Benjamin's point raises is that his own avowedly impure method 
risks falsifying the past even in the attempt to demystify it. Once realist assumptions 
ýonceming memory are abandoned, once it is recognised that the 'weaving' of 
memory is not simple embellishment but is the fabrication of the past, then the 
yardstick by which the accuracy of historical record, testimony, etc., are measured, 
becomes less clear. This can be understood in two ways - as a liberation from a 
historiographical will to truth or, in less sanguine terms, as a necessary conflict which 
structures historical knowledge as much as history itself. Some critics have 
affirmatively drawn the former conclusion, arguing that in Benjamin remembrance 
26 On the imaginative moment in memory, this time in the work of Herbert Marcuse, see Martin Jay, 0 
'Reflections on Marcuse's Theory of Remembrance' in Robert Pippin, Andrew Feenberg & Charles P. 
Webel (eds. ), Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia (London: Macmillan, 1988) pp. 29- 
46. 
27 GS 4, p. 117; 'One-Way Street' in One-Way Street & Other Writings, op. cit., p. 75. 
28 GS 5, p. 587 (N7,5); 'Konvolut 'N", p. 59. 
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approaches 'the free-play of interpretation'. 29 But in fact it can be shown that the latter 
view is closer to Benjamin's own. The stakes in this are high. In historical study, to 
suspend judgement on competing accounts of the past is often not only inadequate but 
dangerous; it is often vital that accurate history can be distinguished from 
'revisionism'. Benjamin's own historiographical technique anticipates the potential 
for (often politically motivated) rewritings of the past, and seeks to counter them on 
strong epistemological grounds. That he acknowledges the danger courted by his anti- 
realism is clear from the various specifications made to the constructive method. He is 
keen to stress that the basis upon which construction takes place is not arbitrary, that it 
need not succumb, as his own genealogical approach might imply, to the play of 
perspectives. This is so because memory can confer its own objectivity on the past; 
this objectivity, however, is to be understood as a result, not a presupposition of, its 
critical application. It is this which distinguishes the truth value of Benjamin's method 
from that of realism. Even memory in what appears its most intensely personal and 
subjective form can confer objectivity on the past: 'memory issues strict weaving 
regulations', as the Proust essay puts it. 30 The consonance with the use of 
constructions in psychoanalysis is evident. There is a sense in which, like Freud, 
Benjamin uses mnemonic constructions to free energies 'pathologically' blocked by a 
particular sedimentation of the past. In both cases the character of the memory 
induced is the measure of construction's truthfulness. The use of constructions in 
analysis is a finely crafted art, and those of the historian even more so: materialist 
historiography 'does not choose its objects casually ... its precautions are more 
extensive, its occurences more essential'. 31 When applied to images of the historical 
past the ultimate test of mnemonic juxtapositions is again a practical one: whether by 
conjuring up startling images of history they can induce the desired estrangement of 
the present from itself, whether they can place the present in a critical condition. 'The 
29 Ned Lukacher, Primal Scenes: Literature, Philosophy, Psychoanalysis (Ithaca & London: Cornell 
University Press, 1986) p. 275; cf. Carol Jacobs, The Dissimulating Harmony: The Image of 
Interpretation in Nietzsche, Rilke, Artaud, & Benjamin (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1978). For a cogent critique of Jacobs see Irving WohIfarth, 'Walter Benjamin's Image of 
Interpretation', New German Critique 17 (Spring 1979) pp. 70-98. 
30 GS 2, p. 312; 'The Image of Proust' in Illuminations, p. 203. 
31 GS 5, p. 594 (NlOa, 1); 'Konvolut'N", p. 66. 
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dialectical interpenetration and actualisation [Vergegenwdrtigung] of past contexts is 
a test of the truth of present action. 32 
Construction as Philosophy of History 
Although a mix of modernist and avant-garde concerns inform this historiographical 
method, its general tenor is that of an older tradition of thought. Benjamin's call for a 
construction of history can be seen as an attempt to rescue something of the 
discredited universal histories of the French Enlightenment and German Idealism by 
returning to their theological roots in Heilsgeschichte or 'redemptive history'. 33 He 
makes this explicit in the notes to the 'Theses' by arguing for a qualified defence of 
universal history: 'not every universal history need be reactionary. Universal history 
without a constructive principle is, though. The constructive principle of universal 
history makes possible the representation of the universal in the partial. It is, in other 
words, monadological. It exists in redemptive history [Heilsgeschichte]. 134 For 
Benjamin, Enlightenment universal history became reactionary when it sought to 
cover over its theological origins, when (as in Kant's Religion Within the Bounds of 
Reason Alone) it defined itself in opposition to 'messianism', to the eschatologicical 
strand in Judaism and Christianity. 35 In this context the messianic or prophetic 
6oncept of history serves as a rejoinder to the universal histories of the Enlightenment 
32 GS 5, p. 1026-7 (0*, 5). 
33 Benjamin assumes the same lineage of universal history proposýd by Karl L6with in his Meaning in 
History: Theological lmplicaýions of the Philosophy of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1949). For a critique of L6with's theory of 'sccularisation', a critique which can with some plausibility 
be extended to encompass Benjamin, see Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimation of the Modern Age trans. 
Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, 1983). A similarly inspired critique, which 
questions more directly Benjamin's own view of secularisation can be found in Hannah Arendt, 'The 
Concept of History', Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1993). 
34 GS 1, p. 1234. 
35 Kant distinguishes the 'moral' view of history from 'messianism' and 'chiliasm', aspects of a 'holy 
history [heilige Geschichte]' which 'in no way applies to us practically'. [Die Religion innerhalb der 
Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, Werke ed. Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1968), vol. VI, p. 136, n.; trans. Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone, 
Theodore M. Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson (New York & Evanston: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 127.1 
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by reintroducing a redemptive moment to what is an otherwise boundless faith in 
providence and progress. Unlike Kant's philosophy of history, whose universal claims 
depend not only ethically but epistemologically upon postulates and regulative ideas, 36 
a monadological view of history allows universal claims to be made at any point 
because each historical moment contains a representation of the whole. Further, 
redemptive history augments the monadological view of time by projecting the 
collation and redemption of these partial representations in the totality. Benjamin's 
dispute with the philosophy of history is not over fundamentals (over whether it is 
possible as a field of study) but simply over the manner in which historical universals 
are to be apprehended. The 'critique of universal history', 37 consistent with 
Benjamin's definition of a 'true criticism' which 'does not destroy its object' but 
merely 'exposes its inner nature', 38 entails not the abandonment of this Enlightenment 
approach but merely the recovery of its original sense. 'The genuine concept of 
universal history, ' he writes, 'is a messianic one. 39 It is defensible only on the 
condition that it be understood redemptively rather than progressively. Minus this 
concept of redemption, the past is, in Benjamin's words, 'nothing more than a 
jumbled collection of facts [Geschichtsklitterung]. 140 To abandon universal history is 
to abandon the hope of making anything other than regional, contingent and ultimately 
insignificant claims concerning history. Not that redemption itself thereby amounts to 
a regulative idea, a principle of thought which, whilst necessary, lacks any historical 
actuality. On the contrary, redemption is prefigured within history in the form of 
36 Kant, 'Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Intent' in On History ed. Lewis White 
Beck, trans. Robert E. Anchor, Lewis White Beck & Emil Fackenheirn (Indianapolis & New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), p. 25; cf. 'Conjectural Beginning of Human History' ! bid.. p. 68, 'Perpetual 
Peace', ibid., p. 106. 
37 GS 1, p. 1239. 
38 Briefe, p. 132; Correspondence, p. 84. 
39 GS 5, p. 608 (N18,3); 'Konvolut 'N", p. 80. This is to imply that there is less of a divide than would 
first appear between Benjamin's destruction of universal history and Adorno's programmatic demand 
that 'universal history must be constructed [konstruieren] and denied' [Theodor Adorno, Negativ 
Dialektik, Gesammelte Schriften, op. cit., vol. 6, p. 314; Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton 
(London: Routledge, 1973), p. 320]. A reading which stresses the divergence between these two 
approaches to history can be found in Gillian Rose, 'Walter Benjamin: Out of the Sources of Modern 
Judaism' in Judaism and Modernity. Philosophical Essays, op. cit., p. 207. 
40 GS 1, p. 1245. 
55 
messianic 'now-times', moments which give historical time its already heterogeneous 
structure. 
Comments from the conclusion to the exposl of the Passagen-Werk explain 
further Benjamin's idisosyncratic conception of universal history: 'Each epoch not 
merely dreams the next but also, in dreaming, strives toward the moment of 
awakening. It bears its end within itself and unfolds itself - as Hegel already saw - 
with cunning. 141 The 'striving' (drdngen) mentioned here and invoked in the same 
breath as Hegel's 'cunning of reason' is indebted in philosophical terms less to 
Hegelian philosophy of history than to Leibnizian metaphysics. To say that the 
constructive principle of universal history is monadological means to say firstly that 
the &et-ef relation which exists between historical particular and historical universal is 
to be understood as that of monad to totality, and secondly that history exhibits a 
characteristic entelechy, a dynamic by which that totality strives towards its own 
complete expression. Monadology is a theory both of relation and of process, of 
temporality. It is in just these Leibnizian terms that Benjamin understands the capacity 
of each particular 'moment' of historical time to express something of history's 'final 
condition', 42 to proleptically represent the collected or re-collected whole of history. 
The archetype for this monadology is, he notes, 'holy' or redemptive history, and 
Benjamin adopts elements of this history for his own constructive method: the 
Christian motif of 'apocatastasis'43 - the gathering together of past time - and the 
notion of 'last judgment'44 - the redemption of that past. 
Benjamin's use of monadology is intended to augment the epistemological 
aspirations of universal history with the theological aspirations which that approach 
discarded, and to ally this new combination to a critical historiographical practice. His 
aim is to realise at the level of a critical interrogation of historical sources both the 
redemptive potential which theology found in history and the totalising scope of the 
philosophy of history. By augmenting the one with the other he aims to achieve a 
comprehension of history which does not simply rest upon a regulative idea, or merely 
41 GS 5, p. 59; Charles Baudelaire, p. 176. 
42 GS 2, p. 75. 
43 GS 5, p. 573 (N I a, 3); 'Konvolut 'N", p. 46. 
44 GS 1, p. 1245. 
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assumes (whether in terms of providence of progress) history's meaningfulness. His 
belief is that the principle of historical finitude involved in eschatology and 
subsequently diluted by universal history is in fact the epistemological buttress which 
those universal claims require, and that resuscitating this principle in turn undermines 
the very idea of progress in terms of which those claims are typically expressed. 
Undeniably, Benjamin's move here involves a revaluation of the eschatology which 
the philosophy of history sought to transcend, and that consequently his formulations 
carry connotations of finality and closure unwelcome to critical philosophy (and even 
+6 
less welcome those who have abandoned the philosophy of history altogether). 45 But it 
is important to note the particular qualifications ascribed to the redemptive dynamic 
he finds in history and the 'atheological' way in which these eschatological and 
apocalyptic motifs are employed. Benjamin stresses that his appropriation of Christian 
apocalypse is to be understood monadologically. This sheds light on his 'Minor 
methodological recommendation' that the destructive (negative') and constructive 
('positive') principles have to proceed in tandem 'ad infinitum, until the entire past has 
been brought into the present in an historical apocatastasis. 146 The apparent 
incongruity between the infinity of this historical task and its consummative outcome 
is explained by the monadological character of Heilsgeschichte. The infinite invoked 
here must be construed not as extensive (thus always retreating, never achieved) but as 
that intensive infinite of which Leibniz wrote and which was understood to be present 
Within the most simple, elemental phenomena. Such an infinite is, by implication, 
conceivable and attainable, but - crucially - only by thought assuming a standpoint 
normally reserved for the divine. In Benjamin's hands universal history aspires to this 
standpoint. Reservations concerning the accent of closure in this rewriting of 
universal history are understandable. It often appears as if the use of theological 
concepts has substituted for one 'form of conceptual closure (that of detem-iinistic 
homogeneous time) another (a postulating of history's fulfilment and termination), 
45 On the difference between Benjamin's 'Theses' and theories of 'posthistory' see Lutz Niethammer, 
Posthistoire: Has History Come to an End?, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Verso, 1992), Ch. 6. 
46 GS 5, p. 573 (Nla, 3); 'Konvolut 'N", p. 46 (amended). On the discrepency between the 'renewal' 
implied by the ad infinitum and the 'finality' implied by apocatastasis see Andrew Benjamin, 'Time 
and Task: Benjamin and Heidegger Showing the Present' in Andrew Benjamin & Peter Osborne (eds. ), a 
Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: Destruction and Experience, op. cit., p. 235. 
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and that as a result the constructive principle merely reinstates what the destructive 
was designed to dispel. What is at stake in this question of openness and closure, 
though? It is surely a question of the human action enabled or compromised by the 
conception of history at issue. But this is also a central concern of Benjamin's, the 
question of whether a certain conception of history is conducive to resignation or to 
action. Turning the tables on this criticism however, he asks whether there is not a 
greater closure involved in assuming historical time to be infinitely extended, in 
assuming history to be interminable. 
The space which a particular conception of historical time either opens-up or 
closes-off is the space of politics, of political action and intervention. It is not 
surprising therefore that the philosophical statements of the destructive and 
constructive method also include reflections upon its political intentions and 
outcomes. Here the double sense of the word 'destruction' serves Benjamin well as he 
shifts between philosophical and political reflection. In the notes to the 'Theses' he 
writes of messianic time as 
the characteristic revolutionary chance each historical moment carves 
out of the political situation .... In reality there 
is not one moment that is 
not accompanied by its revolutionary chance .... It finds confirmation in 
the power of the moment to unlock a particular, hitherto locked 
chamber of the past. Entry into this chamber strictly coincides with 
political action; and it is through the former that the latter presents 
itself, however destructively, as messianic. 47 
Political action is here expressed in terms of a redemptive uncovering of a seemingly 
closed past, a destructive act of remembrance. Only by reactivating a past which had 
seemed complete does political praxis meet the criterion of being messianic. Like 
Marxian 'practical-critical activity' Benjamin's 'political action' realises in secular 
form powers stored up in the theological idea. 48 It is capable of creating messianic 
47 GS 1, p. 123 1. 
48 The formulations on politics in Benjamin's late work recall the messianic and apocalyptic element he 
finds in German Romanticism. In his doctoral dissertation Benjamin cites Schlegel's Athenaeum 
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moments and, in much the same way as a critically applied historiography, of 
redeeming the past: here lies 'a connection between historiography and politics which 
is identical to the theological link between remembrance and redemption. 149 
This identity between politicised historiography and redemptive memory 
eloquently expresses the project of Benjamin's later work, and makes sense of its 
apparently contradictory impulses. Rather than resting upon exclusively theological 
assumptions, as Horkheimer objected, Benjamin's view of the openness of the past 
can be compared to an argument which Nietzsche had already proposed in the 
Genealogy of Morals where he urged the historian to recognise that 'everything that 
exists, no matter what its origin, is periodically reinterpreted by those in power in 
terms of fresh intentions'. The past, says Nietzsche, is subject to 'reinterpretation, 
rearrangement, in the course of which the earlier meaning and purpose are necessarily 
either obscured or JoSt. 150 Nietzsche's emphasis on the power structuring this process 
of 'reinterpretation' prefigures in importantABenjamin's own view of the conflictual 
character of the historical object, and highlights the stakes involved in wresting 
historical interpretation away from its dominant configuration. Equally, it gestures 
towards the political dimension of claims concerning the historical past. 
It is the characteristic latency of the historical object which allows for the past's 
being 'periodically reinterpreted' (Nietzsche) or 'redeemed' (Benjamin). But it is 
remembrance, whether in the form of historiographical practice constructing 
dialectical images or the destructive power of political action unlocking a seemingly 
closed past, which effects this redemption. Benjamin's conception of historical time is 
inextricably linked to his account of memory, and vice versa. This conception of 
history is open because the historical object it conceptualises is itself understood to be 
radically open, not least because of the redemptive effect which historical knowledge 
itself is able to confer. As his stress upon the interrelation of historical knowledge and 
its object indicates, such claims are to be understood as epistemological, they concern 
Fragment 222: 'The revolutionary desire to realize the Kingdom of God on earth is the elastic point of 
progressive culture and the beginning of modern history. Whatever has no relation to the kingdom of C, 
God is of strictly secondary importance in it. ' (GS 1, p. 12 n. 3). 
49 GS 1, p. 1248. 
50 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals trans. Francis Golffing (New York: Doubleday, 1956), p. 
209. 
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the relation between apprehending subject and an object of knowledge, they represent 
a 'theory of the knowledge of history'. The fact that they are not expressed as 
ontological claims is significant and clarifies the difference between Benjamin's 
approach to history and that of Heidegger, whom Benjamin explicitly counters on this 
question. At one point in 'Konvolut 'N" he mentions Heidegger's notion of 
Geschichtlichkeit, or 'historicality', 'the kind of being which belongs to the 
historical', and notes that it is itself ahistorical. 51 Implicitly he suggests that 
Heidegger's question 'what is it to be primordially historicalT approaches things the 
wrong way, since the character of historical time cannot be understood in isolation 
from the form time itself assumes in particular social and historical contexts. This 
point conceals a more fundamental philosophical divergence, though, that for 
Benjamin a more genuine account of historical time is to be found by means of 
resources already present within the philosophy of history and through just that 
process of objectification and conceptualisation which fundamental ontology seeks to 
overcome. 
The difference between the two thinkers is in part a divergent relation to their 
common philosophical background. Benjamin does not wish to completely relinquish 
that 'historiology' by which philosophy, particularly in its neo-Kantian manifestation, 
sought to establish the grounds of historical knowledge. Whereas Heidegger claims to 
have broken with Erkenniniskritik by means of ontology Benjamin seeks instead to 
take his neo-Kantian sources and radicalise them by acknowledging the social or 
gmaterial' determinations of the historical object which historiology had omitted. 
Consequently his own epistemological technique of construction looks to the 'powers' 
and 'interests' inscribed in that object which come to implicate the subject of 
historical knowledge too. This materialistically-broadened epistemology allows 
insight into the conflictual or contradictory character of both the historical object and 4D 
51 GS 5, p. 577 (N3,1); 'Konvolut 'N", p. 50. On 'historicality' see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time 
trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), p. 427-8. Discussion of 
the similarities and differences between the two thinkers is to be found in Howard Caygill, 'Benjamin, 
Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition' and Andrew Benjamin 'Time and Task: Benjan-dn and C, 
Heidegger Showing the Present', both in Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osborne (eds. ), Walter 
Benjamin's Philosophy, op. cit. 
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the historical subject, the power operating in historical interpretation as much as in the 
dynamic of historical development. 
Recognition of this conflict gives rise to a view of the openness or 
incompleteness not only of history but of historical knowledge as well. 
Incompleteness pertains not just to the 'historical object' but just as much to the act of 
its apprehension. The same point can be expressed in another way: the preposition in 
Benjamin's 'theory of the knowledge of history' is not to be taken as implying anPA 
external engagement between historian and object. On the contrary, historiography 
must be understood as implicated in that history which it would analyse such that it is 
obliged to expose at a conceptual level the conflict it reports at the level of empirical 
history. From this follow crucial insights. That the historical object is essentially a site 
of conflict means that there can never be the reassurance that history is 'on one's 
side'. Alongside the redemptive capacity of memory therefore stands an 'infemal'52 
aspect; both qualities derive from the same latency for re-constitution inherent in the 
past itself. Nietzsche is surely correct in underlining the 'power' involved in this 
'periodic re-interpretation' of the past; wrong in seeing no form or relation to this 
power. Recognition of form is what makes Benjamin in the last instance a Marxist 
rather than a Nietzschean. Cognizance of the form of perspectives gives the lie to 
perspectivism. Benjamin's attempt to 'brush history against the grain' implies an 
understanding that the uncritical basis of much historiography, has a tendency to 
consolidate a particular historical interest. A critical historiography, like a 'critical 
theory', cannot but take up its own allegiance. 53 
All of which makes comprehensible one particular sentence from the sixth of the 
'Theses', a phrase which can now be rendered in full. 'To articulate the past 
historically does not mean to recognise it 'the way it really was'. It means to seize 
hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger. 54 What is opposed to the 
homogeneous time in which historiographical realism has purchase is the temporality 
52 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott 
(London: Verso, 1974), p. 166. 
53 Cf. Max Horkheimer, 'Traditional and Critical Theory', in Critical Theory: Selected Essays trans. 
Matthew J. O'Connell et al (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972), an essay with which Benjamin was 
familiar (GS 5, p. 1300). 
54 GS 1, p. 695; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 255. 
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and cognitive characteristics of memory. To articulate the past historically means to 4: 1 
grasp it as a memory capable of retroactively altering the past. The moment of danger 
refers both to the uncritical way in which the past, history, tradition is handed down to 
the present, and the opportunity opened up by the revisability or latency of the past, a 
destructive and redemptive opportunity. But this latency which allows for the past's 
subsequent redemption is also that which allows for an 'infernal' appropriation in 
which past struggles are written out: 'even the dead' are thereby exposed to a 
posthumous historical and historiograhical. defeat. The openness of the historical 
A 
object, history's imperfection, always entails this danger, a danger which threatens 
both historian and historical subject: 'in every era the attempt must be made anew to 
wrest tradition away from a conformism that is about to overpower it. 155 
Redeeming Progress 
It is not only the epistemological aims of universal history which Benjamin wishes to 
retain but also the methodological principle of progress, something which for Kant 
was a precondition for the very possibility of a universal history, the guiding thread 
which comprehends the seemingly random aggregate of historical phenomena. 56 A 
common misconception is that the Benjamin's 'critique of universal history' 
Onequivocally indicts the idea of progress and with it the hope that history might 
develop in anything other than a repetitive manner. 57 The point is plausible in so far as 
it recognises the negative evaluation he gives to the idea of historical novelty, the way 
in which he sees novelty itself produced as an historical illusion, as a mythical 
experience of time at the heart of enlightened modernity. That novelty was perfectly 
compatible with the persistence and repetition of historical conditions was one insight 
of Benjamin's own dialectic of enlightenment: 'The sensation of the newest, the most 
modem is in fact just as much a dream form of events as the eternal return of the 
55 GS 1. P. 695; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 255. 
56 Kant, 'Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Intent' in On History, op. cit., p. 11. 
57 According to Adorno, 'Benjamin teaches' that 'the concept of universal history cannot be saved'. 
[Adorno, 'Progress' in G. Smith (ed. ), Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics, History, op. cit., p. 861. 
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same'. 58 But the presence of a spurious novelty does not for Benjan-dn rule out the 
possibility both of a different type of progress and that history might develop in a 
qualitatively new way. His own concept of the 'truly new' reflects this by standing in 
just the same relation to novelty as the messianic does to progress traditionally 
conceived. It consists in the interruption of that empty continuum in which both 
novelty and progress become credible as conceptions of time. Progress 'does not 
reside in the continuity of temporal succession, but rather in its moments of 
interference: where the truly new first makes itself felt, as sober as the dawn'. 59 
Progress as normally conceived omits the experience of the messianic, the moments of 
'interference' which punctuate and break up homogeneous time. What Kant called the 
$regular movement of history' turns out to be an irregular and erratic movement. 
The attempt to develop an idea of progress grounded in the 'truly new' is an 
attempt to defamiliarise the present without succumbing to a search for an illusory 
novelty. But the 'truly new' as a dialectical third opposed to both repetition and 
novelty encounters a difficulty of how it is to be recognised as new. What would 
progress look like were it to be truly new? A new unmediated by tradition or past 
experience or incapable of being subsumed under existing conceptual schemas would 
be literally incomprehensible. This is where the phenomenon of remembrance can 
serve as a precedent for that renewal or rejuvenation of the experience of time which 
Benjamin seeks, and, by implication, for a critical philosophy of history. If existing 
philosophy of history rests upon 'the concept of the historical progress of mankind', a 
concept which in turn 'cannot be sundered from the concept of its progression through 
a homogeneous empty time', 60 then a critical philosophy of history can draw resources 
from a very different experience of time, one 'neither homogeneous not eMpty'61 
which exists in remembrance. It is remembrance which offers an experience of time 
which effects not a repetition of the past but a reworking of it, and in so doing brings 
to light with a more intense actuality something unacknowledged and hitherto never 
fully experienced: remembrance can introduce the 'truly new' into history. 
58 GS 5, p. 1023 (M*, 14). 
59 GS 5, p. 593 (N9a, 7); 'Konvolut 'N", p. 65. 
60 GS 1, p. 70 1; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 26 1. 
61 GS 1, p. 704; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 264 (amended). 
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What is unfamiliar is for Benjamin to be found nowhere else than in the past -a 
past reworked and reactivated, disinterred from the sediment in which it was 
originally laid down, a history 'brushed against the grain'. 62 The cognition of a real 
'new' would require memory; it would of necessity be a re-cognition, understood as a 
transformation rather than a repetition of the original cognition. Thus one particular 
critic is correct when he notes that Benjamin 'twists the radical future-orientedness 
that is characteristic of modem times in general so far back around the axis of the 
now-time that it gets transposed into a yet more radical orientation towards the past. 
The anticipation of what is new in the future is realised only through remembering 
[Eingedenken] a past that has been suppressed. 163 
This impinges not only upon how the critique of universal history is understood 
but also the nature of the remembrance which in turn grounds that critique. For 
instance it shows up the inadequacies of placing this concept of remembrance in a 
Platonic lineage, and rendering it as 'anamnesis'. 64 It is important to contrast the 
dialectic of openness and completion in the notion of remembrance (Eingedenken) 
with the closure involved in taking anamnesis as a model of memory. Anamnesis is a 
doctrine of a self-sufficient, 'autarkic' past. It is recollection of a knowledge 
primudially and timelessly inscribed in the firmament, a sense retained in Jung's 
quasi-Platonism which postulates a 'collective unconscious' peopled by archetypes, a 
notion Benjamin indicts for 'assigning history a home (Heimat) in nature', 65 that is, 
for substituting the ostensibly innate for what is in fact acquired in experience. 
Eingedenken by contrast, recalls not a prehistory but instead marginalised historical 
phenomena. The doctrine of anamnesis is the paradigm of a realist memory: it says 
that one need only recall what one already knows, 66 and, since what is recalled is 
62 6S 1, p. 697; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 257. 
63 Jilrgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures trans. Frederick G. 
Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity, 1987) p. 12. 
64 See for instance Julian Roberts, Walter Benjamin (London: MacMillan, 1982) p. 118. 
65 GS 5, p. 595 (N1 1,1); 'Konvolut 'N", p. 67. Ernst Bloch argues that the doctrine of anamnesis 
'provides reassuring evidence of complete similarity .... it makes everything a gigantic d1ja vu'. [Bloch 
interviewed by Michael Landmann in 'Talking with Ernst Bloch: Korcula, 1968', Telos 25 (Fall 1975) 
p. 178. ] Bloch chooses to base his own concept of memory not upon Platonism but upon Aristotle's 
notion (taken from the Poetics) of anagnorisis or 'recognition', which he understands as a shock-like 
moment in which the past confronts us as if new. The affinities with Benjamin are clear. 
66 Plato, Meno, trans. W. K. C. Guthrie (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987), p. 130. 
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outwith experience, recollection assumes a peculiarly contemplative character. It is no 
coincidence that Plato's term does not appear in Benjamin's later work. The 
increasingly frequent invocation of Eingedenken and its corresponding privilege in his 
taxonomy of memory in Benjamin's works after 1929, follows a trajectory away from 
the apparently Platonic formulations of his own early work, for instance in the essays 
on language and the 'Prologue' to the Trauerspiel book. But one need not look only at 
this latter period to see his divergence from Plato; the Prologue already finds him 
wary of assimilating his own approach to that of contemplative anamnesiS. 67 By the 
late work remembrance has come to stand for a dynamic act of contestation, both that 
between historian and historical object and of class against class. This dynamic and 
conflictual quality of remembrance is lost in a Platonic translation of Benjamin's 
concept. 
Understanding the meaning of remembrance, its temporality and its function, 
explains in turn how it is able to perform the considerable labour of grounding a 
critically revitalised philosophy of history. Remembrance plays a double role in this 
rewriting of universal history, firstly as part of a methodology which aims to blast an 
object out of the continuum of history and thus to allow its construction in 
monadological form. Here an understanding of the simultaneously destructive and 
constructive character of memory explains much of the procedure of Benjamin's 
critical practice. Secondly the experiential characteristics of memory offer a paradigm 
for a temporality which is neither repetitive nor ahistorically novel, a temporality 
which in turn allows a new concept of progress to be formulated: progress as an event 
of interruption which itself redeems the past. An understanding of remembrance, both 
in terms of its epistemological characteristics (the 'destructive' or redemptive and the 
'constructive' or imaginative) and its temporal attributes (structured, heterogeneous) 
allows a rewriting of universal history which rescues both the idea of progress and the 
principle of universality itself A rescue through critique of the principles of 
universality and progress by which universal history was guided, stands at the basis of 
a renewed philosophy of history. 
67 GS 1, p. 217; The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London: Verso, 1977), pp. 
36-7. 
65 
This tells us something important about Benjamin's philosophical intent in the 
methodolo-ical works which have been the focus of this chapter - the Konvolut of the 0 
Passagen-Werk on the 'Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress 
[Erkenntnistheoretisches, Theorie des Fortschritts]' and the similarly inspired theses 
'On the Concept of History'. As the title of Konvolut 'N' reveals, an examination of 
knowledge (Erkenntnis) and of progress forms a twin-pronged attack upon existing 
philosophy of history, but importantly, it is a critique which aims to salvage the 
systematic aims of that discipline and in turn to radicalise them, such that they might 
be employed for a critical historiography. It is significant therefore that in attacking 
the 'epic' viewpoint typical of the philosophy of history, Benjamin does not opt for an 
historiographical particularism which refuses to make inductions from individual 
historical phenomena. As will be argued more thoroughly in Chapter Four, his focus 
upon the fragment, the moment, the isolated event, aims monadologically towards the 
totality which each moment (however partially) expresses. Benjamin does not 
substitute a genealogy for the philosophy of history but opts instead to rewrite 
universal history in materialist terms. 
The next chapter takes up the themes of the first two - the dialectic of openness 
and completion in Benjamin's conception of historical time and this critical defence of 
Enlightenment philosophy of history. It looks at the development of Benjamin's own 
conception of history out of a recurring engagement with Kantian philosophy of 
history and in particular the attempt made in neo-Kantian thought to fuse Kant's 
historical and moral writings. In the process it becomes clear that a view of the 
abstract openness of history is not by itself sufficient, and that it in fact raises serious 
problems, philosophically and politically. When one side of the equation of openness 
and completion is left out, important misconceptions concerning history arise. It is 
these which preoccupied Benjan-dn from his earliest to his very final work. 
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III 
From Moral Task to Historical Task 
Introduction 
In a letter from October 1917, written whilst at university in Bern, Switzerland, 
Benjamin tells his friend Gershom Scholem that it is his intention to write his doctoral 
thesis on Kant's philosophy of history. He reveals the circumstances and lines of 
thought which have led him to this topic: 
The ultimate metaphysical dignity of a philosophical view that truly 
intends to be canonical will always manifest itself most clearly in its 
confrontation with history; in other words, the specific relationship of a 
philosophy with the true doctrine will appear most clearly in the 
philosophy of history; for this is where the subject of the historical 
evolution of knowledge for which doctrine is the catalyst will have to 
appear. Yet it would not be entirely out of the question for Kant's 
philosophy to be very undeveloped in this respect. Based on the silence 
that reigns over his philosophy of history, this is what you would have 
to expect. I 
Benjamin's preparatory remarks highlight the difficulty inherent in the project from its 
outset: Kant's writings on history are not only textually separated from his major 
critical writings; no extended or systematic reflections upon history are to be found in 
any of the three Critiques. If at all, the nearest Kant comes to incorporating historical 
I Briefe, p. 15 1; Correspondence, p. 98. 
questions into the critical philosophy is to be found in the third Critique, the Critique 
of Judgement. Given this difficulty of allying the writings on history to the doctrinal 
works of the critical philosophy, Benjamin's recourse seems to be to read the one out 
of the other, to extrapolate a philosophy of history from the three Critiques. How 
would this be done? Two options seem available to him: to read a philosophy of 
history into the moral philosophy of the second Critique, the Critique of Practical 
Reason; or to see in the account of 'sensus communis' in the third Critique a 
philosophy of historical development. It should be noted that in neither case is 
Benjamin's goal fully realised - the fusion of the theoretical and the historical, an 
account of the 'historical evolution of knowledge'. 
A few months later Benjamin again writes to Scholem of his project, relating that 
he intends to focus upon Kant's idea of the 'eternal task'. This theme comes not from 
the historical writings but from the second Critique. Benjamin explains: 'It is virtually 
impossible to gain any access to the philosophy of history using Kant's historical 
writings as a point of departure. It would be different if the point of departure were his 
ethics; even this is possible only within limits and Kant himself did not travel this 
path'. 2 Benjamin writes that his 'exaggerated expectations' concerning Kant's 
philosophy of history have 'met with disappointment'. 3 Kant's historical writings 
(Benjamin cites the Ideas for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent and 
Perpetual Peace) are 'less concerned with history than with certain historical 
ýonstellations of ethical interest. ' 'I find Kant's thoughts, ' he writes in conclusion, 
gentirely inappropriate as the starting point for, or as the actual study of, an 
independent treatise. '4 In a letter from the following month Benjamin reports that any 
attempts to grapple with Kant will have to be postponed: 'the development of my 
philosophical ideas has reached a crucial stage. 15 
When, shortly afterwards, this thesis plan was abandoned in favour of a study on 
the concept of art criticism in German Romanticism all that remained of the project on 
Kant and the philosophy of history was a series of fragments - 'The Infinite Task, ' 'On 
2 Briefe, p. 176, Correspondence, p. 116. 
3 Briefe, p. 161, Correspondence, p. 105. 
4 Briefe, p. 161, Correspondence, p. 105. 
5 Briefe, p. 180, Correspondence, p. 119. 
68 
the Transcendental Method, ' and 'Ambiguity of the Concept of the 'Infinite Task' in 
the Kantian School'. 6 The titles of these fragments suggest that Benjamin had indeed 
intended to raise the question of history in terms of practical reason, in terms of 
Kant's ethics: in so far as it is possible to reconstruct the intentions of the doctoral 
thesis, it seems that it would have entailed reading Kantian philosophy of history out 
of the second Critique. Correspondence from this period indicates, furthermore, that 
this encounter with history through the lens of ethics was very much mediated by his 
readings of the neo-Kantian philosopher Hermann Cohen. Benjamin was familiar with 
some of Cohen's major works, among them Kant's Theory of Experience, Ethics of 
Pure Willing and Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism, the latter a work 
published just after Benjamin abandoned his project on the philosophy of history but 
with which he subsequently became acquainted. Cohen's thought (particularly 
Religion of Reason) was crucial to Benjamin's engagement with Kant because it 
involved an attempt to reconcile concepts from the Judaic religion with Kantian 
philosophy and to demonstrate the fundamentally ethical content of both. 
What will be argued in this chapter is that the uncompleted project of a critical 
engagement with Kant and the philosophy of history haunts the entire development of 
Benjamin's thinking, even (and especially) up to his final work 'On the Concept of 
History' where the notion of 'infinite progression', against which Benjamin's 
theoretical armature is aimed, figures as the historical and political instantiation of 
Kantian practical reason. As will become clear, it is not surprising that neo- 
Kantianism becomes the object of Benjamin's critique in the drafts to his final work, 
since it is in opposition to just this thinking (of which, it seems, Cohen is taken as 
representative) that Benjamin will expound his own conception of history. Whilst the 
influence of Cohen's rewriting of Kantian theoretical reason upon Benjamin has been 
noted (in particular upon the 'methodological' works such as the Prologue to the book 
on German Trauerspiel, and the early essay 'On the Programme of the Coming 
Philosophy'), 7 a similar but arguably more significant engagement with neo-Kantian 
6 GS 6, pp. 50-3. 
7 See for instance, Julian Roberts, Walter Benjamin, op. cit.; Bernd Witte, Walter Benjamin: An 
Intellectual Biography, op. cit.; Michael L6wy, Redemption and Utopia: Jewish Libertarian Thought in 
Central Europe: A Study in Elective Affinity, op. cit.. Michael Jennings makes some tentative links 
between Cohen's Judaic writings and Benjamin's Trauerspielbuch but without exploring the 
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practical reason has been largely overlooked. Because the relationship to the former is 
less critical, this has led to commentators typically assuniing a more or less seamless 
continuity between Benjamin and the neo-Kantian philosophy in which he was 
schooled. It is the project of the present chapter to redress this imbalance: to highlight 
Benjamin's more ambivalent attitude to his philosophical heritage by examining his 
relation to Kantian and neo-Kantian ethics, or more precisely to the particular fusion 
of ethics, religion and history that one finds in Hermann Cohen. It is Cohen's 
interpretation of Heilsgeschichte or 'holy history' in terms of the postulates of Kantian 
practical reason which can be identified as the intended philosophical target of 
Benjamin's critique of history as infinite progression. 
However, whilst noting Benjamin's concern, particularly in his final work, to &'rA-L 
critically and polemically arAe against neo-Kantianism, it will become apparent that 
the severity of his criticisms belies the significant commonalities which exist between 
their two approaches to history. Agreeing with Cohen that history must be understood 
in moral terms, he differs only as to the outcome of thus 'applying ethics to history'. 8 
At the same time Benjamin's attempt to distinguish his thinking from neo-Kantianism 
rehearses many central features of Kantian philosophy itself. This is most evident in 
his critique of the idea of homogenous time where he winds M the critical apparatus 0a 
notch and enquires after the preconditions of the model of time upon which 
Kantianism itself rests. In the process this critique reinstates certain essentially 
Kantian dualisms, and the undialectical. account of the relation between quantity and 
quality which emerges has repercussions for Benjamin's understanding of history at 
large. 
14t Rr 
engagement with Kant which informs each. See his Dialectical Images: Walter Benjamin's Theory of C, C, 
Literary Criticism (Ithaca: CorneIl University Press, 1987), p. 68-9. 
8 GS 6, p. 91. 
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'Eternity is not a very long time; it is a tomorrow that could as well be today. 
Eternity is afuture which, without ceasing to be future, is nonetheless present. 
Eternity is a today which is, however, conscious of being more than today. ' 
Rosenzweig, Star of Redemption 
Cohen and Ethical History 
Between 1912 and 1919 Benjamin studied philosophy at Freiburg, Berlin, Munich and 
Bern. At Freiburg University, which in those years knew the distinguished neo- 
Kantians Jonas Cohn and Emil Lask, Benjamin studied under Heinrich Rickert who a 
few years later would supervise the doctorate of a young Martin Heidegger. Benjamin 
appears to have found academic life at Freiburg uninspiring: the seminar by Jonas 
Cohn on Kant's Third Critique and Schiller's aesthetics is said to be 'chemically 
purified of all ideas'; Benjamin describes himself sitting in Rickert's seminar and 
ýursuing his own thoughts, then afterwards agreeing with a fellow student that they 
themselves are 'more incisive' than their teacher. 9 These experiences did not succeed 
in completely alienating Benjamin from neo-Kantianism, though. His interest in the 
following years turned to the Marburg philosopher, Hermann Cohen, with whose 
works Kant's Theory of Experience and Ethics of Pure Willing he became acquainted. 
The greater affinities for Cohen than for Freiburg neo-Kantianism JV perhaps 
explicable in light of the fact that Cohen attempts to synthesize just those seemingly 
opposed fields - idealist philosophy and Judaic religion - which held Benjamin's 
interest at that time. The means by which Cohen attempted to forge this link was the 
moral law. This meant drawing out what is only implicit in Kant himself. that the 
Briefe, p. 6 1, Correspondence, p. 3 1. 
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values underpinning the critique of practical reason (in particular the postulate of 
human freedom) also serve as the barely concealed ground of the realm of the 
theoretical or pure reason. Kant's practical philosophy distinguishes man's natural 
from his intelligible self, man as desiring from man as dutiful. This division between 
natural inclination and moral duty is, moreover, understood to be insurmountable, 
with the implication that the task of striving to be moral is an endless one. This idea is 
adopted by Cohen but with crucial modifications. Firstly Cohen seeks to base the 
striving which constitutes morality not in a rigorous distinction between duty and 
inclination, but in the difference between man and God, finite and infinite. Secondly, 
he understands history as the arena of this ceaseless striving. 
Cohen's defence of the Kantian moral will must be seen in a particular 
intellectual context: with the predominance towards the end of the last century of 
deterministic models in the natural sciences and in the developing human sciences, 
little room or legitimacy seemed left for moral action. Of particular relevance here is 
what Cohen perceived as the denigration of moral and political autonomy inherent in 
Marxism. He understood his defence of moral autonomy to have both philosophical 
and political currency. But his moral philosophy does not, as might be expected, 
follow the more or less orthodox liberalism of Kant's own political writings. Critical 
of both Marxism and liberalism, Cohen's Kantianism understands its politics to lie 
somewhere between the two. 10 
It is Cohen's posthumous work Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism 
which will form the central concern of the present chapter, since it is particularly 
suited to highlighting the similarities and differences between his and Benjamin's 
thinking. At the cost of isolating this work from the tri-partite System to which it 
refers back, focusing upon this work will help to clarify the genealogy of Benjamin's 
own thinking of the relation between theology, history and politics. Where Cohen's 
Ethics of Pure Willing was received coldly by Benjamin - the work, he says, 
'depressed' him with its 'unbelievable leaps'l I- Religion of Reason, by contrast, was 
10 Thomas E. Willey, Back to Kant., The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical 
Thought, 1860-1914 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978), pp. 35-6 & 110-116. 
11 Briefe, p. 254, Correspondence, p. 173. 
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welcomed as an 'extremely remarkable book'. 12 Religion of Reason was written 
during the latter part of Cohen's life, and differs in emphasis from the earlier so-called 
systematic works in its more openly theological character, its attempt to demonstrate 
the congruence of philosophical Kantianism and Judaic religion. It also serves as an 
extended response to an attack made by Heinrich von Treitschke some years earlier on 
the 'un-German' nature of the Jewish religion. 13 
Cohen's book is an ambivalent rehearsal and critique of Kantian philosophy. On 
the one hand he employs the critical method to show the possibility of providing 
rational foundations for religious concepts such as holiness and redemption. 
Consistent with the critical philosophy, such concepts are to be grounded at the cost of 
relinquishing any speculative or transcendent employment. The reasonable nature of 
religious concepts can be guaranteed only by restricting the purview of reason itself to 
a legitimate arena: religion must appear within the bounds of reason alone. On the 
other hand he offers a critique of Kantian 'ethics' for postulating a God with merely 
formal qualities and nothing of the compassion of the God of religion: to this end he 
contrasts the abstractions of 'ethics' with the notion of 'ethical life' (Sittlichkeit), 
Hegel's term for the social, historical and customary environment within which 
morality subsists. 14 However, instead of pursuing the phenomenological approach 
suggested by this invocation of 'ethical life', Cohen relies on what are essentially 
transcendental arguments. 
The congruence of Jewish religion and critical philosophy is established not only 
by filtering religious concepts through the apparatus of practical reason, but by an 
interpretation of the postulates and regulative ideas of Kant's practical philosophy 
which stresses their consonance with the prophetic moment in Judaism. The 
projection by Kant of a 'Kingdom of Ends' (Endzwecke) which serves as the 
regulative idea of moral action, is aligned by Cohen with the Judaic anticipation of a 
12 Briefe, p. 246, Correspondence, p. 167. 
13 Willey, Back to Kant, op. cit., pp. 105-6; Eva Jospe, translator's introduction to Reason and Hope: 
Selectionsfrom the Jewish Writings of Hermann Cohen (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1971), pp. 
16-18. 
14 Hermann Cohen, Religion of Reason Out of the Sources ofJudaism trans. Simon Kaplan (New York: 
Frederick Ungar, 1972), p. 32; Gillian Rose, 'Hermann Cohen - Kant among the Prophets' in Judaism 
and Modernity: Philosophical Essays, op. cit., pp. 114-5. 
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messianic Kingdom of God. 15 Against Kant's explicit intention, 16 Cohen reintroduces 
messianism to the moral view of history. In this . transformation the 'Kingdom' loses 
its subjunctive and hypothetical status and becomes instead an ideal towards which 
humanity should strive. The striving which characterises morality is understood not - 
on Kant's terms - as the inevitable conflict between natural inclination and dUty, 17 but 
instead as the inescapable gap between finite human action and the infinite towards 
whi ch it aims. 'And what is the essence of moralityT asks Cohen. 'It consists of the 
correlation of God and man, '18 of the approach of man to the holiness or sanctity of 
God himself It is in striving to be moral that man's holiness is realised; conversely in 
becoming holy the ideal of morality is unfolded. Holiness is that which is shared by 
man and God, but not equally; man relates to God only in so far as he correlates to 
him through morality. Man can only correlate rather than equate to God because of 
the unbridgeable divide which separates the finite from the infinite. Human action is 
thus 'an infinite task which is determined through [this] correlation .... The holiness of 
man consists in self-sanctification, which, however, can have no termination, 
therefore cannot be a permanent rest, but only infinite striving and becoming. '19 What 
Cohen retains from Kant's practical philosophy is the eternal character of the task 
which morality inspires. Where he differs from Kant is in his wish to reintroduce 
messianism into this conception of the task, a move which appears, on the face of it, 
to go against the very aim of critical philosophy: the Critiques sought to delimit 
thought to the arena of rational knowledge and away from the fields trespassed by 
dogmatic metaphysics. 
Rewriting the messianic idea in Judaism as the 'infinite task' of man's correlation 
with God allows Cohen to characterise Judaism as a religion of futurity. It is a religion 
structured by temporality and that temporality points not merely towards the past and 
15 Cohen, Religion of Reason, op. cit., p. 215. 
16 Cf. Kant, Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone, op. cit., p. 127. 
17 Holiness, according to Kant, would represent the perfect alignment of the will and the moral law, 'a 
perfection of which no rational being in the world of sense is at any time capable. But since it is 
required as practically necessary, it can be found only in an endless progress to that perfect fitness'. 
[Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason trans. L. W. Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1993), p. 
128-91. 
18 Cohen, Religion of Reason, op. cit. p. 98; 100- 1. 
19 Ibid., p. I 11. 
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present but 'the newness of a future. This newness consists in the dawning of the ideal 
in contrast to all actuality. 120 Even the figure of the Messiah does not escape this 
temporalising of religious concepts: 'The ideality of the Messiah, his significance as 
an idea, is shown in the overcoming of the person of the Messiah and in the 
dissolution of the personal image in the pure notion of time, in the concept of the 
age .... This return to time is the purest idealization .... Thus, the thought of history 
comes into being for human life and for the life of the peoples. 121 This definition of 
history no longer carries its original Greek sense where it was directed solely to the 
past; messianism transforms it into 'the being of thefuture. 122 Cohen goes so far as to 
say that the very concept of history 'is a creation of the prophetic idea. '23 
In line with the exposition of the moral task as an historical task, as the infinite 
correlation of man with God, of the infinite advent of God's Kingdom, the Judaic 
notion of redemption is similarly transformed: redemption is not the goal of the task 
but a station encountered along its way. For Cohen, the Jewish calendar attests to this 
temporal structure of redemption by giving it 'symbolic' prominence in the Day of 
Atonement, one of the most important festivals in the Jewish year. Atonement is 
understood as an act which, momentarily purifying us of sin, returns us renewed and 
reinvigorated to the task: 'it need not have its only meaning as the final link in the 
development of mankind, but it can and does take place at each moment in the 
historical development. 124 Redemption is interpreted in its role as ritual or custom, 
situated within the time of dates and chronology, and understood to be transient: with 
the end of the Day, 'suffering has to become again the disciplinary means for the self- 
discipline of man. '25 
This interpretation enables Cohen to distinguish his own account of redemption 
from the eschatological sense this notion has in other strands of Judaic thought. 
'Messianism proclaims and vouches for the infinite development of the human soul. 
And at this point we can positively see how fateful the confusion of Messianism with 
20 Ibid., p. 249. 
21 Ibid., p. 249. 
22 Ibid., p. 262. 
23 Ibid., p. 261. 
24 Ibid., p. 235. 
25 Ibid., p. 230 
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eschatology is'. Messianism, unlike eschatology, 'remains in the climate of human 
existence. And if it makes the future of mankind its problem then it is the task of the 
historical future, the future of the infinite history of the human race, which becomes 
the task of the holy spirit of man. '26 Cohen needs to distinguish his messianism from 
eschatology because the latter conflicts with his specification of the endless task. 
Where eschatology implies death, destruction, 'the end', Messianism prophecies 'an 
earthly future, be it of Israel or of all the peoples. '27 The coming of the Messiah is 'not 
an actual end, but means merely the infinity of his coming'. 28 
Cohen defines the politics which follows from this characterisation of messianism 
as 'ethical socialism'. 29 Again invoking Kant he grounds this politics in the 'pure will' 
which shows up the inhumanity of suffering and its root cause, poverty: 'The poor are 
the sufferers and they are the pious. ' Pity towards the impoverished is not mere 
sentiment (for in this case sympathy would be merely empirical and not a priori) but 
is instead 'a factor of the pure will, as a lever of moral consciousness. It is the 
fundamental power of the moral universe'. 30 It is socialism which, for Cohen, 
embodies the ideal of eradicating such suffering. Socialism has the merit of providing 
the religious idea of judgement and retribution with a this-wordly rather than an other- 
wordly meaning. Retribution for the suffering and indignity of poverty thus becomes 
da goal for moral culture' since if it were to occur only in the after-life, 'it would be of 
no use, either for myself or for others. 131 
This outline of the main themes of Cohen's Religion of Reason shows something 
of its significance, not only as a revival of Kantian thought but as an attempt to fill the 
lacunae left by Kant's reflections on history. The book's importance lies not merely in 
its project of underpinning a conception of history by means of the critique of 
practical reason but also its attempt to provide rational grounds for socialism and for 
retributive justice. This latter element may explain the favourable reception which 
Cohen's thought received in some left-wing, particularly social democratic, circles. 
26 Ibid., p. 307. 
27 Ibid., p. 289. 
28 Ibid., p. 315. 
29 Ibid., p. 259. 
30 Ibid., p. 14 1. 
31 Ibid., p. 314. 
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During the early part of this century attempts such as this to theoretically underpin 
socialist ethics appealed not only to the German academy but indeed had some 
influence upon political programmes and manifestos. It is in this intellectual climate - 
a philosophical movement which had political pertinence - that Benjan-dn's own 
philosophical apprenticeship was undertaken, and whilst he takes his cue from many 
of Cohen's own assumptions, he is also keen to take many of those ideas in a very 
different direction. 
Heilsgeschichte from Cohen to Benjamin 
Already in an early essay of Benjamin's the similarities and differences between his 
and Cohen's thinking becomes clear: 0 
There is an apprehension of history which, trusting in the endlessness 
of time, distinguishes only the tempo at which peoples and epochs roll 
along the highway of progress. To this view properly belongs the 
incoherence, the lack of precision and force of the claims which this 
view is capable of offering to the present. The following reflections, on 
the contrary, are based on a distinct condition in which all of history is 
gathered into one focal point, as in the historical image of the utopian 
thinkers. The elements of the end of time [Endzustand] do not lie 
evident as formless tendencies towards historical progress, but are 
embedded deep in any present as its most endangered, ridiculed and 
scorned creations and thoughts. To render the immanent state of 
completion [Vollkommenheit] in its absolute purity; to direct it visibly 
and powerfully into the heart of the present: this is the historical task. 
The state of completion is not however to be portrayed in its pragmatic 
details (institutions, morals, and so on) - the description of which, 
rather, it eludes - but is instead only graspable in its metaphysical 
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structure, as the messianic kingdom or the idea of the French 
Revolution. 32 
This apprehension of history which no longer trust in the endlessness of time marks 
out the extent of Benjamin's divergence from Cohen's neo-Kantianism. Benjamin 
substitutes for a history modelled on correlation one projecting VoIlkommenheit or 
'completion'; history is defined here not by endlessness but by the presence latent 
within each historical moment of a condition of fulfilment. History is still, as it is for 
Cohen, modelled on the prophetic idea, on the anticipation of the Kingdom, but here 
the meaning of prophecy changes. Benjamin calls this prophetic moment 'utopian', 
unhelpfully invoking a type of thinking which actually bears little resemblance to his 
own (as his argument against specification and codification attest). The theory of 
history outlined here diverges from that of Cohen by substituting the possibility of 
completion for the notion of infinite progression, a 'metaphysical structure' for the 
regulative idea. Benjamin's example of this metaphysical structure of VoIlkommenheit 
- the 'idea of the French Revolution' - is instructive for political as well as historical 
reasons. This idea reappears in his later work where it becomes emblematic of an 
event which breaks with the progression of historical time itself. 
Benjamin, like Cohen, understands the Judaic 'Messiah' as a concept of historical 
time. The difference between the two lies in the model of history which is seen to 
follow from this temporalising of religion. Whilst for Cohen the interval between the 
finite (man) and the infinite (God) demands the task of ethical correlation, an infinite 
approach to the Kingdom of God, Benjamin sees in the messianic view of history the 
possibility latent within each historical moment for realising the Kingdom. In this 
context it is telling that Cohen's understanding of history reproduces the 
characteristics he has ascribed to prayer, those of 'longing': 'The desire for God 
expressed in prayer is a quest for God and always wants to be quest only; for the 
finding cannot be actual, but can have as its goal only 'the nearness to God, ' only the 
drawing near to God .... For God can never 
become actuality for human love. The quest 
32 GS 2, p. 75. 
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is the end in itself of the religious SOU1.133 For Benjamin the historical task yielded by 
Heilsgeschichte is very different: it seeks to make manifest that state of completion to 
which each moment of time monadologically and proleptically points. Short of the 
realisation of the Kingdom 'there remains only the task of liberating, through 
understanding, the forms of the future from their distortions in the present. Critical 
thinking [Kritik] is devoted solely to this task [dient]. 134 For Benjamin (and contra 
Cohen) the anticipation of the Kingdom is nothing without what Rosenzweig calls the 
'wish to bring about the Messiah before his time', and an awareness that each moment 
contains the possibility of His coming. Minus this desire to 'entreat the Kingdom', the 
future 'is only a past distended endlessly and projected forward. 135 That which Cohen 
longs-for is in Benjamin urgently and impatiently entreated. 
For Benjamin, Heilsgeschichte or redemptive history yields an account of time, of 
history and of political practice which differs markedly from that of Cohen's neo- 
Kantianism. Benjamin defends messianism as eschatology against messianism as 
correlation. This move changes in turn the temporal orientation of messianiSM from 
the almost exclusively futural sense it has in Cohen to encompass the past as well. The 
importance of this reorientation becomes clearer in the light of Benjamin's retrieval of 
history's original vocation as remembrance. It is clear that the difference between 
these two thinkers lies not only in the way each construes the 'sources' of Judaism but 
also the use to which they put them. Cohen's intent is to show that Judaic categories 
can be rationally grounded, and that they in turn give rise to a distinct conception of 
ethical life and of politics. For Benjamin religious categories are directly political 
categories but the politics to which the messianic idea gives rise stands sharply 
opposed to that assumed by Cohen. Both wish to use these temporalised categories of 
Judaism to express theories of historical time, but Benjamin's approach diverges 
significantly from Cohen's philosophy of history, grounded as it is in Kantian 
practical reason. Benjamin's antipathy towards the ethical structure of Kant's own 
33 Cohen, Religion of Reason, p. 375. 
34 GS 2, p. 75.6 
35 Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption trans. William W. Hallo (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1970), p. 227. On Benjanfin's indebtedness to Rosenzweig see Stdphane Moses, 'Walter 
Benjamin and Franz Rosenzweig' in G. Smith (ed. ), Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics, History, op. cit., 
pp. 228-246. 
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historical writings extends by implication to Cohen's use of Kant. From Benjamin's 
understanding of the messianic idea flows a conception of historical time opposed to 
that in which an endless task might occur. Whereas the historical and political task 
proposed by Cohen reflects an unbounded conception of history, Benjamin's view of 
the task rests upon a view of time as punctuated by messianic opportunities, where 
each each historical moment is potentially redemptive. The messianic idea expresses 
itself politically in the requirement to 'decide at every moment'. 
To leave the purely theoretical sphere .... will be humanly possible in 
only two ways, in religious or political observance. I do not concede 
that there is a difference between the two forms of observance in terms 
of their quintessential being. Yet I also do not concede that a mediation 
between them is possible. I am speaking here about an identity that 
manifests itself only in the paradoxical reversal [Umschlagen] of one 
form of observance into the other (regardless of which direction), given 
the indispensable prerequisite that every observation of action proceed 
ruthlessly and with radical intent. Precisely for this reason, the task is 
not to decide once and for all, but to decide at every moment. 36 
This thesis of the identity of religious and political observation is not without its 
problems, though. The attempt to avoid 'mediation' (Vennittlung) - perhaps because 
of its Hegelian connotations - is problematic, firstly because if there is 'no essential 
distinction' between the two terms politics and religion, then a 'reversal of one into 
the other' is meaningless; secondly, that relation by which one term passes into 
another is nothing other than the 'mediation' whose possibility Benjamin denies. 
However, recognising that this thesis of the 'identity' of theology and politics is 
confused and even contradictory does not detract from its significance. Asserting that 
the commonality between these two fields lies in their making it possible to conceive 
'sudden change, ' Benjamin shows that he thinks insight into the messianic 
36 Briefe, p. 425, Correspondence, p. 300 (amended). 
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opportunities structuring history gives rise to a political task of intervening at every 
juncture. 
Transition and Transcendence 
A critique of any apprehension of historical time which takes as its model Kantian 
practical reason spans the divide between Benjamin's early so-called 'theological' 
writings and his later 'Marxist' work. The critique links his first essays on the Youth 
Movement to his final projects on the Paris of the nineteenth century, and the 
philosophy of history. What differentiates the early from the later form of this critique 
can perhaps best be explained by noting the significant effect which LukAcs' thought 
had on Benjamin in the intervening years. Upon reading History and Class 
Consciousness in 1924 Benjamin speculated that his own 'nihilism' would entail an 
'antagonistic confrontation with the concepts and assertions of [LukAcs'] Hegelian 
dialectics. 137 Yet he also notes that the book 'validated' his own thinking. The critique 
of an infinite temporality formulated in Benjamin's early writings finds support here 
in the form of a Marxian analysis of the experience of time under modem capitalism, 
providing, the critique of neo-Kantianism with social and historical determinations. 
Benjamin incorporates into his criticism of the infinite task Lukdcs' Marxian analysis 
of the role of quantity and quality in historical time. 
The chapter 'Reffication and the Consciousness of the Proletariat' is central to 
this since it is there that Lukdcs argues that the idea of infinite moral progression 
involves an hypostatising of quantity; it rests upon a model of time which is purely 
quantitative, one in which the qualitative moment has been effaced or obscured. Both 
the reduction of quality to quantity and the idea of infinite progression are for Lukdcs 
intimately related: quantity and progression are 'abstract categories of reflection' 
which 'conceal the dialectical structure of the historical process in daily lifel. 38 'It is 
no mere chance' he says, that 'bourgeois thought should have taken up the idea of 
37 Briefe, p. 355, Correspondence, p. 248. 
38 Georg Luk6cs, 'Reffication and the Consciousness of the Proletariat' in History and Class 
Consciousness trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin, 1971), p. 165. 
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infinite progression'39 since such an idea both conceals and reveals much about that 0 
society itselL 
For Lukdcs it is only in a temporality which is homogeneous, one in which all 
qualitative intervals have been expunged and each moment rendered equal to the next, 
that the notion of infinite progress can have any purchase. 40 Progress has meaning 
only where each moment of time can be linked causally and hence predictably to its 
successor. This experience of time as quantitative equivalence is, for Lukdcs, an 
abstraction, one whose social and historical basis can be specified, and hence whose 
naturalness can be dispelled. It is, for him, the labour process which proves exemplary 
in reducing the qualitative experience of time to a purely homogeneous continuum. 
And it is the merit of the labour theory of value, according to which value is 
determined by socially necessary labour-time, to have critically thernatised this 
quantification by construing it as a real abstraction, 'a reffied and reifying cloak' in 
which the qualitative side of exploitation is obscured. 'The quantitative differences in 
exploitation which appear to the capitalist in the form of quantitative determinants of 
the objects of his calculation, must appear to the worker as the decisive, qualitative 
categories of his whole physical, mental and moral existence. 141 The fact that Lukdcs 
chooses the labour process to show that 'beneath the quantifying crust' lies 'a 
qualitative, living core'42 indicates that he thinks what is at stake in the construal of 
time as quantity is not merely a philosophical category mistake, but the actuality of 
exploitation and unfreedom. 
On Lukdcs' analysis time is never simply a given but instead a problem of 
abstraction, one which demands inquiry into its preconditions and determinants. 
Understanding the nature of time within bourgeois society becomes a question of 
abstraction because there time itsey"becomes abstract in just the way Marx understood 
the designation of labour as an abstraction to refer to a very real state of affairs: the 
expunging of individual characteristics of human creativity in the labour process. For 
Marx, whoever goes to sell her labour power on the market soon discovers the 
39 Ibid., p. 16 1. 
40 Ibid., p. 161. 
41 Ibid., p. 166. 
42 Ibid., p. 169. 
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meaning of the term abstract labour. For Lukdcs, whoever experiences the labour 0 
process soon finds out the meaning of the concept 'homogeneous clock time'. 
Benjamin's appropriation of Lukdcs' discussion is a selective one. Most 
importantly he fails to grasp the Hegelian moment of that analysis which attempts not 
only to critically expose the subordination of quality to quantity in the notion of 
infinite progression, but to problematise that very Kantian opposition as such. The 
merit of Hegel's Science of Logic upon which LukAcs' discussion draws is that there 
quantity and quality are construed not as inert categories through which we apprehend 
reality but are presented dynamically in their 'transition' (Obergang) into one another. 
This transition is described by Hegel as a 'leap' (Sprung) and he finds examples of it 
within the realm of nature, for instance in the events which bound natural life: thus 
'every birth or death, far from being a progressive gradualness, is an interruption of it 
and is the leap from a quantitative into a qualitative alteration. 143 Benjamin's 
oversight of Lukdcs philosophical references is significant in that it reveals the often 
static and undialectical nature of his own construal of quantity and quality. The fact 
that the interrelation of quantity and quality is undertheorised means that Benjamin's 
critique of homogeneous time will itself be dualistic, opposing the qualitative 
experience of freedom to the quantitative experience of alienation. The result is that 
one of the central features of Benjamin's Marxism - his critique of progress as a 
mystification of a specific mode of production - will often amount to a purely external 
form of critique. 
It his here that Benjamin's messianism threatens to compromise his Marxism 
because the act which demystifies homogeneous empty time is described as an 
external intervention, even when what he is referring to is an immanent development: 
the spontaneous actions of a revolutionary class. The emancipating breach of history's 
quantitative continuum from within is expressed as an adventitious breaking of history 
from without. 44 In his many formulations of the messianic Benjamin reveals that he 
43 Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik in Werke ed. Marheineke et al. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1833), 
vol. 4, p. 449; Science of Logic trans. AN. Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), p. 369-70. 
44 Scholern writes: 'It is precisely the lack of transition between history and the redemption which is 
always stressed by the prophets and apocalyptic ists. The Bible and the apocalyptic writers know of no 
progress in history leading to redemption .... It is rather transcendence 
breaking in upon history, an 
intrusion in which history itself perishes, transformed in its ruin because it is struck by a beam of light 
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has construed transition as transcendence: he sees the movement from quantity to 
quality as an advent or epiphany, not as something inherent in quantity itself. Thus 
Hegel's 'leap' appears here in an almost mystical and apocalyptic form: redemption 
'looks to the small fissure [Sprung] in the ongoing catastrophe'. 45 Correspondingly, 
the act of emancipation from the catastrophic continuum of history is placed at the 
limit of understanding and deliberation: messianic time is defined as 'an extraordinary 
event bordering on the miraculous and incomprehensible (Unbegreifliche). 46 It 
sometimes a pears as if Benjamin has salvaged freedom from Kant's postulates only p 
to reinstate it in Kant's noumenal realm. 
The influence of Lukdcs is further visible in the Passagen-Werk, Benjamin's 
project from the 1930s, where the critique of infinite progress is incorporated into a 
critique of ideology, and brought to bear upon mystificatory conceptions of time. 
'Konvolut D' of the mass of notes on the history of Paris is entitled 'Boredom, Eternal 
Recurrence' and attempts to show the affinities between two conceptions of time 
popular in the 19th century. Despite their apparent exclusivity and the fact that one is 
often pitted against the other, both the notion of endless perfectibility and that of 
eternal recurrence share a common social background which Benjamin, following 
Marx, calls 'generalised commodity production'. Where eternal recurrence 
paradoxically rationalises the repetitive nature of mass production - the time of 
'starting all over again', he writes, is little more than the 'regulative idea' of 'wage 
labour'47 - the notion of endless perfectibility (in equally paradoxical fashion) 
mythicises the empty time of accumulation where surplus value production has 
become an end in itself. Raised to philosophical principles, both conceptions of time 
conceal their lowly origins. 
shining into it from an outside source. The constructions of history in which the apocalypticists (as 
opposed to the prophets of the bible) revel have nothing to do with modern conceptions of development 
or progress, and if there is anything which, in the view of these seers, history deserves, it can only be to 
perish. The apocalypticists have always cherished a pessimistic view of the world. Their optimism, their 
hope, is not directed to what history will bring forth, but to that which will arise in its ruin'. [Gershom 
Scholem, The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays on Jewish Spirituality (New York: 
Schocken, 1971), p. 10. ] 
45 GS 1, p. 683; 'Central Park', op. cit., p. 50. 
46 GS 4, p. 927. 
47 GS 1, p. 636; Charles Baudelaire, op. cit., p. 137 (amended). 
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Belief in progress, in endless perfectibility (-an unending moral task-) 
and the picture of eternal recurrence are complementary. They are 
ineluctable antinomies, in the face of which the dialectical concept of 
historical time needs to be developed. Against this dialectical 
conception, eternal recurrence emerges as precisely that 'flat 
rationalism' of which the belief in progress is accused, and this latter 
belongs to the mythical mode of thinking just as much as does the 
picture of eternal recurrence. 48 
The rationalism of the notion of eternal recurrence complements the mythical nature 
of endless progression. Prefiguring Horkheimer and Adomo, Benjamin finds within 
the apparently mythical, incipient enlightenment, within the ostensibly enlightened, 
resurgent myth. Against these 'antinomical' principles a third needs to be articulated: 
this 'dialectical conception' of historical time will aim, by contrast, 'to grasp the 
actual as the obverse of the eternal in history, 149 it will set itself against the element of 
the eternal shared by both these accounts of time. What gives the lie to the 'eternal in 
history' whether it is moral task or amoral repetition, is an understanding of 
redemption. Here lies an affinity with Benjamin's earlier critique of the infinite task. 
What distinguishes these present criticisms is the ideological dimension of particular 
conceptions of time and the correspondingly material ground by which they are 
explained. The 'messianic' which dispells the eternal in history is found just as much 
in the dialectical structure of experience as in holy- or redemptive history. 
Empty Time Versus Messianic Time 
To think 'the obverse of the eternal in history', to think history as radically open but 
not spuriously open-ended, means thinking history in its 'original vocation as 
48 GS 5, p. 178 (D10a, 5). 
49 Briefe, p. 459, Corresppondence, p. 325. 
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remembrance [Eingedenken11.50 It means recognising the redemptive capacity of 
memory, that 'the way the past is experienced in remembrance' is 'neither 
homogeneous nor empty'. 51 For Benjamin remembrance yields an experience of time 
not as linear and sequential but as punctuated by qualitative, ecstatic moments, 
moments which 'stand out from time'. 52 Memory is peculiarly privileged to uncover 
this 'time filled by the presence of the now' because it itself does not correspond to a 
homogeneous temporal continuum. More precisely it does not occur 'in' time at all, 
time understood as mere form. On the contrary, remembrance proceeds as the 
structuring of time; time becomes configured around the experiential significance of a 
particular memory. 'Experience [Erfahrung] accompanies one back into the far 
reaches of time, fulfilling and structuring [gliedert] it. 153 
That this heterogeneous structure pertains just as much to historical time as to 
individually lived time is illustrated in the temporality of the calendar, the way it 
manifests the experience of historical time peculiar to a society or social group. 'The 
inaugural day of a calendar functions as an historical time-lapse camera. And it is 
essentially the same day that keeps recurring in the form of holy days [Feiertagel, 
which are days of remembrance [Tage des Eingedenkens]. Thus calendars do not tell 
time like clocks. '54 The characteristics of psychological memory have a correlate on 
the social level, the massive abridgement of historical time which the festival day of 
remembrance represents. Days of remembrance themselves preserve something of the 
transformation of the calendar which often accompanies social change; they interrupt 
the normal pattern of time in this double sense. 
The 'day of remembrance' was also a concern of Cohen's in Religion of Reason, 
but there it is understood in a significantly different way. Cohen's intent was to draw 
out. the unconditional nature of the remembrance practised in the Jewish religion (his 
paradigm appears to be the commandment to remember, Zakhor) and to highlight its 
moral message. This contrasts with Benjamin's interest in the day of remembrance 
50 GS 1, p. 123 1. 
51 GS 1, p. 704. 
52 GS 1, p. 637; Charles Baudelaire, p. 139. 
53 GS 1, p. 635. 
54 GS 1, p. 701-2; 'llieses' in Illuminations, p. 261. 
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which is directed towards the contingent social and political reality which this and 
other elements of calendar time express. For Cohen, 
all commandments and all festive celebrations are a sign of 
'remembrance of the exodus from Egypt. ' Hence the entire Torah is a 
remembrance of the liberation from Egyptiqn slavery, which, as the 
cradle of the Jewish people, is not deplored, let alone condemned, but 
celebrated in gratitude .... However, while it should remember the 
liberation from Egypt, this remembering is changed into an active duty: 
thou shalt remember that thou hast been a slave in the land of Egypt. 
Through this the memory changes into the social yirtue of loving the 
stranger, as well as into the gentle treatment of the slave and the 
promotion of his liberation. 55 
The difference between Benjamin's materialist analysis of the calendar and Cohen's 
extraction of its rational core is one not just of approach but also of the politics each 
associates with remembrance. Thus Cohen's social democratic call to philanthropy 
contrasts sharply with Benjamin's Marxian interest in the Revolutionary calendar. 
Further, the fact that Benjamin expounds remembrance by means of a phenomenology 
of, rather than exhortation to, political action, reveals much about how he intended his 
own concept of 'remembrance' to be taken. 
These two differing conceptions of remembrance, of history and of the historical 
and political 'task' can only be understood in terms of divergent conceptions of time, 
and it seems that Benjamin finds in the neo-Kantian view of history the same empty 
time, time as mere 'form' awaiting 'intuition' (or in historical terms, awaiting 
'event'), that organised Kant's transcendental aesthetic. Time is understood here (as it 
was for Newton) as a receptacle filled or'fulfilled' by events. But for Benjamin, 
where time is mere form it remains essentially unfulfilled, something which the 
encapsulation of empirical events does not alter. 56 In Benjamin's terms it is not 
55 Cohen, Religion of Reason, pp. 431 & 44 1. 
56 Cf. Benjamin's 1916 essay 'Trauerspiel und TragWie' (GS 2, p. 134). For a discussion see Howard 
Caygill, 'Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition', op. cit. 
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surprising that when transposed to history this conception of time produces a spurious 
infinite, since its lack of fulfilment is implicit from the outset. Elements of his early 
criticism of the 'emptiness' of neo-Kantian time can be seen to combine with a 
subsequent diagnosis of the 'homogeneous' character of neo-Kantian history to 
produce the critique of 'homogeneous empty time' which one finds in Benjamin's 
later works. His own model of time, one which gives rise to a divergent concept of 
history, is a time capable of fulfilment but only by the very interruption or destruction 
of that historical continuum assumed by neo-Kantianism. Here Benjamin's dispute is 
not with Kant's belief in the ideality as opposed to the reality of time (this he takes for 
granted) but with the formalism which emerges from the anti-realist turn. As becomes 
explicit in essays such as 'On the Programme of the Coming Philosophy' Benjamin's 
work is repeatedly concerned to criticise Kantian and neo-Kantian thought for its 
impoverished and formalised notion of experience, its 'unconscious complicity with 
poSitiViSMI. 57 Primarily though, it is the experience of time which is at issue. Whereas 
in his early work this criticism assumes a theological guise (thus the unfulfilled and 
unredeemed nature of the historical continuum), in the later work (and subsequent to 
his encounter with Lukdcs) it is given a materialist twist, with the suggestion that 
Kant's formalism is itself socially grounded. The formal experience recorded by 
Kantianism could gain credibility only within a society which itself impoverishes and 
renders abstract the experience of time. 
It is worth repeating that Benjamin's conception of the messianic idea does not 
imply a rejection of all notions of progress. In fact he is keen to defend a certain idea 
of progress, one which 'does not reside in the continuity of temporal succession, but 
rather in its moments of interference: where the truly new first makes itself felt'. 58 
This idea of progress grounded in discontinuity or interruption proves to be the exact 
opposite of Cohen's conception of history in which 'only continuity is the 
methodological signpost. For it, however, there is no standstill, no regress, but only 
that progress which is the true and the only one; it is progress which is based on 
continuity, which itself is independent of such contingent and external matters as 
57 GS 3, p. 565. 
58 GS 5, p. (N9a, 7); 'Konvolut 'N", p. 65. 
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before and after, and even contemporaneity; continuity overcomes and permeates all 
these. '59 At the cost of some simplification the difference between these two ideas of 
progress - the one grounded in temporal continuity, the other in the 'truly new' - might 
be represented figurally. If, as Hegel says, 'the image of the progress to infinity is the 
straight line, 160 then in Cohen's neo-Kantianism. this line becomes an asymptote of 
ever-nearing 'approximation' to God's kingdom, the Kingdom of Ends. In Benjamin's 
version of Heilsgeschichte, by contrast, the horizontal line of progression is 
interrupted at each point by the vertical axis of messianic time. 61 Each historical 
moment - and the 'moment' (Augenblick) here is not a chronological concept, since 
this is to confuse now-time and homogeneous time - contains the possibility of the 
redemptive destruction of historical time itself 
The Complicity of Progress 
By 1939 the critique of infinite progress takes on a certain currency, urgency even, 
with the signing of the Hitler-Stalin pact which freed the Nazi-hanYto invade Poland. 
For Benjamin the pact proved socialism's inefficacy in halting the rise of Fascism. In 
Germany the social democratic left had proved no more effective in stemming the 
flow of working class support to racist ideology. Reminiscent of the arguments of 
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht prior to the previous war (thinkers to whom he 
alludes in his final work), Benjamin's feeling was that social democracy's faith in 
gradual change would lead it in the last instance to support militarism. In replaying the 
critique of the idea of infinite progress in his theses 'On the Concept of History' 
Benjamin returns to one of his earliest preoccupations, showing the way in which the 
endless task actually undermines rather than grounds the moral and political action it 
was thought to inspire. The fact that the doctrine was adopted by certain social 
democrat thinkers as a theoretical underpinning for their gradualism, had implications 
that were not just philosophically problematic but politically disastrous. In projecting 
59 Cohen, Religion ofReason, p. 177. 
60 Hegel, Science of Logic, op. cit., p. 149. 
61 Cf. GS 5, p. 600 (N13a, 2); Tonvolut'N", p. 72. 
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an endlessly futural democracy, one which could be approached only through 
pragmatism and compromise, such thinking would remove democracy from actuality 
and the only political practice which might make it possible. For Benjamin a 0 
democracy perpetually deferred is an unrealisable democracy, that is, no democracy at 
all. 
The trouble arises in that social democratic thought raised the notion 
[of a classless society] to an 'ideal. ' It was defined in the neo-Kantian 
teaching as an 'endless task. ' And this teaching was the school 
philosophy of the Social Democratic Party .... Once the classless society 
was defined as an endless task, then the empty and homogeneous 
future was transformed, so to speak into an anteroom in which one 
could wait more or less sanguinely (mit mehr oder weniger 
Gelassenheit] for the arrival of the revolutionary situation. 62 
The 'endless task' induces what Benjamin calls 'Gelassenheit', a sort of passivity, the 
intent to 'let things be'. This passivity, however, derives not, as he implies, from the 
imminent anticipation of a political ideal but from its infinite deferral. Applying the 
temporal structure of the postulates of practical reason to an historically periodised 
classless society establishes not so much the inevitability as the impossibility of its 
realisation: the political outcome is an infinitely remote ideal. This inversion of 
openness into the closure of unrealisability is for Benjamin the necessary outcome of 
any thinking of time which invokes a purely extensive infinite. The diagnosis of 
Gelassenheit or 'passivity' amounts to the charge that the outcome of Kantian ethics 
an4 social democratic politics is not only good conscience but inactivity - or rather it 
is precisely in its progressivism that social democracy is most conservative. To charge 
social democracy with Gelassenheit is to point out a fundamental contradiction, that 
to the prescription of practical reason, which exhorts struggle without hope of success, 
resignation is a perfectly reasonable response. 
62 C 
., 
S 1, p. 123 1; cf. Metz, Faith in History and Society: Toward a Practical Fundamental Theology, 
trans. David Smith (London: Burns & Oates, 1980), p. 176: 'We are not made apathetic by the 
apocalyptic feeling for life, but by the evolutionary idea. ' 
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In the infinite moral task, futurity becomes empty and homogeneous, an 
indefinitely extended line. It transforms an open (because unpredictable) future into an 
empty and predictable series stretching endlessly away. Such thinking commits an 
injustice not only to the future but the past as well: it implies the continuity of 
successive historical moments, failing to realise that such continuity is itself 
produced, this by the erasure of anomalies and the elision of ruptures, an historical 
anamorphosis in which relations of power are inscribed. 'Progress [as traditionally 
understood] stands in no relation to the ruptures of history. These ruptures are 
prejudiced by the doctrine of endless perfectibility. '63 
The political correlate of the replacement of endless progress with 'interference' 
is the replacement of gradualism with spontaneism. Benjamin's writings from the 
mid-1920s onwards apply the theory of a radically indeterminate history to a theory of 
political organisation and action. 'The classless society, ' is thus 'not the final goal of 
historical progress, but the ultimate success of the often-frustrated attempts to 
interrupt it. 164 Benjamin urges that there cannot be progress towards communism; to 
think this possible is to misunderstand the dynamic of subversion and reaction which 
defines historical struggles: 'History knows nothing of the bad infinity [schlechten 
Unendlichkeit] contained in the image of the two combatants [capitalist and worker] 
locked in perpetual struggle. 165 History, Benjamin contends, knows nothing of 
Manichean images. 
Insight into the messianic opportunities structuring history gives rise to the 
political 'task' of 'deciding' at every juncture, and 'there is not a single moment that 
does not carry with it its own revolutionary opportunity. '66 Benjamin sees in history a 
radically open (but not thereby formless or unstructured) process, and with this the 
possibility of alternative courses of development being taken just when everything 
seems governed by fate. Redemptive history properly construed (and this means 
breaking with the idea that theology implies preordination) provides an archetype of 
this: it offers a way of thinking history at odds with fatalism or foreclosure. To 
63 GS 1, p. 1243. 
64 GS 1, p. 123 1. 
65 GS 4, p. 122; 'One-Way Street' in One-Way Street and Other Writings, op. cit., p. 80 (amended). 
66 GS 1, p. 123 1. 
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understand historical time redemptively means to have a basis for acting politically in 
the here and now rather than a deferred future. Whether or not this amounts, in the 
words of one critic, to 'actionistic naYvete', 67 that it leaves political judgement at the 
mercy of arbitrariness, the attempt to think history in such a way as would allow 
intervention is surely a laudable one. The twist to this analysis is Benjamin's belief 
that in the name of openness, neo-Kantianism and social democracy have 
paradoxically achieved just the opposite: fulfilling precisely what they decried in 
Marxism, they have foreclosed the future, leaving no justification for the politics they 
would incite. Thus one important upshot of the critique of neo-Kantianism is that the 
openness which Benjamin thinks characteristic of historical time is not to be confused 
with an abstract or spurious openness towards the future, one which 'trusts in the 
endlessness of time. In distancing himself from neo-Kantianism Benjamin realises 
the need to distinguish the openness of the historical object from a spurious infinity of 
historical time. The critique of neo-Kantianism thereby involves developing a 
paradoxical and dialectical qualification to his conception of history: now history is 
seen to be both open and bounded, its openness consists precisely in the potential it 
leaves for a transcendence of history's bad infinity. 
A reconstruction of Benjamin's critique of neo-Kantianism sheds light on the 
origins of many of his distinctive theories of time, history and politics. Yet it also 
demonstrates the ambivalent relation in which he stood to his own philosophical 
background. It underlines the fact that despite his antipathy towards neo-Kantianism, 
and despite the vehemence with which he criticised the philosophy in which he was 
schooled, Benjamin never definitively broke with that philosophy. His critique of 
Kant and neo-Kantianism even in its most hostile moments shares many of the 
assumptions of each; thus his invocation of the religious category of messianic time as 
an antidote to the formalism of the transcendental aesthetic resembles a tendency of 
neo-Kantianism itself to combine critical and metaphysical or pre-critical modes of 
philosophising. Such an invocation of theology lends credence to Adorno's picture of C; 
67 Rolf Tiedemann, 'Historical Materialism or Political Messianism? An Interpretation of the Theses 
"On the Concept of History"', in G. Smith (ed. ), Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics, History, op. cit., p. 
198. 
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'Benjamin's indifference to the Kantian restrictions on philosophy. 68 The 
contradictory character of this critique is further complicated by the fact that Benjamin 
seems to borrows his most powerful argument from a very different tradition of Kant 
criticism: it was Hegel who had criticised the 'bad infinity' of Kant's theoretical and 
practical philosophy, an infinite whose unattainability testifies 'not to its grandeur but 
its defect. 169 Similarly it was Hegel who, before Benjamin, expresses the movement of 
a quantitative into a qualitative alteration as an interruption, a 'leap'. In his haste to 
avoid Hegel, a thinker who he says 'totally repelled himl, 70 Benjamin may have 
overlooked many resources for just the critique which he seeks to mobilise. The fact 
that instead he draws his philosophical armature from pre-critical thinkers such as 
Leibniz (thus the use of ideas such as monadology and entelechy) may be seen to 
weaken the critical force of his engagement with Kant. 
The problems raised by Benjamin's use of metaphysical ideas are taken up in the 
next chapter by means of an assessment of the importance of Leibniz's monadology to 
Benjamin's own 'monadological' method. Recognising the influence of Leibnizian 
metaphysics on the philosophical foundations of this critical method also means 
acknowledging the difficulties to which it gives rise, the limits of its compatibility 
with dialectics and with Marxism. When Adomo characterises Benjamin's as a 
'philosophy of fragmentation' ' he points to the potential complicity of this 
metaphysical aspect of Benjamin's thinking, and the problems it poses not only for 
Benjamin's Marxism but also for his conception of history. 71 
68 Adorno, 'Introduction to Benjamin's Schriften' in Gary Smith (ed. ), On Walter Benjamin, op. cit., p. 
7. 
69 Hegel, Science of Logic, op. cit., p. 149. Benjamin's acknowledgement of Hegel is to be found at GS 41 
1, p. 1177. 
70 Briefe, p. 17 1; Correspondence, p. 113. 
71 bne might be forgiven for thinking that debate over the merits over 'infinite progress' was peculiar C, 
only to a bygone age, one inspired by the promise of boundless scientific or economic development. 
That this is not the case is evinced by an unexpected revival of this issue in contemporary thought, a 
revival which serves to demonstrate that Benjamin's analysis (despite the faults pinpointed above) is 
still topical and pertinent. The persistence of this problematic can be demonstrated by reference to the 
recent work of Jacques Derrida which, drawing upon Benjaminian concepts, attempts to establish a 
'deconstructive politics'. 
In a work from 1991 entitled The Other Heading, Derrida describes the democratic ideal as a 
. promise', expositing it by analogy with Kant's 'infinite task'. The promise denotes in ethical terms 
what the notion of diffidrence is designed to achieve in 'deconstructing' the 'metaphysics of presence'. 
The promise provides a model of temporality which highlights the moral implications of that 
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deconstruction. A promise is for Derrida something which is by its very nature futural: it is a 
performative announcement which is never fulfilled in a temporal present. To say, however, that it is 
futural is for Derrida insufficient, since our conception of the future tense itself rests on a temporal 
prejudice: the future tense is a future present. To avoid this Derrida introduces the notion of the 'to 
come' or 6-venir, a pun on the French term for 'the future'. Writing 'the future' as 'to come' transforms 
it from a future present to something always in advance of the present. To then characterise democracy 
as a promise means to say that democracy can never be achieved in a present, it is always 'to come'; it 
is an endlessly renewed and incomplete task. Derrida says that such a continual reprojection of 
democracy implies 'infinite vigilance'. Politically, he admits, it is a notion of democracy which 'will no 
longer be "revolutionary, " and it must take its time'. [Jacques Derrida, The Other Heading: Reflections 
on Today's Europe trans. Pascale-Anne Brault & Michael B. Naas (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1992), p. 108]. In a contemporaneous essay, 'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of 
Authority, "' part of which comprises a reading .; of 
Benjamin's 'Towards a Critique of Violence. ' he 
again invokes the ii-venir, this time in Benjamin's name. For Benjamin, he says, democracy is always 
'to come'. [Derrida, "'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority... in Drucilla Cornell et al. 
(eds. ), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 391. A subsequent 
book Specters of Marx again replays the theme of the h-venir, this time finding it prefigured in Marx's 
understanding of 'communism'. Marx, according to Derrida, theorises time futurally: for him 
communism is never realised in a present but is 'distinguished ... from every living present understood as 
plenitude of presence-to-itself. ' [Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, The Work of 
Mourning and the New International trans. Peggy Kamuf (London: Routlcdge, 1994), p. 99]. In Marx, 
the future 'is not described, it is not foreseen in the constative mode; it is announced, promised, called 
for in a performative mode. ' (ibid, p. 103) The promise here carries a temporality of a task, a task 
Derrida describes as 'messianic' with repeated allusions to Benjamin. The 'messianic' names, in 
Derrida's words, an 'historical opening to the future', but also, crucially, 'a structure of experience 
rather than a religion, ' (ibid., p. 167) an experience of 'waiting without horizon of expectation. ' (ibid., 
p. 168). There should be no expectation because 'if one could count on what is coming, hope would be 
but the calculation of a program. One would have the prospect but one would no longer wait for 
anything or anyone. ' (Ibid., p. 169). Although Derrida (with some qualifications) defines both 
democracy and now communism along Kantian lines - as regulative ideas - he misrepresents the lineage 
of his own thinking. The notion of democracy as always 'to come' owes more to what Scholem calls 
'the messianic idea in Judaism' than it does to Kant. Furthermore, with this formulation of messianism 
as an infinite task he comes closer to Cohen than he ever does to Benjamin. (It is perhaps no mere 
coincidence that Derrida was also writinc, on Cohen at the same time as formulating this political 
theory. [See Derrida, 'Interpretations at War: Kant, the Jew, the German', New Literary History 22 (1) 
Winter 1991, pp. 39-95. For a critique of Derrida's essay see Gillian Rose, 'Of Derrida's Spirit'. 
Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays, op. cit., especially pp. 79-87. ) Derrida sees Benjamin's 
con 
, 
cept of the messianic as a regulative idea, as always 'to come'. However, in the light of the 
exposition of the term 'messianic' given in this chapter, in particular its role in providing a critical 
response to Cohen's moral task, it should be clear that Derrida's invocation of Benjamin is misplaced 
and inaccurate. In Benjamin's name Derrida has returned the messianic interpretation of communism 
and the communist interpretation of messianism to Cohen's philosophy, thus overlooking Benjamin's 
strong antipathy to the idea that communism should be grasped in terms of Kantian practical reason. 
This misreading would be of merely scholarly interest did it not have ramifications for Derrida's own 
thought: his interpretations perform considerable labour in the attempt to establish a dcconstructive 
politics. What has been said thus far of Benjamin's real understanding of the 'messianic' should point 
up the weaknesses in Derrida's own ideas of democracy, of communism, and indeed of temporality. 
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Dcrrida shows an inability to think politically just that which Benjamin's notion of the messianic 
was designed to capture: 'sudden change' (Briefe, p. 425, Correspondence, p. 300). In writing 
communism as 'to come' Derrida commits what is for Benjamin the dangerous error of conflating the 
time of a classless society with the time of class-ridden society (cf. GS 1, p. 1245). It fails to appreciate 
that the deferral of our political aspirations is something at which our present society proves highly 
adept. Attempting to theorise an 'historical opening to the future', Derrida thinks instead only the 
closure of an unattainable goal. Derrida's Messiah is not God but Godot. 
Benjamin says at one point that the infinite task is like climbing a mountain in which each crest 
that is reached proves to be only an illusion of the summit; the peak 'seems ever to back away' 
revealing yet another to be climbed, so that 'the goal flees totally ungraspable into the distance. ' This is, 
he says a 'perfectly empty kind of infinity'. (GS 6, p. 53) Derrida's politics of the 'to come' - and in this 
he shows the persistent and pervasive influence of neo-Kantianism - can be pictured as just such an 
ever-retreating goal, a perfectly empty kind of infinity. The unattainability of the deconstructive infinite 
attests not to its grandeur but its defect. 
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IV 
A Philosophy of Fragmentation 
Introduction 
The aim of the present chapter is to explore what Benjamin understands by 'the 
monadological structure of the historical object" and to argue that this predication 
rests in turn upon another, that history's 'original vocation' is 'remembrance'. 2 In 
what follows it will be proposed that these two qualities of the 'historical object' are 
intimately linked, and that recognising that remembrance, like history, is 
monadological provides an invaluable key to understanding Benjamin's thought. This, 
of course, begs the question of what is meant by 'monadology'. To answer this 
requires a discourse on method: it demands that we follow the development of 
Benjamin's historical methodology from the early Ursprung des deutschen 
Trauerspiels to the late Passagen-Werk. Benjamin himself relates the methodological 
elements of these two texts: in a letter to Scholem he writes that the Passagen-Werk, 
like the book on German Trauerspiel will need 'an introduction which deals with the 
theory of knowledge, and this time, especially with the theory of the knowledge of 
history. 13 
As well as illuminating the role played by memory and remembrance in 
structuring Benjamin's philosophy of historical time, the discussion that follows will 
throw into relief the strengths and weaknesses of his method. In particular it will allow 
I GS 5, p. 594 (NIO, 3); Tonvolut'N", p. 66. 
2 GS 1, p. 123 1. 
3 Briefe, p. 506; Correspondence, p. 359 (amended). 
an assessment of significant criticisms made by Adomo of the 'fragmentary' nature of 
Benjamin's method and the 'lack of mediations' in his critical practice. Exploring and 
evaluating this use of monadology equally serves to highlight the complex and often 
contradictory philosophical lineage of Benjamin's thinking, in particular his relation 
to Leibniz and to critical philosophy. This appropriation of Leibniz centres around the 
contention that each temporal moment contains in latent form the collected or 
recollected entirety of history; particularity (e. g. individual memory, the instant) is 
understood as a compressed representation of the whole ('collective consciousness', 
the entire span of past history). Adomo's dialogue with Benjamin restages critical 
philosophy's encounter with metaphysics: his critique of the monadological method 
invokes (explicitly) Hegel and (implicitly) Hegel's criticisms of Leibniz. For Adomo, 
the 'immediacy' in the Leibnizian account of the relation between 'monad' 
(particular) and 'universe' (universal) is a significant flaw, especially when applied to 
social and historical questions. Adomo asks the searching question of whether it is 
possible to employ monadology as a critical method once it is acknowledged that 
monads replicate the illusory veneer of individuality or immediacy which attends 
modem conditions of production. 
Ag. Nr 
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'It is certain that whoever could write the history of his own life from 
its very ground would have thereby grasped in a brief conspectus the 
history of the universe. ' 
Schelling, Ages of the World 
'Methodological Observations' 
In a letter written during the composition of his work on German Trauerspiel, 
Benjamin announces that the work's Prologue is to involve a series of 
'methodological observations' on the study of literature. 4 Although couched in the 
language of philosophical aesthetics and informed by neo-Kantian Erkenntniskritik 
('critique of knowledge'), the Prologue amounts to much more than that. Indeed 
Benjamin's 'Erkenntniskritische Vorrede' can be seen as a methodological preface to 
his thought in general; the philosophical and historiographical approaches of his later 
work find expression here in germinal form in this critique of aesthetic categorisation 
and periodisation. Under the guise of a critique of aesthetic knowledge, Benjamin 
reflects upon the grounds of knowledge per se. 
. The Prologue sets forth a definition of philosophy's task as 'the representation 
[Darstellung] of Ideas'. 5 Through a critique of aesthetic methodology it develops 
philosophical themes which exceed their sheerly aesthetic deployment in the work 
itself. On the one hand Benjamin castigates an 'inductive methodology' which 
'abstracts ... rules and laws' from particulars on the grounds that 
it risks 'nominalism' 
4 Briefe, p. 342; Correspondence, p. 238. 
5 GS 1, p. 214; The Origin of German Tragic Drama, op. cit., p. 34. 
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and, by implication, 'scepticism'. 6 On the other hand he rejects a deductive method 
which can only 'project a pseudo-logical continuum' of concepts and attempt to fit 
particulars under it. 7 Criticising both induction and deduction, Benjamin urges that the 
truth can be revealed only by a specific configuration of particulars in the Idea, for 
which he provides a formula - 'Ideas are to things as constellations are to stars'. 8 A 
configuration of objects or phenomena in the Idea is at the same their 'salvation': 
when seen 'as points in such constellations, phenomena are subdivided [aufgeteilt] 
and at the same time redeemed [gerettetl. '9 This Ovidian metamorphosis of 
phenomena rescues the empirical by revealing its truth-content, its expression of 
universality. Yet thought can only apprehend the timeless Idea virtually, by means of 
concepts; similarly, it is only through concepts that the subdivision and redemption of 
phenomena can occur. To have recognised this was the merit of the great 'systems' of 
ideas. Although Plato, Leibniz and Hegel10 are mentioned at this point, Benjamin 
proceeds to explicate his philosophical method with reference to only the first two 
thinkers. He takes as a prototype for a method which would avoid both induction and 
deduction the account in Plato's Symposium of an Erotic 'ascension' from sensible 
particulars to the realm of truth. The Symposium, Benjamin points out, 'presents truth 
- the realm of ideas - as the essential content of beauty. It declares truth to be 
beautiful' and classifies it in terms of 'the stages of erotic desires. "' According to the 
Symposium Eros holds to that in the particular which partakes of the Idea of the 
Beautiful; passing from a sense of physical beauty to moral beauty and the beauty of 
knowledge until attaining the True itself. 12 Whilst 'ascension' appears to imply the 
derivation and induction already criticised, and the more familiar Platonic model by 
which phenomena 'partake' of the forms seems to imply a similarly questionable 
deduction, Benjamin gives his reading of Plato a Leibnizian twist by construing it as 
highlighting the presence of the Idea, the universal, within particulars themselves. 
6 GS 1, p. 221; Origin, pp. 40-41. 
7 GS 1, pp. 223-5; Origin, pp. 42-44. 
8 GS 1, p. 214; Origin, p. 34. 
9 GS 1, p. 215; Origin, p. 34 
10 GS 1, p. 212; Origin, p. 32. 
11 GS 1, pp. 210-11; Origin, pp. 30-31. 
12 Plato, The Symposium, trans. W. Hamilton, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 195 1), p. 94-5. 
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For the remainder of the Prologue it is Leibniz who becomes Benjamin's 
philosophical interlocuter, something which is significant for any understanding of 
these methodological observations and for any understanding of Benjamin's use of the 
'monad' more generally. In a letter from this period written to his friend Florence 
Christian Rang (the only person he believed qualified to fully understand the 
Trauerspiel book) Benjamin explains that his aim in the Prologue is to augment a 
Platonic conception of the Idea with aspects of Leibnizian metaphysics: 'Ideas' 
intensive infinitude characterises them as monads .... I am adopting Leibniz's concept 
of the monad for a definition of ideas. '13 This comment is revealing and makes 
comprehensible not only the more difficult themes of the Prologue but also 
Benjamin's use of Leibnizs terms elsewhere. But what does it mean? To grasp the 
meaning of 'intensive infinitude' it is helpful to set out Leibnizs intention in 
formulating the notion of the monad. This is helpful for the further reason that 
Benjamin himself never explicitly addresses the question of his relationship to 
Leibniz's philosophy. His appropriation of the terms 'monad' and 'monadology' is 
typically decontextualised from the original metaphysical dispute in which they were 
formulated. 
Leibniz's monad was devised as a response to a perceived inadequacy in the 
attempts of Descartes, Spinoza and the atomists to understand substance. His belief 
was that their philosophies foundered when required to justify the relation between 
parts and whole which their account of substance entailed. Leibniz's solution to their 
difficulties involved proposing a model of simple substance that in some way reflects 
the whole. The problem with which Lcibniz wrestled was how to retain the distinction 
between parts and whole whilst holding to the immanence of the one in the other. His 
answer was to assert that while the part cannot contain the whole in complete form, it 
can contain it either as a partial representation, or as a potential to be realised. The 
monad's quality of representing the whole he terms 'perception', the potential for 
unfolding the whole, 'appetition'. Perception itself is twofold since it can be either an 
unconscious representation or consciousness proper ('apperception'); the former is 
described as the perception involved in a 'deep drean-fless sleep ... or a swoon', the 
13 Briefe. p. 323; Correspondence, p. 224 
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latter is distinguished by its being 'accompanied by memory. 14 Both perception and 
appetition are essential charcateristics of the monad: if there were only perception then 
the representation of the whole in each monad would be static; appetition names the 
latency inherent in each monad, the dynamic movement which makes possible the 
representation of the whole in its diversity. The relation between the monads thereby 
becomes significant: each 'monad', according to Leibniz, is simple indivisible 
substance exhibiting an intrinsic self-sufficiency or autarky which leaves it unaffected 
by other monads. Its only relationship is to the whole which it 'expresses', an infinite 
which, because it is immanent to the monad itself, is intensive rather than (as on 
Descartes' model) extensive; a monad's infinity is thus qualitative rather than 
quantitative, intensive rather than extensive. 
Benjamin's intention in invoking Leibniz's terminology during the Prologue 
appears to be twofold. Firstly it offers a more adequate account of the relation of 
particularity to universality than he finds in Platonic derivation and Kantian 
deduction, and when used as a characteristic of the idea, a more adequate theory of 
truth. Secondly, in the notion of 'appctition' it provides a teleology which does justice 
to what he sees as the essential dynamic of the object of knowledge. 'The tendency of 
all philosophical conceptualisation is thus redefined in the old sense: to establish the 
becoming of phenomena in their being. For in philosophical science (Wissenschaft] 
the concept of being is not satisfied by the phenomena until it has absorbed all its 
history. '15 Consistent with Leibniz, the epistemological and vital aspects of 
monadology are united in the underlying theme of the Prologue - that the whole (truth) 
necessarily stands in a dynamical relation to the part (phenomena). 
That 'philosophy is meant to name the Idea, as Adam named nature'16 indicates 
the unusual amalgamation of Platonism and theology which defines this early 
conception of the philosophical project: the ascent from sensible particulars to the 
realm of truth (the Idea) is at the same time the recovery of the original meaning of 
objects, lost in the multiplication of languages and meanings. The need for 
14 Leibniz, 'Principles of Nature and of Grace', P, Philosophical Writings, ed. G. H. R. Parkinson, 
trans. Mary Morris & G. H. R. Parkinson, (London: Dent, 1973), p. 197 
15 GS 1, p. 228; Origin, p. 47 (amended). 
16 Briefe, p. 323; Correspondence, op. cit., p. 224. 
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configuration is given by the multiplicity of names (meanings) in a lapsarian world: 
'philosophy is - and rightly so -a struggle for the representation of a limited number 
of words which always remain the same -a struggle for the representation of ideas. ' 17 
This clearly problematic notion of the 'word' need not concern us here, for the aim of 
this reconstruction is merely to contextualise the later invocation of monadology as a 
philosophical-historical method. It is sufficient to note that this lapsarian account of 
language becomes very much marginalised in Benjamin's application of monadology 
to the 'historical object'. For the purposes of the present argument then, for which this 
exposition serves as a preamble, what is important is the use of a Leibnizian 
framework as a means of arriving at philosophical truths. That framework allows a 
critique and a modification of the philosophical procedures of induction and deduction 
as traditionally conceived. 
Consistent with Leibnizian monadology, the 'Prologue' does not set the particular 
against the whole, the fragment against the system, 18 but sees the former as the mirror 
of the latter. Monadology, Benjamin stresses, concerns itself with the 'totality'; it is 
invoked in order to sophisticate, rather than undermine, systematic philosophy. A 
philosophy can therefore be 'systematically oriented' without being 'systematically 
developed'. 19 It is merely the method of approach to this totality which is different 
from that taken by systematic philosophy. Benjamin concludes: 'And so the real world 
could well constitute a task [Aufgabe], in the sense that it would be a question of 
penetrating so deeply into everything real as to thereby reveal an objective 
interpretation of the world. In the light of such a task of penetration it is not surprising 
that the philosopher of the Monadology was also the founder of the infinitesimal 
calculus. 120 Monadology ironically inverts the infinite task into an infinitesimal task - 
17 C; S 1, p. 217; Origin, p. 37. 
18 As Anson Rabinach argues in his Introduction to Gershom Scholem (ed. ), The Correspondence of 
Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholern 1932-1940, trans. Gary Smith & Andre Lefevere (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. xx. In a similar vein Michael Jennings argues that Benjamin's 
use of the fragment is directed against the idea of totality. See Jennings, Dialectical Images: Walter 
Benjamin's Theory of Literary Criticism, op. cit., p. 46. 
19 Benjamin cited in Irving Wohlfarth, 'On The Messianic Structure of Walter Benjamin's Last 
Reflections'. op. cit., p. 212, n. 52. 
20 GS 1, p. 228; Origin, p. 48. 
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one of interpolating into the n-dnutiae of perception and experience so as to reveal the 
totality represented, however partially, within. 
Monadology as Historiographical Method 
The use of monadology in the Prologue to the Trauerspielbuch contextualises and 
illuminates its subsequent reformulation in the methodological 'preface' to the 
Passagen-Werk and Ober den Begriff der Geschichte. 'Konvolut N', the set of notes 
on the 'theory of the knowledge of history', and the similarly inspired theses 'On the 
Concept of History', can now be examined more fully in the light of the early work. 
Whilst formally resembling a neo-Kantian preoccupation with the justification of 
knowledge, these works display a philosophical content which is predominantly 
Leibnizian. The idea of applying monadology to historical study, although prefigured 
in Benjamin's early messianic writings, can be traced in this instance to his readings 
of Hermann Lotze during the preparation of the Passagen-Werk. It appears that 
Lotze's mobilisation of Leibnizian metaphysics against the Kantian critical 
philosophy, and in particular against the formalism of Kant's conception of time, 21 
proved influential upon Benjamin's thinking at this point. 
Both the monad's qualities of 'perception' and 'appetition' are invoked in the 
'Konvolut 'N" and the 'Theses', but this time they are expounded as characteristics 
not of the 'monadic structure of the Idea' but of the 'monadological structure of the 
historical object'. The 'historical object' (Gegenstand der Geschichte) names both 
historical phenomena and history-as-object and fuses the epistemological and dynamic 
characteristics of the monad. Like the phenomena rescued in the constellation of the 
Idea, the historical object is 'whatever is redeemed by knowledge. 22 What was for 
Leibniz an account of the temporal latency of simple substance becomes for Benjamin 
a model of historical time where future, present and past interpenetrate. For Leibniz, 
'every individual substance involves in its perfect notion the whole universe, and 
21 See for instance Hermann Lotze, System of Philosophy, vol. 2, Metaphysic, trans. Bernard Bosanquet 
(Oxford: CIarendon, 1884), esp. p. 246. 
22 GS 5, p. 595-6 (N 11,4); 'Konvolut 'N", p. 67. 
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everything existing in it, past, present and future. '23 'The present is big with the future 
and laden with the past' such that 'in the smallest substance eyes as piercing as those 
of God could read the whole sequence of things in the universe: 'The things that are, 
the things that have been, and those that are presently to come. "24 In similar terms 
Benjamin contends that 'the historical object, by virtue of its monadological. structure, 
discovers within itself its own fore-history [Vorgeschichte] and after-history 
[Nachgeschichte]. 125 The historical object's capacity for representation is at once its 
entelechy, since the whole strives towards its own more adequate expression. Thus 
history, in Benjamin's words, 'bears its end [Ende] within itself'; 26 this end is nothing 
other than history's complete revelation. In its 'striving' (Leibniz, Benjamin) or 
'heliotropy' (Benjamin) the isolated historical monad thus betrays the most 
'inconspicuous' and yet significant of transformations. 27 The historiographical method 
to which these twin definitions of the historical object gives rise is, like the 
epistemological method of the Prologue, a relentless interpolation into minutiae, in the 
cause of revealing both the object's fore- and after-history and the dynamic by which 
the historical totality seeks to manifest itself therein. As historiographical method, 
monadology seeks to make unconscious representation into distinct apperception; with 
its help the historian's eyes can aspire to become 'as piercing as those of God. ' 
The 'theory of the knowledge of history' which underlies Benjamin's late studies, 
like the 'critique of knowledge' which organised the Prologue, attempts to expose the 
limitations and weaknesses of inductive and deductive method, only this time in the 
context of the philosophy of history and historiography. Benjan-Lin declares against, on 
the one hand, the attempt to subsume particular historical objects (events, phenomena) 
under a predetermined schema, a schema which is itself typically ahistorical, 'eternal'. 
On the other hand, he indicts a method which seeks to establish 'a causal connection 
between various moments in history'. 28 In both cases universal claims concerning 
23 Leibniz, 'Primary Truths' in Philosophical Writings, op. cit., p. 90. 
24 Leibniz, 'New Essays on the Human Understanding' in Philosophical Writings, op. cit., p. 156. 
25 GS 5, p. 594 (NIO, 3); 'Konvolut'N" p. 66. 
26 GS 5, p. 59; Charles Baudelaire, p. 176. 
27 GS 1. p. 694-5; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 255. 
28 GS 1, p. 704; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 263. 
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history rest upon an unexamined assumption of temporal continuity: their method 'is 
additive; it musters a mass of data to fill the homogeneous, empty time. 129 
'Konvolut 'N" along with the 'Theses' in their various stages of completion 
show Benjamin working out his own ambivalent relationship to universal history. 
Between these sets of formulations he both calls for its 'destruction [Abbau]130 and 
offers a qualified defence of it: 'Not every universal history need be reactionary. 
Universal history without a constructive principle is, though. The constructive 
principle of universal history makes possible the representation of the universal in the 
partial. It is in other words monadological. 131 To 'destroy' universal history clearly 
does not imply its eradication, its abstract negation; on the contrary the invocation of 
monadology is intended to rescue the critical potential of the philosophy of history by 
redefining it: 'the genuine concept of universal history is a messianic one'. 32 A 
monadological or messianic conception of history differs from an inductive approach 
by recognising the universal within each moment of historical time, or rather by 
perceiving (counterfactually) the potential gathering of time which each temporal 
moment presents. 'Every moment' is thus 'one of judgment over particular preceding 
moments. 133 From this account of the universality latent within particular moments of 
time follows an approach which, whilst still recognisably situated within the tradition 
of universal history, diverges from its previous formulations in that history's 
meaningfulness is understood to be visible within particular events rather than in their 
progressive succession. 
The sense of 'monadology' in this critique of historiography has not diverged as 
far from its original Leibnizian meaning as may appear. 34 To set a- monadological 
conception of time against the purely homogeneous conception visible in existing 
historiography entails adopting in turn Leibniz's own understanding of the monad as 
29 GS 1, p. 704; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 263. 
30 GS 1, p. 1240. 
31 GS 1, p. 1234. 
32 GS 5, p. 608 (N18,3); 'Konvolut 'N", p. 80. 
33 GS 1, p. 1245. 
34 For a view of the relation between Benjamin and Leibniz which emphasises their differences see 
Andrew Benjamin, 'Time and Task: Benjamin and Heidegger Showing the Present' in Andrew 
Benjamin & Peter Osborne (eds. ), Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: Destruction and Experience, op. cit., 
pp. 237-9. 
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non-extended substance. Again it should be borne in mind that Leibniz conceived the 
monad as a means of exposing flaws in the Cartesian view of substance as something 
extended, quantitative and continuous. For Leibniz 'extension is nothing but an 
abstraction [which] presupposes some quality, some attribute, some nature in the 
thing, which quality extends or diffuses itself along with the thing. '35 Retained in 
Benjamin's usage of 'monadology' as a model of historical time is this recognition of 
the purely quantitative as an abstraction in which the qualitative is concealed. If the 
homogeneous and continuous conception of time upon which existing historiography 
rests is nothing but an abstraction from time's qualitative character, then a 
monadological account of time cannot but take up a critical relation to history as 
commonly conceived. Monadology in Benjamin's hands opposes the intensive 
universality of the instant to the extensive, purely quantitative, continuum of time - the 
only conception within which 'progress' is meaningful. Benjamin's own descriptions 
of the qualitatively structured nature of time show that he not unaware of what is 
entailed by redefining historical time monadologically, and that he/ acknowledges 
the lineage and origin of his philosophical concepts. 
If the Prologue understands truth to consist in 'the sum total of all possible 
meaningful juxtaposition' of Ideas, then in the 'Preface' to the Passagen-Werk, 
historical truths are to emerge from the precisely crafted juxtaposition of past and 
present events. The 'constellation' of the Prologue becomes the 'construction' of 
'Konvolut 'N", an arrangement or configuration of particulars from which historical 
truths may be read off. The specifications given to the constructive method show the 
extent of the continuity between the monadology of Benjamin's early work and that of 
his last works: construction involves 'carrying the montage principle over into history. 
Building up the large structures out of the smallest, precisely fashioned structural 
elements. Detecting the crystal of the total event in the analysis of the simple, 
individual moment. 36 
The difference between the early and later senses of monadology is that now it 
takes on 'materialist' qualifications: as an account of the relation between part and 
35 Leibniz cited in translator's introduction to The Monadology, trans. Robert Latta (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1898), p. 28, n. 2. 
36 GS 5, p. 575 (N2,6); 'Konvolut 'N", p. 48. 
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whole, between phenomena and truth, monadology provides not just an approach to 
universal history which would avoid deduction and derivation but also a way of 
thinking about social phenomena. In Benjamin's hands it becomes a timely response 
to a situation in which it has become increasingly difficult to divine the social totality: 
under such circumstances the question of how to pass from the observation of isolated 
phenomena to general reflection upon society and history becomes all the more 
difficult. In the Passagen-Werk this is formulated as a Marxian problematic: how to 
uncover social relations from their own self-produced illusions of immediacy, when 
society commonly appears in its most elemental, that is, unmediated, form. 37 For 
Benjamin, Marx's analysis of the commodity expresses the problem of induction 
eloquently, since the commodity in its apparent immediacy and self-sufficiency both 
conceals and yet points towards the entire set of social relations which constitute 
commodity-producing society. In the context of this illusory (though nonetheless 
'real') immediacy, monadology becomes a critical and defetishising approach to 
historical and social analysis. Yet its critical deployment carries with it a significant 
danger, as will become clear: whilst the intention is to reveal the universal in the 
particular, to detect 'the crystal of the total event in the analysis of the simple, 
individual moment', its result often appears as a fetishism of the immediate. 
Monadological Memory 
In informing his belief that the 'historical object' is structured monadologically, the 
importance of Benjamin's understanding of memory cannot be overestimated. If 
history is a form of remembrance then both can be expected to share the same 
fundamental characteristics. That remembrance is, like history, monadological is 
confirmed in Benjamin's writings on Proust. These writings in turn reveal the benefits 
and limitations of moving directly from personal psychological memory to collective 
37 CL Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), p. 125. 
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memory and history. Benjamin believed the Passagen-Werk to be undertaking for the 
presentation of history what Proust had achieved with respect to an individual life. 38 
Benjamin draws upon Proust's rich descriptions of the fortune and work of 
memory whilst distancing himself from their individualism. Proust's model of 
memory amounts to a relentless attention to minutiae; it stakes itself on the belief that 
in the most innocuous objects of experience, in the smallest details, one may find 
withheld an entire lived past. In the involuntary reminiscence, Proust tells us, 'the 
materials of memory no longer appear singly, as images, but tell us about a whole 
[Ganze]1.39 Whereas 'an experienced [erlebtes] event is finite .... a remembered 
[erinnertes] event is infinite [schrankenlos], because it is a key to everything that 
happened before and after it'. 40 The remembered event opens monadologically onto 
all that preceded and succeeded it. Correspondingly, it is the task of the work of 
remembrance to rescue all that is thus involuntarily evoked. 'What Proust began so 
playfully became awesomely serious .... remembrance advances 
from small to smallest 
details, from the smallest to the infinitesimal, while that which it encounters in these 
microcosms grows ever mightier. 141 Not only does Proustian memory exhibit the 
monad's quality of 'perception', it also captures its dynamic 'appetition': in the 
involuntary reminiscence it is as if past time itself strives towards its own 
manifestation. 
But for Benjamin the resources which Proust provides for theorising the power of 
iemembrance are qualified by the problematic assumptions upon which his writing 
rests, the impoverished experience which his defence of memory implicitly articulates. 
The hard lesson of A la recherche is that it is only by chance that one comes upon the 
key which might unlock the 'microcosm' of life-history, and where remembrance is 
thus serendipitous it is, paradoxically, melancholic: 'The wrinkles and creases on our 
faces are the registration of the great passions, vices, insights that called on us; but we, 
38 GS 5, p. 5 80 (N4,3); 'Konvolut 'N", p. 52. 
39 GS 2, p. 323; 'The Image of Proust' in Illuminations, p. 214. 
40 GS 2, p. 312; Me Image of Proust' in Illuminations, p. 202. 
41 GS 6, p. 467-8; 'A Berlin Chronicle' in One-Way Street and Other Writings, p. 295-6. One 
implication of Benjamin's interpretation is that Proust's writing is not - as Gilles Deleuze has 
characterised it -a 'deviant monadology', but rather a perfectly orthodox monadology. See Deleuze, 
Proust and Signs trans. Richard Howard (New York: Braziller, 1972). 
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the masters, were not home. 142 For Benjamin, Proust's defence offortuna, of chance, 
unwittingly testifies to an experience become routine and habitual; his writing is 
'nonchalent' with regard to this, its own precondition, and instead of acknowledging 
the deterioration of experience it seeks to preserve its purity by individualising it. 
Proust aestheticises remembrance and in the same movement, delimits it. His 
definition of 'art' as the act of 'gymnastics' by which an artist's own experiences are 
translated into 'generalities 143 exposes the limitations of his monadology. The 'brief 
lightning flashes' of reminiscence attest to the fact that an entire life can be 
'illumined', 'restored to its true pristine shape', but only - crucially - 'within the 
confines of a book'. 44 Memory becomes a solitary act of autobiography. For Proust - 
and Benjamin's judgement is crushing - 'redemption is my private show'. 45 
In its individualism, its restriction of reminiscence to the purview of living 
memory Proust's work attests to a deterioration of tradition, the dissolution of an 
earlier form of remembrance. 'Proust could appear as an unprecedented phenomenon 
only in a generation that had lost all bodily, natural substitutes for remembering 
[Eingedenken], and, poorer than before, was left to its own devices, and thus could 
only get hold of [its past] in an isolated, scattered, and pathological fashion'. 46 The 
difficulty for' Benjamin is that this pathological element of the involuntary 
reminiscence threatens to taint his own use of the concept. Any historical translation 
of Proust's terms would need to rid involuntary memory of the accent of 
individualism which attends it and the pathological arbitrariness with which it 
operates. When involuntary memory is equated with the retroactive effect of political 
action the dangers are exacerbated further. A translation of these redemptive powers 
of Proustian reminiscence into qualities of historical remembrance (the actions of a 
social group, a collective, a class) would need to critically"'thernatise the psychologism 
and individualism in their original formulation, 47 otherwise the idea of a collective 
42 GS 2, p. 32 1; 'The Image of Proust' in Illuminations, p. 211-12. 
43 Proust, In Search of Lost Time, vol. 6. - Time Regained, op. cit., p. 275. 
44 Ibid., p. 457. 
45 GS 1, p. 643, n.; Charles Baudelaire, p. 145, n. 
46 GS 5, p. 490 (K 1,1). 
47 Cf. Robert Alter, Necessary Angels: Tradition and Modernity in Ka/ka, Benjamin, and Scholern 
(Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1991) p. 106: 'There were two imaginitive steps 
[Benjamin] found it difficult to take. One was from the Jewish focus on the vista of the past to the 
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memory could rest methodologically upon a mere aggregation of individual (isolated) 
memories. For the politicisation of memory to be critical, it would need to 
problematise the social atomism from which theories such as Proust's derive their 
legitimacy, but without offsetting this illusory individuality by hypostasising an 
equally spurious collective. That Benjamin failed to find a way beyond these two 
possibilities was, as will be seen, Adorno's final judgement upon the Passagen-Werk. 
Despite diagnosing the privilege afforded to the involuntary as a 'pathological' 
expression of the decline of tradition, Benjamin still thinks it possible to put Proustian 
categories to historical or historiographical use. He sees in Proustian memory an 
analogue of the redemptive power of historical remembrance which highlights the 
crucial involuntary moment in that act of recovery. He does not wish to completely 
eclipse the involuntary in reminiscence; the redemption of the past through 
remembrance requires both elements of the Proustian dualism. The dualism allows 
him to express the necessarily unexpected and unforeseeable character of redemption 
along with the instantaneous character of the insight which it affords. Yet in this very 
enthusiasm for Proust the paradox of Benjamin's relation to his own diagnosis of the 
decline of tradition becomes clear: the attempt to employ the involuntary reminiscence 
for a critical historiography stands alongside an awareness of the impoverished 
experience out of which this form of memory arises. 
The more monadology is applied to social and historical questions in Benjamin's 
writings from the 1930s, the more its potential weaknesses are exposed. It is on the 
legitimacy of this movement from the most individual experience to the universal or 
collective, a shift in which the identification of memory and history plays a key role, 
that the philosophical soundness and political credibility of Benjamin's thinking of 
historical time seem most open to question. It is hardly surprising that the trajectory of 
his thought at this point inspired uneasiness in those to whom he revealed his ideas. 
The above exposition and contextualisation of Benjamin's monadology provides the 
necessary background to reassess the objections which were levelled at his thinking, 
in particular, important criticisms posed by Adorno. Such an assessment in turn allows 
Jewish expectation of a future redemption -a paradox he states at the end of his 'Theses' without 
satisfactorily explaining. The other was the step from the private, aesthetic revelation of d1ja vu to the 
collective memory of revelation that Jewish tradition took as its matrix. ' 
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an answer to the question - what in Benjamin's 'method' is it either possible or 
necessary to defend? 
A 'Philosophy of Fragmentation' 
A criticism made by Adorno of the Prologue to the Trauerspielbuch is instructive in 
that it highlights the ambivalent relation in which he stood to Benjamin's thought. It 
demonstrates that even in the midst of a seemingly damning critique Adorno could 
still find elements worthy of commendation and even appropriation in the latter's 
work. The Prologue, he contends, 'despite marvellous things like the concept of 
configuration` - fails because of its 'blatant historically oblivious, and in the end, 
veritably Mythological Platonism, which not by accident must take frequent recourse 
to phenomenology. 148 According to Adorno, Benjamin subsequently conceded these 
points. The vociferousness of this reaction to the book on the German mourning-play 
sets the scene for the protracted exchange which would take place over Benjamin's 
later formulations of monadology throughout the latter part of the 1930s. Frequently, 
it seems that isolated observations on Adorno's part would amount to important and 
searching criticisms of Benjamin's thought in general. 
Adorno's criticisms divide into two elements which he himself often conflates 
but which it is important to separate: the first is directed at Benjamin's use of the 
monad, something he thinks implies a wish to render philosophy surrealistic. The 
second is a critique of the reductive nature of Benjamin's Marxism, that as an 
explanation of cultural and historical phenomena, it is inadequate. The first element of 
this criticism stems from Adomo's belief that the monadological or 'micrological' 
method fetishised the monad or particular in its immediacy, failing to critically 
interrogate the appearance or illusion (Schein) of immediacy which masks a more 
fundamental mediation. According to Adorno, 
48 Adorno cited in Gary Smith, 'Thinking Through Benjamin' in G. Smith (ed. ), Benjamin: Philosophy, 
Aesthetics, History, op. cit., p. xxvii. 
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[Benjamin's] micrological and fragmentary method never entirely 
integrated the idea of universal mediation [Vermittlungl, which in 
Hegel and Marx produces the totality. He never wavered in his 
fundamental conviction that the smallest cell of observed reality offset 
[weige] the rest of the world. To interpret phenomena materialistically 
meant for him not so much to elucidate them as products of the social 
whole but rather to relate them directly, in their isolation, to material 
tendencies and social struggles. 49 
As should be clear thus far, the fragmentary or the micrological does not 'offset' a 
preoccupation with the social and historical whole, but merely shifts analytic emphasis 
onto particular instantiations of that whole. 50 Monadology names that capacity to 
'detect the crystal of the total event in the analysis of the simple, individual moment'. 
It addresses the question of how to reconstruct social relations from their own self- 
produced illusions of immediacy, when society commonly appears in its most 
'elemental', that is, unmediated, form. But this project is complicated by the fact that 
both (Kantian) deduction and (Platonic) derivation have been ruled-out. Benjamin's 
assumption appears to be that since the illusion of immediacy has itself become 
'second nature', no simple derivation of social relations is possible. On the contrary 
only a shocking juxtaposition of social phenomena may allow insight into the 
concealed totality. The focus upon 'extremes' in the Prologue and the invocation of 
surrealism in subsequent works is a response to this state of affairs. 
According to Adorno, Benjamin's aim 'was not merely for philosophy to catch up 
with surrealism, but for it to become surrealistic .... [But] his philosophy of 
fragmentation remained itself fragmentary, the victim, perhaps of a method, the 
feasibility of which in the medium of thought must remain an open question. '51 This 
49 Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, op. cit, vol. 10, part 1, p. 247; Prisms, op. cit., p. 236 (amended). 
50 Pierre Missac argues that 'to understand Benjamin's intentions, one would have to stop opposing the 
fragmentary or rhapsodic presentation to the systematic and the methodical to the chaotic'. On the 
contrary, he argues, does not 'the aphoristic-influence or lend aid... (to] the systematic'? [Pierre 
Missac, Walter Benjamin's Passages, op. cit., p. 143.1 But pace Missac there is not simply a relation of 
influence of support between the fragment and the system; monadology collapses the divide between 
thcse two stylistic and methodological approaches. 
51 Adorno, 'A Portrait of Walter Benjamin' in Prisms, op. cit., p. 239. 
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'fragmentary philosophy' had good intentions, though: it 'sought to avoid the danger 
of estrangement and reification, which threaten to transform all observation of 
capitalism as a system into a system itself. 152 The charitable appearance of these latter 
comments is explained by the fact that Adorno wishes to ally Benjamin to his own 
project of resuscitating denigrated particulars in a strategic evasion of totalising 
thought. In fact Benjamin never counterposes his focus upon particularity to 
systematic thought, and never equates (as Adorno does) systernaticity with ideology. 
His use of 'configuration' or 'construction' is directed only against inductive and 
deductive forms of thinking as normally conceived, not against systematic thought per 
se. Acknowledgement of the fragmentary form of much of Benjamin's writing should 
not deflect attention from its systematic aims. Benjamin's use of configuration does, it 
must be admitted, consolidate induction in a different, an 'eccentric' form. 53 But if 
this is to be characterised as a 'rescue [Rettung] of induction' (Adomo)54 then 'rescue' 
must be understood in Benjaminian, that is destructive, terms. 
Adorno's criticism misconstrues Benjamin's use of the term 'monadology', 
something which is all the more curious given that elsewhere he praises the critical 
potential of monadology when employed as a literary technique. In a debate over the 
progressive merits of modernism, Adomo argues (contra Lukdcs) that modernism's 
use of a monolooue or what he calls a 'monadological' style is commendable because 
it makes explicit its own social preconditions. Monadology is, to this extent, 'the 
hidden truth common to all men'. The monologue form (Adorno cites Joyce and 
Beckett as examples) attests to this: 'They objectify themselves by immersing 
themselves totally, monadologically, in the laws of their own forms .... The voice of the 
age echoes through their monologues: this is why they excite us so much more than 
works which simply depict the world in narrative form. The fact that their transition to 
objectivity remains contemplative and fails to become praxis is grounded in the nature 
52 Ibid., p. 236. 
53 Adorno contends that the Prologue 'undertook a metaphysical rescue [Rettung] of nominalism: 
throughout inferences are made not from top to bottom but rather, in an eccentric manner, C, 
"inductively". ' [Adorno, 'Einleitung zu Benjamins Schriften' in Noten zur Literatur, Gesammelte 
Schriften, vol. 4, p. 570; 'Introduction to Beniamýin's Schriften' in Gary Smith (ed. ), On Walter 
Benjamin, op. cit., p. 5. ] 
54 Adorno, Negative Dialektik, Gesammelle Schriften, vol. 6, p. 357; Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. 
Ashton (London: Roudedge, 1973), p. 365. 
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of a society in which the monadological condition persists universally, despite all 
assurances to the contrary. 155 
Adomo's reception of 'monadology' oscillates between a Marxian awareness of 
the danger of abstraction - that as method it uncritically takes as foundational and 
primordial the kind of atomism which obtains only in a highly developed (that is, 
mediated) society56 - and a more sympathetic reading of its methodological 
individualism which sees in it 'a staae on which objective realities are made visible. '57 
Significantly for the present discussion, his appraisal of monadology as a literary style 
is subsequently extended to Benjamin's philosophical method: 'in Benjamin and 
Proust 
... the most specific experiences, those which are completely submerged 
in 
particularity, are transformed into universality. 158 Given that monadology, when 
employed as a literary form, is deemed praiseworthy because it acknowledges its own 
social determinations ('the monadological condition'), why is it deemed invalid as a 
philosophical approach, especially when literary form and philosophical style are so 
closely bound together in Adomo's own thinking? In this light such reproaches 
against Benjamin's 'lack of mediation'59 seem somewhat inconsistent. 
Adomo's second criticism centres upon Benjamin's Marxism which he thinks 
reductively determinist. His reservations concern in particular Benjamin's attempt to 
augment a model of a causal relation between 'base' and 'superstructure' with the 
notion of 'expression [Ausdruck]' such that cultural phenomena are to be understood 
Co express the 'economic system [Wirtschaftl' of a given historical epoch. 60 According 
55 Adorno in Aesthetics and Politics (London: Verso, 1980), p. 166. 
56 Cf. Marx, Grundrisse trans. Martin Nicolaus (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1973), pp. 83-4. 
57 Adorno in Aesthetics and Politics, op. cit., P. 160. 
58 Adorno, 'Ernst Bloch's Spuren: On the Revised Edition of 1959' in Notes to Literature vol. I ed. 
Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 
213. In the same way Adorno finds in Proust 'the dictum from Hegel's Logic that the particular is the 
general and vice versa, with each mediated through the other [and where] the whole, resistant to 
abstract outlines, crystallizes out of intertwined individual presentations. ' ['Short Commentaries on 
Proust' in ibid., p. 174]. 
59 Adorno in Briefe, p. 785; Correspondence, op. cit., p. 581. 
60 GS 5, p. 573-4 (NIa, 6); 'Konvolut 'N", p. 46-7. Whilst from the context of Benjamin's proposition 
it appears that 'Ausdruck' is being used in its physiognon-ac sense (cf. JOrgen Habermas, 
'Consciousness-Raising or Rescuing Critique' in Gary Smith (ed. ), On Walter Benjamin, op. cit., p. 
116), to read his formulation (as it seems Adorno does) as a reference to Leibniz (Ausdruck' translates 
Leibniz' French 'expression', his term for the monad's capacity to represent the whole) makes it all the 
more illuminating. For the meaning of this term see, in particular, Leibniz, letter to Arnauld of 9 
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to Adorno, 'to interpret phenomena materialistically meant for [Benjamin] not so 
much to elucidate them as products of the social whole but rather to relate them 
directly, in their isolation, to material tendencies and social struggles. '61 Adorno's 
point is that qualification of the base-superstructure model is insufficient; the model 
must be dispensed with entirely: 'Materialist determination of cultural traits is only 
possible if mediated by the total social process. 162 
Whilst the criticism of reduction is well-taken and alerts us to the flaws in (still) 
prevalent interpretations of Marx, Adorno goes further - perceiving an essential link 
between this reductive Marxism and the idea of monadology. Both imply an isolation 
of phenomena from the social totality which produces them. The point fails to hit its 
mark though because this is not Benjamin's understanding of monadology, a term 
which, on the contrary, seeks to highlight the social whole concealed within social 
phenomena. Thus Benjamin's redefinition of dialectics as a theory of the monad63 
entails an historical task of constructing (which in this case means reconstructing) the 
social determinants of seemingly immediate, isolated and self-contained phenomena. 
Benjamin understands the theory of commodity fetishism in precisely these 
monadological terms: just as from the predicates of simple substance every other can 
be infer-red, so from the elementary form of economic wealth the entire set of social 
relations of a given epoch can be inferred. The commodity renders monadology 
materialistic in the same way Marx understood it to render (Hegelian) dialectics 
material. In a world where experience itself is commodified, the theory of commodity 
fetishism becomes a necessary means of understanding experience's concealed 
determination. It becomes clear that the application of monadology to social theory 
need not involve an economic reduction; on the contrary, if it were applied 
copsistently then social phenomena would be seen as expression of the social whole. 
Whilst Benjamin may be reproached for frequently reducing the social totality to the 
'economic' (wirtschaftlich) this reduction is not a necessary outcome of the 
monadological method; indeed it is not even a consistent outcome. 
October 1687 in Die Philosophische Schriften von G. IV. Leibniz ed. C. 1. Gerhard (Berlin: Olms, 1965) 
vol. II, p. 112; Philosophical Writings, op. cit., pp. 71-2. 
61 Adorno, 'A Portrait of Walter Benjamin' in Prisms, op. cit., p. 236. 
62 Adorno, in Aesthetics and Politics, op. cit., p. 129. 
63 GS 5, p. 596 (N 11,4); 'Konvolut 'N", p. 67. 
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The element of truth in Adorno's criticism is that phenomena construed as 
monads can be related to the universal only directly, without reference to other 
phenomena, since the monad, containing as it does all its relations, predicates or 
events, cannot be affected by other monads. Monads, in Leibniz's words (repeated by 
Benjamin), have no 'windows'. 64 Thus when Adorno argues that monadology relates 
phenomena 'directly, in their isolation to material tendencies and social struggles' he 
means that their determination is understood without reference to their mediation by 
other phenomena. This criticism rehearses in turn a point made by Hegel against 
Leibniz - that the monad's relation to itself is one of mere 'abstract universality'. 65 
Hegel had argued that 'to gain the freedom of substance it is not sufficient to represent 
it as a totality that is complete within itself and has nothing to receive from without. 
On the contrary, the mechanical [begrifflose: literally 'conceptless'], merely mirrored 
relation to itself is precisely a passivity towards another. 166 In the uni-directional 
relation of mirroring the monad adds nothing either to other phenomena or to the 
universal. Like KEint, Hegel sees monadology as lacking conceptuality - the monad is 
taken to be the thing-in-itself67 - but he goes further in seeing this lack of 
conceptuality as entailing a deficit of mediation, for in mediation 'the active object 
has ... its determination only by means of another object. 
168 
Monadology allows expression of universality but not mediation of and by it, for 
mediation (and thus Adorno's understanding of determination) is a two-way relation: 
each term of the relation is what it is by virtue of that relation. The Hegelian notion of 
totality which stands behind Adorno's criticism is just this mutual determination of 
64 GS 3, p. 51. 
65 Hegel, Science of Logic, op. cit., p. 714. 
66 ibid., p. 715. 
67 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1978), p. 
283. 
68 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 715. Cf. Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane & 
Frances H. Simson (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), vol. Ill, p. 345: 'From a single grain of 
sand, Leibniz holds, the whole universe might be comprehended in its entire development - if we only 
knew the sand thoroughly. There is not really much in all this, though it sounds very fine; for the rest of 
the universe is considerably more than a grain of sand, well though we knew it, and considerably 
different therefrom .... To the sand grain much must 
be added which is not present and since thought 
adds more than all the grains of sand that exist, the universe and its development may in this way 
certainly be comprehended. ' 
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universal by particular an4 particular by universal, something unthinkable under the 
monadological assumption of the integrity and autarky of the monad. 69 One can 
understand Adorno's sympathetic exposition of literary monadology (where Benjamin 
is favourably compared to Proust and where the focus upon particularity in each is 
seen to yield universal observations) to be only a partial endorsement; Adorno's 
reservation is that whilst such approaches may express universality, the relation 
between particular and universal upon which they rest is ultimately abstract and one- 
sided. In this light Adorno can be seen to view monadology as both true andfalse: 
true in that it methodologically reflects a social actuality; false in that this social 
condition is neither absolute nor ineluctable. 70 It is possible to understand Adorno's 
fear that Benjamin's thinking remained 'undialectical' in just these terms - as 
attempting to develop a more dialectically measured appraisal of monadology. 
The cogency of this criticism impinges upon Benjamin's attempt to use 
monadology to translate characteristics of individual experience into qualities of a 
collective (for instance remembrance or political action). Benjamin's invocation of a 
social collective as subject of historical knowledge in response to the methodological 
individualism by which memory is commonly understood can only underline the 
strength of this criticism. The charge that Benjamin uncritically shifts from the 
individual to the collective without mediation is most forceful on the question of his 
application of psychoanalytic theory to social collectives. The 'collective' in collective 
memory is a generality which is just as abstract, indeterminate and illusory as the 
individual to which it is opposed. Benjamin struggles with the problem of how a 
group psychology would be possible which does not hypostasise the spurious 
69 In an attempt to defend Benjamin against Adorno's criticism, Giorgio Agamben has unhelpfully 
I caricatured the latter's use of 'mediation' as mere causalism by another name: 'The hypocrisy implicit 
in the separation of economic structure and cultural superstructure remains exactly the same if the 
economic process is made the determining cause, and it is left to mediation to give it a bashful covering 
with its dialectical veil. ' [Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: Essays on the Destruction of 
Experience, trans. Liz Heron (London: Verso, 1993), p. 1201. The point Agamben overlooks is that the 
concept of the social totality which inspires Adorno's criticism renders inappropriate not only the causal 
relation between, but the very separation of, 'economy' and 'culture'. The origins and lineage of 
Adorno's concept of totality are more fully explored in Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality: the 
Adventures of a Conceptfrom Lukdcs to Habermas (Cambridge: Polity, 1984). 
70 Cf. Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno 
(London: MacMillan, 1978), p. 124. 
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collectives and imaginary communities which bourgeois society itself poduces. 
A 
Reporting Horkheimer's sardonic observation that a social collective exists only in 
disasters and catastrophes, Adomo contends that just as Benjamin's universality is not 
a totality, so his invocation of collectivity overlooks the fact that the social totality is a 
divided totality, a conflict ridden society. In both cases, Adorno's criticism is directed 
at an inadequate understanding of the meaning of totality. The monadology which, 
substituting expression for mediation, makes possible a direct movement from the 
personal to the collective, cannot but hypostasise both particularity and universality. 71 
Adorno reminds Benjamin of some rudimentary elements of Marxism: that just as 
there is no such thing as society except as an abstraction, so equally the 'individual' 
amounts to a mystification of social relations. 
If I reject the use of the notion of the collective consciousness, it is 
naturally not in order to leave the 'bourgeois individual' intact as the 
authentic substratum. The interior should be made transparent as a 
social function and its self-containedness [Geschlossenheit] should be 
revealed as illusion [Schein]. As illusion, however, not vis-A-vis a 
hypostasised collective consciousness, - but vis-ý-vis the real social 
71 An alternative response to Adorno's criticism would be to argue, following Rainer NNgele, that since 
Benjamin's monad is not a particular in the first place, the criticism of a lack of mediation is 
inappropriate. Ndgele writes: 'The model of the. monad allows Benjamin to formulate certain 
constitutive elements of his mode of thought that set it apart from a tradition of dialectics and mediation 
based on the mediating category of the particular (das Besondere), ' that is, the 'harmonious 
reconciliation of the general and the individual. ' [Rainer Ndgele. Theatre, Theory, Speculation: Walter 
Benjamin and the scenes of modernity, op. cit., p. 68. ] Ndgele's interpretation is plausible in so far as 
Benjamin never explicitly defines the monad as particular; it falls down once it is recognised that the 
term could not convincingly refer to anything else. If the monad is, as Ndgele thinks, 'radically 
singular', Adorno's criticism would have been circumvented only by succumbing to an equally arresting 
insight of Hegel's - that the search for singularity is chimerical because all specification itself requires 
universals. [Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977), pp. 58-66; cf. Marx, Grundrisse, op. cit., p. 84. ] Whilst it is undeniable that there are motives 
behind Adorno's incorporation of Benjamin's terminology into the dialectical framework of 
particularity/universality, the framework (itself originating in Plato) is not as alien to Benjamin's 
thought as N5gele suggests. Furthermore, by crediting Benjamin with having appreciated the illusory 
nature of singularity or individuality, Adorno's critique actually redeems the monadological method 
somewhat. 
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process itselL The 'individual' is a dialectical channel which may not 
be mythologised away but can only be sublated [aufgehoben]. 72 
Benjamin's own criticisms of the individualism of Proustian memory (where memory 
is mere autobiography, the act of an isolated individual or 'private person'73) 
substitute a collective for an isolated subject in a way which for Adorno finds 
dangerously uncritical. The self-containcdness of the individual as social monad must 
be exposed as illusion, but not by transferring its qualities onto a putative collective. 
Adorno urges that this underestimates the extent to which 'the real social process' 
itself produces individuality as a 'social function'. The realm of the circulation of 
commodities, the veneer upon the process of production, is the proper sphere of 
liberal assumptions of individuality and personality, but the individual cannot be 
mythicised away because of the contingent actuality of the mode of production which 
determines it, and which it in turn legitimises. 
Inadvertently, Adorno's criticism draws attention to an inconsistency in 
Benjamin's formulation of the 'monadological structure of the historical object'. With 
this definition he wished to assert the historical object's relation with the present: 'by 
virtue of its monadological structure, the historical object discovers within itself its 
own fore-history [Vorgeschichte] and after-history [Nachgeschichte]. '74 The after- 
history or after-life of the historical object is that capacity which enables the past to be 
gubsequently rescued, redeemed or reinterpreted. To this extent the past just is a 
relation with the present; the past is constituted in and through the present. On this 
basis, and as was seen earlier, Benjamin strenuously argued against assumptions of the 
past's 'completeness' (Abgeschlossenheit). Yet at the same time monadology 
necessarily carries with it a supposition of the autarky or self-sufficiency (in 
Benjamin's phrase, 'inalienable isolation') of the monad, 75 with the result that 
construing the historical object as a monad risks consolidating rather than exposing 
72 Briefe, p. 681-2; Correspondence, p. 502 (amended). 
73 GS 1, p. 611; Charles Baudelaire, p. 113. 
74 GS 5, p. 594 (N10a, 3); 'Konvolut'N". p. 66. 
75 GS 1, p. 228; Origin, p. 47. Cf. Leibniz, 'Monadology' § 18, Philosophical Writings, op. cit., p. 18 1. 
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this presumed autarky of the past event. Might this be the most serious drawback of 
Benjamin's attempt to ally Leibnizian metaphysics to his own critical project? 
The persistent scepticism which Adorno held towards Benjamin's method can be 
understood as a worry that monadology fails to allow a sufficiently critical grasp of 
the illusions of immediacy which plague both philosophical thinking and the social 
reality it seeks to comprehend. Each of the criticisms discussed above can be 
surnmarised under the heading of a critique of spontaneism: the 'spontaneity' 
(Leibniz) of the monad which allows it to unfold the universal, a capacity which is 
methodologically emulated in the 'unfolding [Auswicklung]' of Benjamin's own 
subject matter; 76 the spontaneity of Proustian involuntary memory which Benjamin 
would enlist as an analogue of historical knowledge; and the spontaneism of the 
politics which results when mediation is underestimated. It cannot be denied that 
Benjamin consciously privileges the immediate. In one concise but telling phrase he 
writes: 'That which is fruitful in the fullest sense lies enclosed within the hard shell of 
immediacy [Unmitteilbarkeit]. 177 Of course this formula can be read more or less 
sympathetically, that is, dialectically: it was Hegel who compared truth to the fruit of 
a plant already latent in the form of the bud. 78 Taking Adorno's criticism seriously 
might entail that Benjamin's relentless focus upon the immediate be castigated for 
fetishising immediacy; on the other hand one might just as convincingly applaud it for 
responding (in a manner not too distant from that of Hegel himself) to the question 
'With what must the science beginT. The relentless return to the immediate would in 
this sense amount to a continual beginning, a perpetually incipient method. 79 
To say that there is a methodological primacy afforded to the immediate in 
Benjamin's thinking is to tell only part of the story though, since the concern of his 
monadology is always with what lies concealed behind this immediacy, what it 
expresses. Because his philosophy typically takes a fragmentary form does not 
76 GS 5, p. 577 (N2a, 4); 'Konvolut'N", p. 50. 
77 GS 3, p. 275. 
78 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, op. cit., p. 2. 
79 Paraphrasing Hegel, Adorno admits 'just as-there is nothing immediate between heaven and earth 0 
which is not mediated, so too there can be nothing mediated without the concept of mediation involving 
a moment of the immediate. ' [Adorno, 'The Handle, the Pot, and Early Experience' in Notes to 
Literature, vol. 2, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholson, (New York: Columbia U. P., 
1992), p. 219]. 
120 
undermine its systematic intent. This important distinction becomes (perhaps 
consciously) obscured in Adorno's characterisation of Benjamin's as a 'philosophy of 
fragmentation'. There is more of Adorno's own philosophical project in this portrait 
than Benjamin's: a wish to use the fragment in his own resuscitation of denigrated 
particularity whilst distancing himself from its surrealist connotations. Benjamin's 
own concerns are different, they represent a critique of philosophical method couched 
in methodological terms: questioning the collusions involved in inductive and 
deductive approaches within epistemology, aesthetics and the philosophy of history, it 
seeks not to render philosophy surrealistic but to rework and revitalise the 
metaphysical element in philosophy. Noting (as the present chapter has attempted to 
do) the extent to which Leibnizian metaphysics organises these methodological 
observations should serve as a rejoinder to those who conceive Benjamin's thinking as 
breaking with philosophy altogether. 80 On the contrary it is possible to set his 
reflections within a tradition which from Plato's time onwards has understood the 
central philosophical problem to be how to pass from particular phenomena to the 
realm of truth. That Benjamin's critique of existing method seeks only to consolidate 
method may be seen either as its strength or its weakness; a potentially more injurious 
criticism (which, strangely, Adomo never proposed) would have been to question the 
very status of 'method' and 'methodology' themselves, to question the very attempt to 
place method before philosophical practice. 
The theological structure of Leibnizian metaphysics is another question which 
must be asked of any defence of Benjamin's appropriation of monadology, since with 
the theory of the monad necessarily comes the divine standpoint, the only position 
from which the totality of monads can be comprehended. For Leibniz this difference 
between the standpoint of the monad and the comprehended totality of monads is in 
turn a theological chasm between creature and Creator. Each monad can represent 
universality in only a more or less 'confused' manner; only for God is knowledge of 
the world 'distinct'. 81 If Benjamin is to be consistent in his adoption of monadology 
80 Pierre Missac's contention that Benjamin's use of the term 'monad' is merely metaphorical is closely 
linked to his declaration against philosophical readings of Benjamin. See his Walter Benjamin's 
Passages, op. cit., p. 110 & 24. 
81 Leibniz, 'Monadology' § 37; 'Principles of Nature and of Grace' § 13, Philosophical Writings, op. 
cit., pp. 185 & 201. 
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then he must also assent to the implications of this for the philosophy of history: any 
speculation upon historyfrom within is unavoidably partial and indistinct. Historical 
knowledge in the present, whether in the form of critical historiography or political 
consciousness, can hope for only a partial and confused comprehension of the past. 
That Benjamin does concede this circumscription of knowledge is evinced in a 
provocative and cryptic passage where he suggests that only in 'the messianic 
world ... is universal history possible'. 82 In this statement is contained a recognition of 
the necessary counterfactuality of any universal-historical claims in the present. Put 
another way, in the here and now history totalises only 0 proleptically and (hence) Yly 
contradictorily. Universal-historical claims (Benjamin's included) amount to wagers 
upon their own future redemption. 
Whilst the objections discussed above to Benjamin philosophical method and his 
theory of memory can be categorised in terms of critique (thus the Hegelian and 
Marxian inspiration for Adomo's engagement) there is another way in which both a 
theory of memory and a philosophy of historical knowledge can be critically 
examined, namely by subjecting them to a genealogy. Before it is possible to 
determine what can be rescued from Benjamin's thought both in terms of a philosophy 
of memory and of history it is necessary to address such a genealogical criticism of his 
project, and it is this which forms the focus of the next chapter. However, as will 
become clear, a genealogy of Benjamin's privilege of memory becomes complicated 
by the fact that Benjamin himself utilises many of the techniques of genealogy 
himself, and was familiar with its most eminent practitioners. 
82 GS 1, p. 1238. 
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V 
Melancholy Memory 
Introduction 
Benjamin's 'oblique' relation to 'the manifest tradition of philosophy' (Adorno) 
appears most clearly in the way he appropriates isolated elements from the tradition 
for his thinking of memory. In that theory of memory one can find not only 
consciously avowed lineages but also less well-acknowledg6d (yet equally significant) 
affinities with previous philosophers. Nietzsche's views on encumbered memory 
represent one example of such a constellation, as Irving Wohlfarth has noted. ' 
Likewise with Kierkegaard's views on forgetting, as Max Pensky observeS. 2 Equally, 
Freud's reflections on 'mourning and melancholia', whilst seemingly unknown to 
Benjamin, show important similarities to Benjamin's own reflections on melancholy, 
as Christine Buci-Glucksmann implies in juxtaposing the terminology of each. 3 But 
whilst such affinities are often noted, the philosophical stakes involved are rarely 
recounised. That in developing his theory of memory, Benjamin's relation to the 
philosophical tradition was always selective may reveal something of his own 
ambivalence towards the manner in which that tradition dealt with the problem of 
memory, indeed the difficulties which it presents for his own attempt to revalue and 
prioritise memory. That Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Freud are cited above is not 
I Irving Woh1farth, 'Resentment Begins at Home: Nietzsche, Benjamin, and the University' in Gary 
Smith (ed. ), On Walter Benjamin (Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, 1988), p. 228. 
2 Max Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics: Walter Benjamin & the Play of Mourning (Amherst: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 1993), p. 164. 
3 Christine Buci-Glucksmann, Baroque Reason: The Aesthetics of Modernity (London: Sage, 1993), p. 
155-6. 
incidental, because as philosophical approaches to memory theirs can each be 
described as 'genealogies', or to use a less precise but more sug0lestive term, CýO 
'diagnoses' of memory. The genealogy of memory one finds in these three thinkers, 
taken together with the privilege they accord to forgetting, presents searching 
questions for Benjamin's own defence of memory. 
This chapter sets out to look at Benjamin's relation to the ideas of memory 
proposed in, respectively, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Freud, always with the 
following question in mind - could Benjamin have had anything other than an 
ambivalent or troubled relationship to a genealogy of memory? This is brought most 
sharply into relief at the point where the diagnostic resources of these three thinkers 
are directed at a particular form of consciousness which, suppressing the importance 
of forgetting, becomes weighed down with rerniniscences of the past, paralysed by 
retrospection, and whose scope for activity in the present is correspondingly 
diminished. Each termed this phenomenon 'melancholy' Benjamin himself will make 
use of this diagnosis but not without encountering difficulties in attempting to 
distinguish his own understanding of memory from that reactive and debilitating form 
of recollection. 
Ag. Rr 
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'... that recollection is a searchingfor an image in a corporeal substrate, is proved by 
the fact that the same persons, when despite the most strenuous applications of 
thought, have been unable to recollect, feel discomfort, which even though they 
abandon the effort at recollection, persists in them none the less, and especially 
persons of melancholic temperament. For these are most powerfully moved by 
images. ' 
Aristotle, OfMemory and Reminiscence 
'The Unhappiest One': Kierkegaard 
In a letter of 30th April 1913 written whilst at University in Freiburg, Benjamin lists 
the books which presently engage him. 'My reading: Kant, Groundwork to a 
Metaphysics of Morals, Kierkegaard, Eitherl0r. Gottfried Keller, Das Sinngedicht. 
But no normal person can endure a colossal and exclusive association with these 
writings for an entire week. Whenever a few pages of Kant had tired me out, I fled to 
Kierkegaard .... [Eitherl0r] confronted me with question after question that 
I had 
always divined but never articulated to myself, and excited (even) me more than any 
other book. 14 
There is clear evidence that Kierkegaard's thinking exerted considerable 
influence upon Benjamin: he was familiar not only with EitherlOr but also with Fear 
and Trembling, Repetition, and Stages on Life's Way; 5 He read and reviewed 
Wiesengrund's book The Construction of the Aesthetic which treated Kierkegaard in 
the terms of his own Trauerspiel study; 6 Kierkegaard himself is invoked in the book 
4 Briefe, p. 47; Correspondence, p. 20 (amended). Eitherl0r, Benjan-dn continues, 'is the ultimatum: 
aesthetics or ethical life [Asthetentum oder Sittlichkeit? ]' (ibid. ) 
5 GS 5, p. 1303. 
6 GS 3. p. 382. 
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on German Trauerspiel, hardly surprising given that the book was written in the 
period just after the enthusiastic letter quoted above. Over and above biographical 
links such as this, one can see similarities in the importance each ascribes to the 
categories of repetition, recollection and melancholy, and in the manner in which 
these categories are understood. Crucially, in Kierkegaard's philosophy they are 
understood as modem problematics, as phenomena intimately bound up with 
modernity: 'People have now been talking about the frivolity of this age; I believe it is 
time to talk a little about its melancholy .... Or is not melancholy the defect of our age? 
Is it not this which echoes with frivolous laughter, is it not melancholy which has 
deprived us of courage to command, of courage to obey, of power to act, of the 
confidence necessary to hope? 17 Just such a diagnostic use of the categories of 
melancholy, recollection and repetition is reaffirmed in Benjamin's thinking: they 
allow the definition of a peculiarly modem form of experience. Where such categories 
appear in Kierkegaard and Benjamin they are understood by both to span the divide 
between a philosophy which applied itself to personal and psychological phenomena 
and philosophical reflection upon society and history. 
It is in his account of a peculiarly modem form of melancholy which he terms 
Andenken, that Benjamin's thinking converges upon that of Kierkegaard most 
markedly. Benjamin's 1930s studies of Baudelaire, in particular 'Central Park' and 
'Konvolut 'J" of the Passagen-Werk, incorporate a diagnosis of Baudelaire's 
melancholy 'brooding' and seek to explore his views of nature, memory, and time 
with the same critical apparatus that had been applied to the Baroque mourning-play. 
Yet, as Benjan-An notes, 'melancholy bears in the nineteenth century a different 
character to that which it bore in the seventeenth. The key figure of the early allegory 
is the corpse. The key figure of the later allegory is the 'souvenir' (Andenken). 's That 
despite the differences between the two periods they can still be compared is due to 
the fact that the kind of sadness identifiable in the work of modem writers such as 
Baudelaire or Proust is, like the Baroque aesthetic, less a reaction to the loss of some 
particular object than the expression of an historical and spiritual crisis. The 
7 Soren Kierkegaard, EitherlOr vol. 2, trans. Howard V. Hong & Edna V. Hong (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1987) p. 23-4. 
8 GS 1, p. 689; 'Central Park', p. 54-55. 
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melancholy Benjamin finds in modem literature is not so much a symptom as a world- 
view, and as such closer to the cosmological sense which the concept had for 
antiquity, or the religious sense it had in the Renaissance, than to the individualised 
pathology with which psychology and later psychoanalysis dealt. By using the same 
term and concept he employed in exploring the Baroque aesthetic, by reviving his 
analysis of the forms of memory and the experience of time typical of that period and 
applying them to modernity, Benjamin wished to show that in the nineteenth century 
the melancholy spirit returns in response to an historical and social crisis as pervasive 
as that of the seventeenth. 
What Benjamin sees as the distinctive allegory of modem melancholy, Andenken, 
is both a type of memory and its objectified form, the souvenir or memento; it is 'the 
schema of the transformation of the commodity into the collector's object. 9 Grasping 
the past in the form of mementoes can only confirm the loss of that experience which 
it attempts to preserve; it makes of the past a series of 'lived' moments to be gathered, 
collected, displayed. 10 Memory as Andenken is both introspective and ostentatious, 
emptying the outside world to stock up the inner; to the same extent that worldly life 
is denigrated the interior begins to resemble the cluttered baroque stage. 'The souvenir 
[das Andenken] is the complement of 'experiences' [des 'Erlebnisses']. In it is 
distilled the increasing self-alienation of the man who inventories his past as dead 
possessions. In the nineteenth century allegory evacuated the surrounding world in 
brder to settle in the inner world. Whereas the relic derives from the corpse, the 
souvenir derives from deceased experience [Erfahrung] which calls itself, 
euphemistically, 'lived' [Erlebnis]. 'I I If DUrer's Melencholia I provides an image of 
baroque sadness, then the treasure-lined bourgeois interior is its modem counterpart. 
However, alongside this hypertrophied and alienated character of Andenken exists 
what is for Benjamin a more laudable aspect - the investment of 'things' with the 
ability to retrieve the past; Andenken displays a redemptive as well as an infernal 
moment. Benjamin attempted to clarify this dual character of the 'thing' in response to 
9 GS 1. p. 689; 'Central Park', p. 55 
10 Cf. GS 4, p. 145; 'One Way Street' in One-Way Street and Other Writings, op. cit., p. 101-2: 
'... souvenirs [Andenken]: chains and picture-postcards, oil paintings, knives and little marble figures. 
The city sights are not seen but bought. ' 
II GS 1, P. 681; 'Central Park', p. 49 (amended). 
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questioning from Adorno: agreeing with Adomo that insofar as it invested things with 
traces of the past, this form of memory might be turned to critical use, he denied that 
the past concealed in the thing is simply the labour expended in its production, urging 
instead that reffication belies something more primordial - traces of the messianic 
world itself. 'the tree or the bush which are invested are not made by men. '12 The 
continuity between modem and Baroque melancholy appears here as the redemptive 
moment concealed behind hypertrophied and fixated memory. 
In his commentary on the meaning of melancholy in Benjamin's work, Max 
Pensky suggests that this antipathy towards the hoarding of the past represented by 
Andenken is inspired by Kierkegaardian or Nietzschean 'active forgetting. Whilst 
plausible, this interpretation needs to be qualified since it homogenises the oeuvre of 
both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard and overlooks Benjamin's selective relation to each 
thinker. Benjamin's view is in fact closer to Nietzsche's essay 'On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life'13 with its attempt to cultivate a critical memory and 
history (witness his quote from this essay in the 'Theses') than to the 'active 
forgetting' introduced in The Genealogy and set against memory per se. 14 In this latter 
work memory figures as the medium in which morality was registered upon the body; 
as such, it is ascribed purely repressive qualities. Equally, and for similar reasons, 
Benjamin's relationship to Kierkegaard is less straightforward than Pensky's 
comments would suggest: Kierkegaard's concept of 'melancholy', like Nietzsche's 
kenealogies of memory or ressentiment, threatens to implicate rather than augment 
Benjamin's retrospective thinking. This may explain why he felt that EitherlOr 
'confronted [him] with question after question', that Kierkegaard's 'psychological 
analyses ... are as devastating as Nietzsche's. '15 In fact Benjamin's critique of 
mnemonic inwardness was probably inspired more by Weber than by the Nietzsche 
upon whom Weber in turn draws - Weber's idea that a devaluation (Entwertung) of 
the outer world coincides with a hypertrophy of the inner is repeated almost word for 
12 GS 1, p. 1134. 
13 Friedrich Nietzsche, 'On the uses and disadvantages of history for life' in Untimely Meditations, 
trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
14 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Francis Golffing (New York: Doubleday, 1956), pp. 
189-194. 
15 Briefe, p. 47; Correspondence, p. 20. 
128 
word at various points in the Baudelaire study. Equally, the touchstone of this idea 
may be religious rather than philosophical: one can detect in Benjamin's opposition to 
Andenken and the personalised manner in which it rescues the past what is at bottom a 
basic tenet of Judaism - the necessary publicity of redemption. 
The melancholy of the poet, writer or dramatist is for Benjamin never simply a 
psychological idiosyncrasy or mental aberration; instead, as was already argued in the 
Trauerspiel study, the artist is a stage on which the movement of fallen history is 
played out. Melancholy in both its baroque and modem forms appears as the 
subjective expression of world-historical mourning (Trauer). 16 Thus Baudelaire's 
sorrow (Leiden) is said to be 'age-old' (uralt); 17 similarly, Kdstner's 'nihilism' is but 
'the latest of two millenia of metamorphoses of melancholy. '18 Yet there is also 
something historically specific about the sadness expressed in these latter writers: 
within a Marxian framework Benjamin traces it to the deterioration of experience and 
tradition attendant upon the rise of modem conditions of production. That the 
melancholy found in the subjects of Benjamin's criticism is understood to be more 
than simply psychological, that it in fact tells us something about modernity itself, 
becomes clear when Benjamin invokes Kierkegaard's discourse of melancholy in the 
Baudelaire Konvolut. 19 Benjamin quotes several passages from an essay in EitherlOr 
entitled 'The Unhappiest One' (in his translation 'Der Ungliicklichste'), highlighting 
both the similarities and differences between his own and Kierkegaard's views on the 
interrelation of time and memory. At this point it is helpful to examine Kierkegaard's 
essay in order to make clear what is at stake in the Benjamin's references to it. 
The essay in question begins as a commentary on Hegel's 'unhappy 
consciousness' but soon develops into a search not for the meaning of unhappiness 
but for its superlative form - 'who is the unhappiest one'? The inwardly disrupted 
consciousness described by Hegel is unhappy, according to Kierkegaard, because he is 
'absent' to himself, but in one of two possible senses: he may find his essential reality, 
his fulfilment, in either past or future time. The former is a 'recollecting', the latter a 
16 Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, op. cit., p. 94. 
17 GS 1, p. 658; 'Central Park', p. 32. 
18 GS 3, p. 283; 'Left-Wing Melancholy (On Erich Kastner's new book of poems)', Screen 15,2 
(Summer 1974), p. 31. 
19 GS 5, p. 431 (G5, I). 
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'hoping' individuality. Kierkegaard urges that those who recollect are more properly 
'unhappy', since hope pertains to the future, to possibility and action, whereas 
memory orients itself towards a past which cannot be altered. 
If for example an individual becomes absorbed in antiquity or in the 
Middle Ages or in any other time, but in such a way that it had a 
decisive reality for him, or he became absorbed in his own childhood 
or youth in the way that this had had decisive reality for him, then, 
strictly speaking, he would not be an unhappy individuality. But if I 
were to imagine a person who had had no childhood himself, since this 
age had passed him by without any real meaning, but who now, for 
example, by becoming a teacher of children, discovered all the beauty 
in childhood and now wanted to recollect his own childhood, always 
stared back at it, he would certainly be a very appropriate 
example .... He is continually recollecting that 
for which he should hope, 
because he has already encompassed the future in thought, has already 
experienced it in thought, and he recollects what he has experienced 
instead of hoping for it. Thus what he is hoping for lies behind him; 
what he recollects lies ahead of him. His life is not backwards but is 
turned the wrong way in two directions .... He cannot grow old, 
for he 
has never been young; he cannot become young, for he has already 
grown old; in a sense he cannot die, for indeed he has not lived; in a 
sense he cannot live, for indeed he is already dead. He cannot love, for 
love is always present tense, and he has no present time, no future, no 
past, and yet he has a sympathetic nature, and he hates the world only 
because he loves it; he has no passion, not because he lacks it, but 
because at the same moment he has the opposite passion; he does not 
have time for anything, not becaýse his time is filled with something 
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else, but because he has no time at all; he is powerless, not because he 
lacks energy, but because his energy makes him powerless. 20 
It is not only a fixation upon the past which defines melancholy for Kierkegaard, but 
the ambivalence or reversal of affect it involves. The unhappiest one 'hates the world 
only because he loves it. ' This powerful description of melancholy captures the 
paradoxical and destructive manner in which the will operates here with regard to 
time. It is precisely the melancholic's backward-directed energy which deprives him 
of the strength to act in the present or to confront the future. The difficulty such a 
description of melancholy presents for Benjamin is that while it may serve as a fitting 
characterisation of Baudelaire, it equally poses serious questions of his own critical 
practice with its placement of 'hope in the past'. 21 Traces of the ambivalence which 
defines this superlative unhappiness can be found not only in Benjamin's picture of 
the melancholy worldview but also in the destructive principle which he sets against 
it. There is a sense in which Benjamin himself must denigrate the present in placing 
the hope for critical activity in a radical engagement with the past. That this sensed 
proximity to his own thinking may have motivated Benjamin's interest in the subject 
of melancholy was something not lost on others. When Adomo recounts a 
'melancholy [schwendifig] observation' on Benjamin's part, that he "revered 
youth, "22 he appears to do so with the Kierkegaardian unhappy consciousness in 
mind. Benjamin's own admission that Eduard Fuch's 'materialist's melancholy' 
('Schwennut, ' and later 'Traurigkeit') touched a specific chord in hiM23 would lend 
credence to such a characterisation. Benjamin's continual fascination with thinkers 
and writers he will categorise as melancholic is often accompanied by a clearly 
strpnuous attempt to gain critical purchase on his subject matter. His diagnosis of 
melancholy, whether in the baroque mourning-play or in modem writers as disparate 
20 Kierkegaard, EitherlOr Part. 1, trans. Howard V. Hong & Edna V. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1987) p. 224-6. 
21 GS 1, p. 695; Illuminations, p. 255. CE Peter Szondi, 'Hope in the Past: On Walter Benjamin' in On 
Textual Understanding and Other Essays (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), pp. 145- 
161. 
22 Adorno, 'Benjamin der Briefscreiber' in Gesammelte Schriften, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 587; 'Benjamin the 
Letter Writer' in Correspondence, p. xx. 
23 Briefe, p. 725; Correspondence, p. 535. 
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as Baudelaire, Blanqui, or Proust, can be seen to involve Oust as it did for 
Kierkegaard) a certain ironic self-diagnosis. Criticisms of these thinkers are thus 
mixed with admiration for, and appropriations of many of their ideas. But the 
melancholy which in turn fascinates Benjamin is not so much this psychological 
category as the more cosmological idea familiar to the classical and neo-Platonist 
traditions, Something of this sense of the term is retained in Kierkegaard for whom 
the concept in never simply a personal idiosyncrasy but registers something collective, 
something historical. 'The Unhappiest One' is therefore not 'one' at all but represents 
a character-type, shorthand for an identifiable philosophical and historical worldview, 
a structure of experience and a mode in which that experience is comprehended. It 
was in this form that Kierkegaard took up the notion of the unhappy consciousness 
from Hegel, and it is in the same form that melancholy is employed in Benjamin's 
critical reflections on Baudelaire or PrOUSt. 24 In Benjamin's hands 'melancholy' refers 
to a specific form of experience defined by its relation to time, to tradition and action. 
This becomes explicit in his presentation of Trauerspiel as a concept of history as 
much as an aesthetic category where historical time is drawn into the mournful 
outlook of the baroque aesthetic itself, but equally in the Baudelaire study where 
melancholy characterises the poet's relation to 'the modem' in its transience. 
Is ifjust coincidental that Benjamin invokes Kierkegaard's 'Unhappiest One' to 
diagnose Baudelaire's relation, to modernity, to that 'brooding' which 'stands under 
the sign of memory [Erinnerung]1? 25 Or might one detect in Benjamin's references to 
this unhappy consciousness the same 'complex, ' 'troubled' and 'ambiguous' attitude26 
which has been identified in his study of Baroque mournfulness? If Benjamin 
implicates himself in thus characterising Baudelaire then elsewhere he shows his 
divergence from Kierkegaard's alignment of unhappiness and recollection. His 
exchange with Horkheimer (discussed previously) shows him implicitly engaging 
with the Kierkegaardian dualism of melancholy versus hope and setting forth his own 
view of memory in contradistinction to both. The Benjamin/Horkheimer exchange 
24 Cf. Gillian Rose 'Walter Benjamin - Out of the Sources of Modern Judaism' in Judaism and 
Modernity, op. cit., p. 18 1. 
25 GS 5, p. 466 (J79a, 1). 
26 Max Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, p. 140. 
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allows insight into the philosophical prejudice upon which Vierkegaard's opposition 
rests. Benjamin's mobilisation of Eingedenken (remembrance) against the assumption 
of the completeness of the past stakes itself on the belief that memories (especially 
those of an involuntary character) confirm not time's completeness but the contrary. In 
remembering, one is reminded that certain possibilities from the past remain 
unrealised; memory reveals at once the past's incompleteness and its capacity for 
completion (the possibility of the perfection of an action or event). There is thus a 
continuing latency inherent in the past, a capacity which memory brings to light. 
Remembrance uncovers and activates this afterlife (Nachleben) of the past, unsettling 
what was hitherto thought to be over and done with. Remembrance carries with it the 
notable capacity to render complete or incomplete the past as such. In revealing 
unfulfilled moments of the past remembrance makes the ostensibly complete into 
something incomplete: 'the kind of happiness that could arouse envy in us exists only 
in the air we have breathed, among people we could have talked to .... 127 At the same 
time only our re-membering or reconstructing the past has the potential to change its 
character, to make the incomplete or unfulfilled happiness - into something 
complete. Remembrance, for Benjamin, delineates a structure of experience which is 
messianic in character, it shows that 'our image of happiness is indissolubly bound up 
with the image of redemption'. 28 In this light Kierkegaard's description of the 
melancholy of recollection appears one-sided - recollection is for him the act of a 
consciousness whose reality lies in the past, one who is 'absent to himself: 
4recollection is above all the distinctive element of the unhappy ones, which is natural, 
because past time has the notable characteristic that it is past; future time, that it is to 
come. '29 If the past were unchangeable as Kierkegaard assumes, then recollection 
would indeed be a melancholy and debilitating exercise. But Benjamin turns the tables 
on Kierkegaard, insisting that only in such a melancholy memory lies the hope which 
would actualise what has hitherto remained wishful possibility. Remembrance cuts 
across the existential opposition Kierkegaard has developed between (retrospective) 
melancholy and (futural) affirmation because in remembrance any sadness at the still- 
27 GS 1, p. 693; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 254. 
28 GS 1, p. 693; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 254. 
29 Kierkegaard, Eitherl0r, part. 1, op. cit., p. 223. 
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remaining unrealisation is tempered by hope at the still-obtaining possibility. 
Benjamin's account of memory allows of both melancholy and affirmation. 
Just as Benjamin questions the denigration of recollection in Kierkegaard, so he 
equally offers a response to the affirmative 'repetition' which Kierkegaard sets against 
it, typified in the attempts of the narrator of Repetition to repeat in every (even the 
most minute) detail a journey he had previously made to Berlin (that the project 
proves impossible is not deemed sufficient evidence of its futility). For Benjamin, a 
certain novelty is the precondition of any experience worthy of name; repetition 
denotes a 'mythical' form of events, and by implication, an impoverished experience 
of time. For Benjamin what is to be affirmed as an antidote to the more debilitating 
forms of recollection is not repetition but novelty. Yet he is aware (like Kierkegaard) 4>ý. ý 
novelty can itself be produced repetitively; 30 this is why he distinguishes between a 
novelty devoid of memory and tradition and 'the truly new' which represents a 
moment of 'interference' in a temporal or experiential series, 31 but which itself 
requires a retrospective (redemptive) stance towards the past. The idea of a 
redemptive remembrance shows up the weaknesses of Kierkegaard's existential 
dualism, highlighting the impoverished experience upon which it rests. Kierkegaard's 
distribution of experience along a temporal axis with only two significant possibilities 
- repetition backwards (recollection) and repetition forwards (repetition proper, 
affirmation) - recapitulates that deterioration of experience whose inauthenticity it 
would overcome. Benjaminian remembrance, by contrast, looks for novelty not in the 
future but in the past, and by recalling not the, same but the new, eschews 
Kierke-aard's version of melancholy. To the Kierkegaardian opposition of 
recollection (repetition backwards) and repetition (repetition forwards) Benjaminian 
'remembrance' represents a'third which mediates the two, allowing the past to be 
affirmed in a way which is not simply pathological and debilitating, whilst differing 
from 'repetition forwards', typically a repetition of the same. The new which 
30 Cf. Kierkegaard, Repetition, trans. Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1983), p. 132: 'He alone is truly happy who is not deluded into thinking 
that ... repetition should be [of] something new, for then one grows weary of it. ' 31 GS 5, p. 593 (N9a, 7). 
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remembrance affirms differs from the spurious novelty correctly questioned by 
Kierkegaard by virtue of being a transformation of something past. 0 
That Benjamin offers a dialectical alternative to Kierkegaard's opposition of 
repetition backwards (recollection) and repetition forwards (affirmation) is clear in an 
autobiographical note from 1933 where he reflects upon Paul Klee's painting Angelus 
Novus, seeing in it the same 'dialectic of happiness [Dialektik des Gliicks]', a complex 
of 'hymnic' and 'elegiac' motives which he had ascribed to Proust in the essay of 
1929.32 Benjamin writes of Klee's angel: 'He wants happiness: the conflict in which 
lies the ecstasy of the unique, "once only" new, as yet unlived with that bliss of the 
'donce more, " the having again, the lived. That is why he can hope for the new on no 
way except on the way of the return home [Heimkehr]1.33 What is at stake in the 
alternatives of recollection or repetition is here, as it is for Kierkegaard, 'happiness', 
and yet Benjamin seeks to dialectically entwine what Kierkegaard could only offer as 
an existential choice, by urging that it is only in transformative recollection, in the 
redemptive repetition-backwards of a lived past, that it is to be found. Benjamin goes 
further in questioning whether this is ever a simple matter of choice, of a resolve or 
'courage' to repeat forwards; that EitherlOr 'demands heroiSM134 is for Benjamin the 
work's significant flaw. In offering an existential choice Kierkegaard's account leaves 
out this dialectic of happiness, the contradictory mix of recollection and affirmation, 
repetition and novelty in experience. This dialectic provides an alternative not only to 
Kierkegaard's pathologising of recollection, but also to his spurious (and for 
Benjamin equally pathological) alternative - affirming the repetition of a past without 
searching for novelty. The value of this idea of affirmation as a solution to 
pathological memory is not exhausted by these critical points, however, and it is 
significant that it recurs in Nietzsche's writings, which in many respects further the 
diagnosis of melancholy formulated by Kierkegaard. Whilst it seems possible to 
defend Benjamin against Kierkegaard's denigration of memory, Nietzsche deepens the 
32 GS 2, p. 313; 'The Image of Proust' in Illuminations, p. 204 (amended). 
33 GS 6, p. 523; 'Agesilaus Santander' (second version) cited in Gershom Scholem, 'Walter Benjamin 
and his Angel', in Gary Smith (ed. ), On Walter Benjamin, op. cit., p. 7 1. 
34 Briefe, p. 47; Correspondence, p. 20. 
135 
problem Benjamin faces of defending a form of memory which is liberatory rather 
than simply reactive. 
'Time's Desire': Nietzsche 
If, as Scholem suggests, Nietzsche is one thinker with whom Benjamin never fully 
came to terms, 35 it is surely because he puts forward what must be the most persuasive 
rejoinder to any desire to redeem the past. This is clear in a passage from Zarathustra 
(singled out by both Irving Wohlfarth and Rebecca Comay36) where the theological 
doctrine of redemption is redefined ironically as a release from the wish to change 
what is past. 
To redeem the past and to transform every 'It was' into an 'I wanted it 
thus! ' - that alone do I call redemption [Erldsung]!... 
'It was': that is the name of the will's gnashing of teeth and most 
secret melancholy [Trfibsafl. Powerless against that which has been 
done, the will is an angry spectator of all things past. 
That the will cannot work backwards; that it cannot break time and 
time's desire - that is the will's most lonely melancholy.... 
This, yes, this alone is revenge itself. the will's antipathy [des Willens 
Widerwille] towards time and time's 'It was'.... 
All 'It was' is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful chance - until the creative 
will says to it: 'But I willed it thus! '... 
But has it ever spoken thus? 37 
35 Irving Wohlfarth, 'Resentment Begins at Home', in Gary Smith (ed. ), On Walter Benjamin, op. cit., 
p. 227. 
36 Rebecca Comay, 'Redeeming Revenge: Nietzsche, Benjamin, Heidegger, and the Politics of 
Memory' in Clayton Koelb (ed. ), Nietzsche as Postmodernist. - essays pro and contra, (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1990) 
37 Friedrich Nietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra in Werke, ed. Karl Schlecta (Munich: Hanser, 1955), 
vol. II, p. 394-5; Thus Spoke Zarathustra trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961) p. 
161-3 (amended). 
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Seen in terms of this ironic 'redemption' Benjamin's own use of the concept can only 
appear negative. Seeking to negate 'time and time's desire' the efforts of the 
materialist historian would seem to nurture only a self-destructive will. Powerless 
against what has been done (and here the image of Klee's 'New Angel' in the Ninth 
Thesis comes to mind) he would be an angry spectator of all things past. Nietzsche's 
affirmative notion of redemption seeks to deliver the will from such a debilitating 
absorption in what is past, to release creativity from a condition in which it is turned 
against itself, consuming itself in reminiscence. If the wish to transform the past, to 
will backwards, typifies a 'melancholy' antipathy towards time then Benjamin's 
notion of redemption comes uncomfortably close to what is targeted in Zarathustra's 
speech. 
But Benjamin's view of memory is more dialectical than this would suggest. To 
say that he displays an "ill will' toward time and its transiency'38 is to tell only half 
the story. In fact his thinking traces a difficult path between a sanguine refusal of the 
'it was' and a sober awareness of how difficult is the task of halting time. However 
difficult, the task is never as futile as Nietzsche implies, since it is aided as well as 
circumscribed by the reality of transience, of whose force both he and Benjamin are 
very much aware. 'The destructive character' Benjamin writes in the essay of the same 
name, 'is always blithely at work. It is nature that dictates his tempo, indirectly at 
least, for he must forestall her. Otherwise she will take over the destruction herself. 139 
Contrast this, though, with the meaning of destruction in the 'Theologico-Political 
Fragment': '... the rhythm of this eternally transient worldly existence-is happiness 
[Gliick] .... To strive after such passing ... is the task of world politics, whose method 
must be called nihilism .... For in happiness all that is earthly seeks its downfall 
[Untergang], and only in good fortune [GUick] is its downfall destined to find it .... For 
nature is Messianic by reason of its eternal and total passing away'. 40 The instantiation 
of happiness here necessitates nihilism, understood as exacerbating, not resisting, the 
destructive effect of transience. The transience of 'the earthly' becomes not simply (as 
it was for the Baroque) a cause for mourning, but yields the means for its own 
38 Rebecca Comay, 'Redeeming Revenge', op. cit., p. 24. 
39 GS 4, p. 397; 'The Destructive Character', One- Way Street & Other Writings, p. 157. 
40 GS 2. p. 204; 'Theologico-Political Fragment', One-Way Street & Other Writings, p. 156. 
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overcoming: destruction is a prelude to transcendence. Benjamin's formulation comes 
very close to Nietzsche's ironic redemption, a fact he seems to recognise in his choice 
of terms: Untergang is Nietzsche's 'down-going', Zarathustra's descent into the world 
to teach the hard lesson that man must 'go under' before any 'going over' (Obergang) 
is possible. 
It is as a clarification of his own avowed 'nihilism'41 that Benjamin's exchange 
with Horkheimer over the completeness or incompleteness of the past can be 
understood. This is not immediately apparent though, if we assume (with one 
commentator) that Horkheimer's position, in which 'materialism' dictates that the past 
be construed as closed, shows a more nihilist attitude than Benjamin's 'theological' 
view of the continuing actuality of the past. 42 Such an interpretation overlooks the 
element of nihilism in Benjamin's refusal of the past's 'closed' (geschlossen) 
character (Nietzsche's es war or 'it was'). Similarly complicated is the question of 
who is the more materialist in this debate - even Benjamin's ostensibly theological 
argument is, as was shown previously, grounded in an insight into the periodic 
'rearrangement' of the past, an idea one also finds in Nietzsche. 43 But what is clear is 
that the difference between the 'destruction' which both Benjamin and Nietzsche 
invoke lies in the fact that whereas the former is staked upon the incomplete and open 
nature of the past, and correspondingly seeks to rescue and redeem past events, the 
latter - and here lies one of the 'affinities' Benjamin notes between Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche - rests on a view of the past as irrecoverable, as unalterable, and sees a 
melancholy antipathy towards time in those who wish it otherwise. 
Benjamin's thinking takes on a nihilist aspect insofar as it identifies not only the 
barbarism of tradition but what might be called the ambivalence of destruction, the 
manner in which any critical response to that barbarism must itself make use of the 
destructive qualities of time, tradition and memory. Benjamin's use of the term 
41 Briefe, p. 355; Correspondence, p. 248. 
42 Helmut Peukert, Science, Action, and Fundamental Theology: Toward a Theology of 
Communicative Action, op. cit., p. 206-10. 
43 Cf. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), p. 104: 
'Historia abcondita. - Every great human being exerts a retroactive force: for his sake, all of history is 
placed in the balance again and a thousand secrets of the past crawl out of their hiding places - into his 
sunshine. There is no way of telling what may yet become part of history. Perhaps the past is still 
essentially undiscovered! So many retroactive forces are still needed! ' 
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'destruction' encapsulates at its most intense his ambivalent relationship to what is 
transient, since transience not only gives rise to the mutability of the present; it also 
threatens to occlude the past. Destruction does not simply suppress, but must make 
use of, transience, a point which is overlooked in one Nietzschean criticism of 
Benjamin. 44 Seeing his relation to transience in these ambivalent terms may go some 
way to accounting for the dual character, by turns melancholy and sanguine, of his 
writings. As Freud once noted, insight into the fact that all things pass away often 
engenders two emotions, the one an 'aching despondency', the other a 'rebellion 
against the fact asserted. 145 Time and again in Benjamin one finds this enormously 
productive yet finally unresolved tension between despondency and rebellion. 
Just as remembrance cuts across Kierkegaard's diagnostic dualism (either 
melancholy or hope) so it seems it would fail to fit neatly onto Nietzsche's distinction 
between active and reactive will, between affirmation of time's 'it was' and a 
resentful negation of the past. In its destructive aspect, remembrance both negates the 
past and, in the same movement, affirms it. In negating the apparent objectivity of 
history, the dominant tradition which is handed-on or transmitted as historical truth, 
remembrance in fact affirms what was hitherto concealed in that act of barbarism, 
what had been suppressed in the past. For the Nietzsche of Zarathustra the 
redemption of the past can only involve accepting that the past cannot be altered. For 
Benjamin this would amount to no redemption at all. Consequently, there are elements 
of Nietzsche's own self-perfecting nihiliSM46 which remain simply incompatible with 
Benjamin's belief in a redemptive remembrance. A note from the Nachlass entitled 
'The Perfect Nihilist' encapsulates this problem. Nietzsche writes: 'The nihilist's 
eye ... is unfaithful to 
his memories: it allows them to drop, lose their leaves; it does not 
guard them against that corpselike pallor that weakness pours out over what is distant 
and gone. And what he does not do for himself, he also does not do for the whole past 
of mankind: he lets it drop. 147 The difference between the two thinkers is clear: those 
44 Rebecca Comay, 'Redeeming Revenge'. op. cit., p. 24. 
45 Freud, 'On Transience' in Art & Literature trans. James Strachey (Harmondworth: Penguin, 1985), 
p. 287. 
46 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 
1968). pp. 34. 
47 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, op. cit., p. 17. 
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destructive powers of transience which Nietzsche wishes to enlist for a self-perfecting 
nihilism are just those which Benjamin ascribes to memory. Nietzsche may on 
occasion admit to the retroactive alteration of the past, but rarely does he acknowledge 
that it is memory which accomplishes this redemption. Had he done so the unqualified 
disparagement memory receives in the Nachlass and in The Genealogy n-dght have 
resembled the more nuanced reflections of 'On the Use and Disadvantages of History 
for Life' where a liberating, critical memory is set against its cumbersome counterpart. Z, 
Given such deep differences (and given Nietzsche's own equivocations) it is 
hardly surprising that Nietzschean ideas enter Ben amin's theologically-guided 
thought in discordant and disruptive fashion. His antipathy to what he viewed as an 
'heroic' politiCS, 48 along with the complicities he saw in the doctrine of eternal 
recurrence, 49 together highlight the limits of his debt to Nietzsche. Similarly, the 
vagaries of Benjamin's messianism. could never extend as far as rejecting the 
cschatology which Nietzsche showed to be part and parcel of the nihilist and 
melancholic devaluation of the world. It is at this point, as will become clear later, that 
Benjamin is most susceptible to a Nietzschean genealogy. 
'The Economics of Pain': Freud 
A significant feature of Benjamin's work on the German mourning-play, and indeed 
of -his writings in general, is that for one who wrote so frequently on the topic of 
melancholy there exist no references to Freud's essay 'Mourning and Melancholia'. 
Whilst the failure to mention Freud's essay in the Trauerspiel book can be attributed 
to the fact that it would not have been readily available until 1924 (by which time the 
Trauerspiel book was essentially complete), this still does not account for subsequent 
oversights. The term one finds repeatedly in Benjamin's writings, Melancholie, is also 
Freud's, although he rarely uses it in its clinical sense; as commentators have noted, 
his frequent references to melancholy owe more to the ancient and medieval theory of 
48 GS 5, p. 175. 
49 GS 1, p. 1234. 
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the humors than to Freudian psychoanalysis, 50 even when the phenomenon is 
identified in specifically modem contexts. This apparent oversight of psychoanalytic 
writings on melancholy is curious because in other places he draws so heavily on 
Freudian concepts (whether it is the theory of shock formulated by Freud in his study 
of traumatic neuroses, or the dialectic of repetition and recollection in therapeutic 
treatment). Given the prominent role which psychoanalysis was to take in the 
Passagen-Werk, a work itself conceived as a parallel to the Trauerspiel book, this 
lacuna seems all the more difficult to explain. 
Like both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Freud deals with melancholy in a way 
which seems to anticipate Benjamin in close respects. All of these thinkers understand 
melancholy to be a particular pathological form of memory, one distinguishable from 
normal unhindered memory by its characteristic blocked or fixated attitude to the past. 
Each in turn sees it as constituting a mode of experience in its own right, one 
paralysed by (often wishful) retrospection. In this fixation the capacity for action 
oriented towards the present and future is correspondingly diminished or stifled. 
Melancholy is for each primarily an experience of time, and each brings to bear a 
temporal framework in diagnosing and criticising melancholy. For each, the temporal 
facets of experience are seen as the key to melancholy's identification, diagnosis, and 
remedy. 
Just as Benjamin distinguishes between tragedy, Trauerspiel and his own critique 
of Trauerspiel in terms of the conceptions of time attendant upon each, so Freud 
distinguishes between mourning and melancholia in temporal terms. Whilst the work 
of mourning is defined by the possibility of its termination in the liberation and 
revitalisation of the ego, melancholia is defined as an interminable display of grief, a 
gradual process of debilitation, an 'open wound ... emptying the ego until it is totally 
impoverished'. 51 With the work of mourning, a finite period of time characterises the 
50 Susan Sontag, Introduction to Walter Benjamin, One-Way Street and Other Writings, p. 8; Fredric 
Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1971) p. 64; Rainer Nagele, Theatre, Theory, Speculation: Walter 
Benjamin and the scenes of modernity, op. cit., p. 22 1, n. 2. 
51 Freud, 'Trauer und Melancholie' in Studienausgabe vol. III. Psychologie des Unbewu, 6ten 
(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1975), p. 199; 'Mourning and Melancholia', in Pelican Freud Library, 
vol. H: On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), p. 262. 
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gradual dissociation of libidinal energy from the cathexis which bound it to the love- 
object: 'each single one of the memories [Erinnerungen] and expectations in which 
the libido is bound to the object is brought up and hypercathected, and detachment of 
the libido is accomplished in respect of it. 152 The melancholic, by contrast, is less able 
to consciously 'abreact', to call up and work though painful memories, and thereby to 
release the emotional affect bound up in them; memories come upon the melancholic 
involuntarily; he is, 'suffering from reminiscences', 53 'clinging to the object through 
the medium of a hallucinatory wishful psychosis'. 54 One particular case history finds 
Freud specifying further the time-dimension of these two phenomena: whereas 'a 
normal period of mourning would last from one to two years, a pathological one like 
this would last indefinitely. 155 
Freud traces these distinguishing temporal characteristics of mourning and 
melancholia to divergent configurations of what he calls 'the economics of pain', that 
is different amounts of excitation and different paths taken by libidinal energy as it 
moves through the psyche. The manner in which emotional energy is accumulated and 
expended differs in mourning from that in melancholia -a 'normal' movement of 
energy will tend towards the conditions compatible with a minimisation of painful 
stimuli (thus a painful cathexis will be given up and the energy reinvested elsewhere); 
so it is that with the work of mourning complete the ego becomes 'free and 
uninhibited again'. But melancholia, by contrast, is prodigal: any labour undertaken is 
inatched by an equally protracted and debilitating consumption, the patient's self- 
regard is severely diminished, sometimes with serious somatic effects, and indeed 
'what is psychologically very remarkable ... an overcoming of the 
instinct which 
compels every living thing to cling to life. 156 This remorseless dejection is all the more 
52 Freud, 'Mourning and Melancholia',, op. cit., p. 253. 
53 This phrase from Freud and Breuer's Studies on Hysteria is adopted as the title of an essay by 
Michael Newman which seeks to situate Benjamin's idea of redemptive memory in terms of what it 
calls 'the aporetic relation of mourning and melancholia'. ['Suffering From Reminiscences', in Francis 
Barker, Peter Hulme & Margaret Iverson (eds. ), Postmodernism and the Re-Reading of Modernity 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992)]. 
54 Freud, 'Mourning and Melancholia', op. cit., p. 253. 
55 Freud, 'Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis ['The Rat Man']' in Pelican Freud Library 
Volume Nine: Case Histories 11 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979) p. 66. 
56 Freud, 'Mourning and Melancholia', op. cit., p. 254. 
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mystifying because of its apparent lack of an object: 'one cannot see clearly what it is 
that has been lost, and it is all the more reasonable to suppose that the patient cannot 
consciously perceive what he has lost either .... We cannot see what it is that is 
absorbing him so entirely. 157 
How then can the melancholic depletion of the ego be explained? Freud knows 
that whatever is happening to diminish the ego so thoroughly must in some way be 
analogous to the process of mourning and yet, unlike mourning, not dependent upon 
some real loss. His response is to suggest that in melancholia a splitting of the ego has 
occurred, a process whereby one element is separated and set up as a critical or 
judging authority - the censuring agency known as conscience: melancholia, involves 
a hypertrophy of conscience. Now this splitting and the subsequent hypertrophy of the 
censuring superego is itself, argues Freud, the result of the ego's internalisation of a 
real relation to an other. 'So we find the key to the clinical picture: we perceive that 
the self-reproaches are reproaches against a loved object which have been shifted 
away from it on to the patient's own ego. 158 It is this ambivalence of the melancholic 
ego toward the lost object - perhaps a hidden satisfaction at the object's death or 
disappearance - that blocks the normal process of mourning. 
Freud's definition of melancholy in terms of ambivalence closely resembles 
insights of Kierkegaard - the transformation of love into hate, passion into passivity, 
life into living death. It similarly evokes Nietzsche's formulation of melancholy as a 
will turned against itself, a counter- or ill-will (Widerwille). For Freud these 
contradictory emotions displayed by the melancholy ego stem from the fact that it 
continues to censure the object for its own dependency. Only by working-through 
these ambivalent emotions can the ego come to terms with its own part in the 
m4levolence it ascribes to the object, and, by gradually liberating its cathexis, 
dissipate that anger. For Benjamin too the impotence of the melancholic is a spur to 
anger, to 'spleen' in its original sense: 'For someone who is past experiencing there is 
no consolation. Yet it is this very inability to experience that constitutes the essence of 
57 Freud, 'Mourning and Melancholia', p. 254. 
58 Freud, 'Mourning and Melancholia', p. 257. 
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rage .... The outbreaks of rage are timed to the ticking of the seconds to which the 
melancholy man is slave. 159 
Freud, again mirroring Kierkegaard, sees as superfluous any concrete object-loss C) 
to melancholy's pathogenesis - it may just as well be 'the loss of some 
abstraction ... such as one's country, liberty, an ideal, and so on. 160 For Benjamin it is 
just these abstractions which produce the most interesting and compelling forms of 
melancholy, 'for feelings, however vague they may seem when perceived by the self, 
respond like a motorial reaction to an objective structure of the world. 161 That 
melancholy reacts to some objective character of the world is clear in both Benjamin's 
survey of the baroque - Trauerspiele 'are not so much plays that cause mourning, as 
plays through which mournfulness finds satisfaction: plays for the MOUMfUJI62 and 
modem melancholy - 'the 'souvenir' is the schema of the transformation of the 
commodity into a collector's object. 163 Whereas the baroque conceived the 'objective 
structure of the world' theologically as an unredeemed, creaturely realm, modernism 
(whose prototype was Baudelaire) pointed towards its source in a deterioration of 
tradition and an increasing commodification of life. 
Melancholy is for Freud, as it was for Yierkegaard, a form of repetition- 
backwards, a burdened and fixated relation to the past. But Freud differs from 
Kierkegaard in refusing to equate all recollection with melancholia. On the contrary he 
believes that pathological memory may be alleviated only by a further act of 
fecollection in which each memory that connects the ego to the lost object is called to 
mind and gradually de-cathected. This is one crucial assumption which Benjamin 
shares with Freud since he too wishes to substitute for the encumbered melancholy 
memory a retroactive remembrance of the past. It is not forgetting or repetition but 
paradoxically remembrance which overcomes the pathology of memory. Like Freud, 
59 GS 2, p. 642; Charles Baudelaire, p. 143 (amended). 
60 Freud, 'Mourning and Melancholia', op. cit., p. 252. Cf. Kierkegaard, EitherlOr Part. 1, op. cit., p. 
189. 
61 GS 1, p. 318; Origin, p. 139 (amended); cf. Adorno, Kierkegaard. - Construction of the Aesthetic, 
trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 60: 'Melancholy is 
not accidental; rather, inwardness becomes melancholic through the specific struggle with historical 
realien'. 
62 GS 1, p. 298; Origin, p. 119. 
63 GS 1, p. 689; 'Central Park', op. cit., p. 55. 
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Benjamin does not see repetition as a viable alternative to melancholy since repetition 
itself denotes an incomplete act of recollection, another form of fixation. For 
Benjamin, Kierkegaard's hopeful repetition ignores the transformation of the past 
necessary to free a fixation, and as such risks repeating the past's mistakes even as it 
would free itself from them. If Kierkegaard draws attention to a pathological moment 
in recollection, Benjamin (following Freud) highlights an equally pathological 
element in repetition. The difficult path between these two dangers is that traced by 
the concept of remembrance. 
Of each of the three thinkers discussed, Benjamin shares most with Freud because 
where Kierkegaard sees recollection as melancholic and Nietzsche denies its 
redemptive power, Freud recognises that memory is the only means for overcoming 
melancholy. Not by dispensing with memory, or engaging in 'active forgetting, but 
only through cultivating a different type of remembering can the melancholy fixation 
upon the past be transcended. Freudian memory has this dual character rarely seen in 
Kierkegaard or Nietzsche. Yet it also has the benefit of acknowledging the resistance 
which militates against any coming, to terms with past. Recognition of the 
transformative power of memory is always tempered by recognition of its weakness, 
the resistance it faces in the form of fixation or the compulsion to repeat. This 
simultaneously powerful yet endangered memory becomes in turn one of the defining 
characteristics of Benjamin's own concept of remembrance. 
Melancholy History 
T4at for Benjamin the phenomenon of melancholy refers just as much to a particular 
outlook upon history as it does to a psychological state is significant in the light of 
Freud's own temporal definitions of mourning and melancholia. A comparison of 
Benjamin and Freud shows up the flaws in the common criticism that Benjamin's 
thinking of history recapitulates the melancholy historical outlook to which he 
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professes opposition. 64 Such a criticism needs to be qualified by recognition of the 
fact that (as Freud shows) melancholia is potentially infinite whilst mourning is 
defined by the possibility of its termination. In terms of this distinction, Benjamin's 
invocation of eschatolo- a-ainst baroque sadness comes closer to mourning than to oy 00 
(potentially interminable) melancholy. Had Freud studied the Baroque aesthetic he 
might well have pointed out that there is no Trauerarbeit in Trauerspiel; no work, 
only the unending play of sadness. The infinity of the Baroque view of history would 
be the most eloquent expression of its melancholy. One can only speculate as to a 
Freudian view of this world-historical sadness since it is never employed by 
Benjamin. However, Benjamin does note that melancholy is sustained by 'the 
consciousness of time running empty', 65 that melancholy coincides with the 
experience of empty homogeneous time. If it is an empty unfufilled time which lies at 
the basis of the melancholy outlook on history, then it would indeed correspond to the 
endless history projected in Trauerspiel, 'the supposed infinity of a world without 
hope', 66 a view of history repeated in modem conceptions of progress. By implication, 
the act of remembrance which Benjamin sets against this empty homogeneous time 
carries with it a different temporality, a time capable of fulfilment - messianic time. 
Clearly there is more of the work of mourning than melancholia in operation in the 
concept of remembrance. But whilst he may be defended against charges of 
recapitulating a melancholic view of history, the possibility remains that his is still an 
faberrated mourning, not the sadness of true mourning and lamentation, 67 that the 
eschatology which would break with melancholy rests on the same traumatised 
historical vision. In these terms messianic hope and melancholic hopelessness would 
be two sides of the same coin, each revealing an interruption in the labour of coming 
to terms with the past. 
64 See for instance Scholem, 'Walter Benjamin and His Angel' in Gary Smith (ed. ), On Walter 
Benjamin, op. cit., p. 85. 
65 GS 1, p. 1141. 
66 GS 1. p. 406; Origin, p. 232. 
67 Gillian Rose, 'Walter Benjamin: Out of the Sources of Modern Judaism' in Judaism and Modernity: 
Philosophical Essays, op. cit., p. 187. The italicised phrase comes from Laurence A. Rickels, 
Aberrations of Mourning: Writing on German Crypts. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988). 
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Such a criticism is compelling. It is undeniable that the eschatology which is 
contrasted with melancholy fatalism shares important features with that very view of 
history. The conclusion of the Trauerspiel study, as Pensky notes, 'is not 
unambiguously critical'68 of the Baroque. This troubled attitude towards allegory and 
the melancholy to which it corresponds reappears in Benjamin's writings on 
modernity. 'The allegorical mode of apprehension, ' he writes, 'always arises from a 
devalued appearance-world. The specific devaluation [Entwertung] of the appearance- 
world represented by the commodity is the foundation of the allegorical intention for 
Baudelaire. 169 For Benjamin it is bourgeois society which excels at this emptying-out 
of the world, realising materially what the Baroque could construe only theologically, 
as God-forsakenness: 'the devaluation [Entwertung] of the world of things in allegory 
is outdone within the world of things itself by the commodity. 170 
But as Weber argued (and here the influence of Nietzsche is evident), eschatology 
equally denigrates worldly existence: the doctrine of Last Judgement 'has tended to 
progress step by step towards an ever-increasing devaluation [Entwertung] of the 
world. '71 To the melancholy devaluation of the mundane, eschatology responds not 
with an affirmation but with a heightened devaluation. This ambivalent character of 
the critique of melancholy reveals its implication in that which it would overcome. 
Benjamin appears to acknowledge this nihilistic character of his redemptive criticism 
when, referring to a letter from Overbeck to Nietzsche, he describes Christianity as a 
religion of 'unconditional, eschatologically grounded world-negation 
[Weltvemeinung]1,72 just the characteristic of Christianity identified and exploited in 
the Trauerspiel study. Here the two senses of 'world-negation' - the one, renunciation, 
68 Max Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, p. 149. 
69 6S 1, p. 1151 cited Pensky, p. 166. 
70 GS 1, p. 660; 'Central Park', p. 34. 
71 Weber, Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur Religionssoziologie I (Tubingen: Sibeck, 1920), p. 567; 'Religious 
Rejections of the World and their Directions' in From Max Weber, ed. & trans. H. H. Gerth & C. 
Wright Mills (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 353. Cf. Nietzsche: 'Even the 'Last Judgement' is still the 
sweet consolation of revenge - the revolution, such as the Socialist too anticipates, only conceived of as 
somewhat more distant ... 
Even the 'Beyond' - why a Beyond if not as a means of befouling the Here. 
and-Now?... ' [Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1990), p. 97]. 
72 GS 4, p. 228. This phrase is cited in Bernd Witte, Walter Benjamin: An Intellectual Biography, op. 
cit., p. 173. 
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devaluation, sublimation, the other, destruction, transcendence, precipitation - stand in 
uneasy relation. Because just this world-negating eschatology (both in its Christian 
and its Judaic manifestations) constantly informs Benjamin's thinking, his relationship 
to the object of his criticism - the melancholy devaluation of the world - is always 
closer and more complex than first appears. Like the melancholic world-view, 
eschatology sees no aspect of life which is not itself tarnished by the thing-like quality 
of the world. The remedy shares much with the symptom. In his Anatomy of 
Melancholy (1621), Robert Burton depicted a utopia which might deliver the world of 
its melancholy condition; to the melancholic, only suc h an other-worldly politics 
appears sufficient. 
It is here that Benjamin differs most fundamentally from the genealogies of 
melancholy undertaken by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Freud, because his relation to 
melancholy is always more equivocal than the undiluted criticisms one finds in the 
latter. Benjamin's is not a genealogy but a dialectic of melancholy, one which seeks 
not to counter melancholy with repetition or affirmation but to turn melancholy 
against itself, to utilise its heightened powers of absorption and contemplation, the 
fascination found in melancholy subjectivity with the reified and unredeemed 'thing, 
turning these powers to redemptive ends, to rescuing the thing, or, as it is in its 
capitalist manifestation, the commodity. If this involves a negation of the world then 
paradoxically it also expresses faithfulness to it: 
Fidelity is completely appropriate only to the relationship of man to the 
world of things. The latter knows no higher law, and fidelity knows no 
object to which it might belong more exclusively than the world of 
things. And indeed this world is calling it; and every faithful vow or 
memory surrounds itself with the fragments of the world of things as 
its very own, not-too-demanding objects. Clumsily, indeed justifiably, 
fidelity expresses, in its own way, a truth for the sake of which it does, 
of course, betray the world. Melancholy betrays the world for the sake 
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of knowledge. But in its tenacious self-absorption it embraces dead 
objects in its contemplation, in order to rescue them. 73 
In 'the spirit of melancholy' Benjamin's criticism too descends into the depths of the 
fallen world, cultivating, like the baroque outlook, a fidelity to the creaturely, but one 
which, unlike the baroque, seeks ultimately to redeem it. His thought at large retains 
something of this betrayal of the world in the cause of knowledge, in its relentless 
fascination with the reified relic or the souvenir, searching for what each contains and 
conceals, what each remembers. This assumption that it is only by working with the 
destruction of tradition that tradition's nihilism can be transcended eloquently 
expresses Benjamin's own self-perficient nihilism. His redemptive criticism becomes 
a means for turning devaluation (Entwertung) against itself, clearing a space for a 
more fundamental renewal, a revaluation. Eschatological devaluation of the world 
thereby conceals a more deep-seated fidelity to it. But in this assumption the 
dangerous affinity between melancholy and the destructive critique of melancholy is 
further underlined. 74 
The orientation of criticism towards a redemptive remembrance of the past 
struggles with a melancholy which threatens to overpower it. Klee's New Angel 
'wants happiness' but is being blown away from the place where it is to be found. The 
question is not whether the melancholy moment can be excised from this project but 
whether it need always serve 'pathological', that is, regressive, ends. There may be a 
necessary melancholy in destruction as much as there is destruction in melancholy. 
Here Benjamin must ultimately diverge from Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Freud and 
defend an element of that melancholy which each denigrated. 
73 6S 1, p. 333-4; Origin, p. 156-7 (amended). 
74 Pensky argues that Benjamin's appropriation of surrealist ideas in his works of the 1930s enabled 
him to overcome this dilemma and to pursue a 'postmelancholy criticism': in surrealism 'hypertrophied 
memory' is 'released from the model of the self-reflecting subject and dispersed in the energized field 
of objects'; 'mournfulness is turned into (black) humour' (Melancholy Dialectics, op. cit., p. 192,186]. 
But if one sees melancholy more or less definitively surmounted in Benjamin's later work the problem 
remains of explaining the theses 'On the Concept of History' in which each of the problems discussed 
above concering the melancholy of remembrance recur in accentuated form. The replacement here of 
the isolated subject of memory not with a 'field of objects' but with a collective subject, ('the 
revolutionary classes at the moment of their action') serves not so much to overcome the problem of 
melancholy as to raise its stakes. 
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Like the criticisms levelled against Benjamin by Adorno, those of the 
genealogists of memory are cogent'and compelling, but in the last instance do not 
invalidate the concept of remembrance, nor the view of history to which it gives rise. 
There is much in this concept which can be defended. It may be this concept's 
resilience which explains its influence in subsequent appropriations of Benjamin's 
thinking, and its recurrence in contemporary criticism. It is to the legacy of the 
concept of remembrance that this thesis turns now in conclusion. As will become 
clear, it is a particular rendition of Benjamin's philosophy of memory that has shaped 
its reception by contemporary readers: frequently remembrance has been construed 
ethically as a theory of how justice can be rendered to past generations. This particular 
interpretation has had a significant effect on how Benjamin's thought as a whole has 
been received. The discussion thus far provides the necessary resources to evaluate 
this interpretation both in its fidelity to Benjamin's intention and in terms of its own 
merits and weaknesses. 
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Beyond Commemoration 
Introduction 
When critics have recognised the important role played by the concept of 
remembrance within Benjamin's philosophy or noted its ramifications for any 
thinking of history and time, the particular way in which that concept has been 
construed has been crucial. Indeed the specific interpretation of this aspect of 
Benjamin's work has played a significant part in determining the legacy of Benjamin's 
work as a whole. The view that remembrance denotes an ethical act, an event of 
commemoration, has become a popular assumption amongst contemporary readers, 
and whilst this has renewed interest in Benjamin, the circumscription of the diverse 
lineages, meanings and applications of the concept has been considerable. This final 
chapter sets out to critically examine this fate of Benjamin's philosophy of memory in 
an ethics of commemoration, to question in particular the way in which his concept of 
Eingedenken has been invoked in attempts to found a philosophical ethics in memory 
of the Holocaust. In recent debates within theology, social theory and philosophy, 
remembrance of the Holocaust is frequently seen as a means of doing justice to the 
genocide itself. Moral reflection on the atrocities of Nazism is now frequently 
expressed in terms of founding a new form of remembrance or commemoration. Here 
memory becomes a categorical imperative, an unconditional demand, a 'basic 
category of practical critical reason' (Metz). Significantly for the present discussion, it 
has often been Benjamin whose name has been invoked as an antecedent for such 
moral philosophy after the Holocaust. The following discussion is devoted to showing 
how Benjamin's thinking of memory and history have been expressed in ethical terms 
by thinkers such as Habermas, Metz and Peukert and subsequently incorporated into a 
model of Holocaust remembrance. The detailed examination of Benjamin's 
philosophy of memory given thus far provides a unique vantage point from which to 
assess this ethical legacy of his thinking. 
The first section of this chapter looks at Metz's notion of 'dangerous memory' 
and the role Metz's interpretation of Benjamin plays in its exposition. The second 
section examines similar themes in works by Christian Lenhardt and Helmut Peukert, 
their development of a notion of 'anamnestic solidarity'. The third part goes on to 
explore the way 'Benjaniinian' ideas of solidarity in remembrance and critical 
historiography have been taken up by Habermas in his political writings and in his 
reflections upon the Holocaust. Throughout, the strengths and weaknesses of each of 
these readings of Benjamin are highlighted. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the 
limits of any ethics of commemoration and the questions Benjan-dn himself poses of 
any attempt to found such an ethics in his name. 
Ag. 
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'As though it were the task of every age to have to be just 
towards everything that has ever existed! ' 
Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of Historyfor Life 
Dangerous Memory: Metz 
The political theology which Johann Baptist Metz has developed over recent years in 
the form of an engagement with elements of liberation theology and critical theory is 
of interest to any examination of the legacy of Benjamin's theory of remembrance 
because of the importance of Metz's interpretation of Benjamin to the exposition and 
development of his central category of 'dangerous memory'. In Metz political 
theology carries a different meaning than that it had for Schmitt (who in turn 
influenced Benjamin) where it named a genealogy of political concepts understood as 
secularised theological categories. Here it derives from the more normative 
assumption that theology cannot subsist in abstraction from questions of 'public life, 
justice and freedom, in other words, political problems'. ' Political theology 'is not 
simply a theory of the subsequent application of the Christian message, but a theory of 
the truth of that message with a practical and critical intention for the modem world. '2 
HQwever, Metz's view is that the historical distance between the present and biblical 
times means that the question of how that message is to be articulated becomes a 
problem of remembering a tradition which has become all but extinguished. Memory 
becomes, of necessity, 'the fundamental expression of Christian faith'; Significantly 
though, this memory of Christ's suffering and resurrection has an essentially critical, 
I Metz, Faith in History and Society, op. cit., p. 88. 
2 Ibid., p. 89. 
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'dangerous' quality when applied to the historical present. 3 'In faith, [Christians] 
remember the testament of Christ's love, in which the kingdom of God appeared 
among men by initially establishing that kingdom between men, by Jesus' confession 
of himself as one who was on the side of the oppressed and rejected and by his 
proclamation of the coming kingdom of God as the liberating power of unconditional 
love. 14 This dangerous memory differs from 'romantic or restorative' views of the past 
in that 'it is conscious of the deadly conflict between God's promises and a history 
that is dominated by man's alienated desires and interests .... It is characterized by ... the 
persistence, the impatience and the patience that are required by the Christian memory 
as the imitation of Christ. 15 In its projection of Christ's own resurrection into future 
human salvation memory becomes not retrospective but anticipative; not (as 
Kierkegaard has it) opposed to hope, but becoming instead hope's 'eschatological 
expression', a 'repetitive memory forwards'. 6 Yet this dangerous, hopeful memory is 
equally endangered: the extent of its destruction 'is a typical measure of totalitarian 
rule'. Totalitarianism is for Metz the attempted erasure of past suffering and past 
aspirations to which Christianity responds with 'anamnetic [sic] solidarity' or a 
solidarity with history's oppressed. Solidarity in memory works against the apparent 
continuity of triumph and conquest which defines history as commonly conceived, it 
'shocks us out of ever becoming prematurely reconciled to the facts' of historical 
continuity, by setting 'the non-sense of history against the probing optimism of the 
Victor'. 7 The idea of historical continuity, together with notion of 'evolution in 
history' both rest, Metz argues, upon an uncritical view of time. 
Man's understanding of reality, which guides his scientific and 
technical control of nature and from which the cult of the makeable 
draws its strength, is marked by the idea of time as a continuous 
process which is empty and evolving towards infinity and within which 
3 In Metz's formulation there are clear echoes of Merkegaard's 'there is no weapon as dangerous as the 
art of being able to recollect' [EitherlOr vol. 1, op. cit., p. 293]. 
4 Metz, Faith in History and Society, op. cit., p. 90. 
5 Ibid., p. 204. 
6 Ibid., p. 184,188. 
7 Ibid., pp. 110,113,130. 
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everything is enclosed without grace. This understanding of reality 
excludes all expectation and therefore produces that fatalism that eats 
away at man's soul. Man therefore is already resigned even before 
society has been able to introduce him successfully to this resignation 
as a form of practical rationality. 8 
Dangerous memory differs from the assumption of temporal homogeneity implicit in 
such an idea of history by virtue of its 'narrative structure': alluding to Benjamin, 
Metz cites the essay 'The Storyteller' in which memory, tradition and experience are 
shown to be intimately linked: for Benjamin narration, whether in the form of stories 
or tradition, is understood as the means by which experience is transmitted. For Metz, 
interpreting these themes theologically, narrative is the necessary means of 
communicating and passing-on the experience of faith; narrative is 'dangerous' 
insofar as it reverses the destruction of that passing-on; faith is thus capable of being 
'translated into dangerously liberating stories'. 9 Again Benjamin appears in the 
background when Metz weighs up competing views of history within the 
philosophical tradition and reveals his sympathy for hermeneutics in its privileging of 
history-as-memory over history-as-science. 
This use of Benjamin's ideas reveals a confusion in Metz's notion of dangerous 
memory. For Benjamin, what is overlooked in making a positive science of 
historiography is indeed the mnemonic aspect of history, but by returning to this 
original vocation of history Benjamin sought to draw attention to the discontinuous 
structure of historical time. That history has a continuous structure only as appearance, 
as illusion, is dispelled by recognition of the heterogeneous temporality of memory. 
BLIt it is precisely continuity to which Metz appeals when he describes the 'narrative 
structure' of dangerous memory. Despite recognising Benjamin's critique of temporal 
homogeneity he fails to see the implication of narrative (his 'dangerously liberating 
stories') in that critique. This error may well be due to the fact that instead of drawing 
upon the 'Theses' and the exchange with Horkheimer in which Eingedenken takes 
8 Ibid., p. 170. 
9 Ibid., p. 212. 
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priority he focuses on the essay 'The Storyteller' in which Erinnerung is the 
privileged form of memory, that mnemonic medium which passes a happening on 
from generation to generation. 10 Erinnerung is 'dangerous' only in so far as refers to 
what has been lost in the deterioration of tradition; the critical quality of Eingedenken 
by contrast lies in its more subtle relation to that destruction of tradition. Where 
Erinnerung provides a seamless link in tradition's chain, Eingedenken has the 
capacity to disrupt that continuity. Metz's allusions to 'The Storyteller' are in fact 
self-defeating because that essay announces precisely the end of narrative, something 
which, with the development of the 'secular productive forces of history', 11 proves 
irreversible. Indeed Benjamin does not even think it desirable to resuscitate a form of 
experience transmitted solely by narrative. This is one reason why Erinnerung is for 
the most part supplanted in his development of a critical mode of engagement with 
tradition. That Eingedenken and not Erinnerung is for Benjamin the truly 'dangerous' 
form of memory reveals not only an inconsistent but a potentially conservative 
dimension to Metz's political theology. The point at which his reading of Benjamin 
proves less than compelling is also the point at which his own speculations on 
theology seem weakest. (It is here that Peukert, upon whom Metz in turn draws, 
proves to be the better reader). 
Metz's 'memorative soteriology' misinterprets Benjamin's idea of redemptive 
memory in several ways. Firstly it literalises Benjamin's view of the redemptive 
capacities of remembrance and in the process fails to see the complex interweaving of 
theological and secular ideas which yield its meaning. To construe memory solely in 
soteriological terms (that is, as a doctrine of divine salvation) is to overlook its secular 
currency, something Benjamin was always keen to stress. Secondly, even in 
theological terms Benjamin's Judaism is not easily translated into Metz's Christian 
framework, with its assumption that memory exhibits a speculative tension between 
'the already' (Christ's resurrection) and the 'not yet' (human salvation). 12 Even an 
interpretation seemingly more faithful to Benjamin's Judaism, one which sees the 
function of remembrance as illuminating the gap between a pre-lapsarian past and its 
10 GS 2, p. 453; 'The Storyteller' in Illuminations, p. 98. 
11 GS 2, p. 442; 'The Storyteller' in Illuminations, p. 87. 
12 Metz, Faith in History and Society, op. cit., p. 200. 
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future re-establishment13 is limited and misleading if it ignores memory's equally 
historical and political function. In Benjamin's writings the critical or 'dangerous' role 
which memory is able to play is better understood in just this secular sense, that it 
brings to light still-unfulfilled historical demands and desires. Remembrance does not 
long for a pre-historical arkhe but merely keeps alive a promise latent within historical 
struggles themselves. Metz's assumption that Benjamin privileges Erinnerung as 
dangerous memory is complicit in a common view of his critical project as a sort of 
historical nostalgia. It serves to render memory conservative rather than destructive by 
seeking to revive a pre-modem form of faith and reverse the process of secularisation. 
It ignores Benjamin's more complex analysis of the forms of memory characteristic of 
modernity. Thirdly, Metz describes memory as 'a basic category of practical critical 
reason' but without exploring further the implied link to Kantian philosophy: 
presumably this definition entails that here a cognitive (theoretical) faculty has ethical 
(practical) import. Yet other elements of Kantian practical reason can be seen at work 
here. The idea of solidarity takes on the qualities both of a duty and of a postulate of 
moral action; to this extent Metz's Christian reflections evoke Cohen's Kantianism in 
their assumption that it is through fellow-feeling that one may aspire to the Kingdom 
of Ends, this understood (theologically) as God's kingdom. It is in the sense of a task 
of solidarity that memory becomes practical or ethical in Metz's hands. This in turn is 
one important feature which Metz's appropriation of Benjaniin shares with those of 
Lenhardt and Peukert. 
Solidarity in Remembrance: Lenhardt and Peukert 
Christian Lenhardt's essay 'Anamnestic Solidarity: The Proletariat and its Manes' is 
conceived as a contribution to 'the Marxian philosophy of history'. It proposes 'an 
immanent critique of the concept of solidarity, as it has emerged in Marxist thought, 
assimilating and systematizing a handful of sporadic remarks by Walter Benjamin and 
13 Cf. Irving Wohlfarth, 'On The Messianic Structure of Walter Benjan-tin's Last Reflections', op. cit., 
pp. 148-212. 
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Max Horkheimer. '14 Claiming 'no truck with theology' it seeks instead a 'spiritualist 
revision' of the way in which Marxism has understood the notion of solidarity. 
Drawing upon terms used by Alfred Schutz, Lenhardt proposes a typology with which 
to express historically the relation between freedom and unfreedom within the 
Marxian paradiarn: he distinguishes between the generation of enslaved predecessors 
(Vorwelt), enslaved contemporaries (Mitwelt) and emancipated successors (Nachwelt). 
It is typically assumed, argues Lenhardt, that Marx privileged the latter two categories 
as respectively the agents and beneficiaries of social revolution and that, by 
implication, the first generation is relegated to status of 'dead wood in the evolution of 
mankind'. It is this assumption, the imbalance of indebtedness between future and 
past generations which Lenhardt is keen to redress. He argues that the debt of 
gratitude owed by the Nachwelt generation to both the Vor- and Mitwelt places it an 
'unenviable' position, 'for what can it do practically and existentially, to equalize the 
burden of injustice borne by its predecessors? '15 According to Lenhardt it is here that 
Benjamin comes into his own, because he 'addresses the fundamental problem of the 
relationship between generational types' through the concept of remembrance: 'he 
sensed that what he called remembrance (Eingedenken) and redemption were 
cornerstones of a materialistic depth-structure which had yet to be unearthed and 
shown to exist. '16 Remembrance is singled out because it provides an outlook with 
which both present and future generations can do justice to the struggles of their 
deceased ancestors, just that outlook Lenhardt finds lacking in Marxian orthodoxy. 
The concept achieves several things: it overcomes the 'instrumental' or 'one- 
dimensional' relationship between past, present and future generations typical of 
Marxism as commonly conceived; it recognises the need for solidarity not only 
amongst the living but between the living and the dead; it acknowledges that historical C) 
consciousness is both 'rational-reconstructive' and at the same time 'emotionally and 
sympathetically committed'; it highlights a hitherto under-explored link between 
Marxism and religious thought; 17 the historiography to which it gives rise benefits 
14 Lenhardt, 'Anamnestic Solidarity: The Proletariat and its Manes', Telos, 25 (Fall 1975), p. 133. 
15 Ibid., p. 133. 
16 Ibid., p. 137. 
17 Ibid., p. 153. 
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from having 'a sense of good-and-evil which informs the materialist plot and colors 
the redemptive telling of the story'. 18 Indeed the power of remembrance is nothing 
less than 'the power of the historical being called man'; it becomes 'imperative, 
especially for Marxists and especially under materialist auspices, to reflect upon [its] 
power'. 19 
Digressing into an anthropology of ancestor worship, Lenhardt outlines a 
'Marxian religion' in which reverence for the proletariat's 'manes' (the souls or spirit 
of the dead) would be seen as a necessary precondition of the happiness of future 
liberated generations. Minus this anamnestic homage 'the felicity of the lucky 
succesors will have an admixture of displeasure owing to the exclusion of the 
ancestors from the feast of their grand-children. 120 The notion of anamnestic solidarity 
is attributed not only to Benjamin's invocation of Marx in the 'Theses' but to Marx 
himself via a biographical link (as Lenhardt admits, a tenuous one) with Hegel's 
writings on ancestor worship in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Admitting 
that his argument may run counter to the letter of Marx ('let the dead bury the dead' 
urges The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte), Lenhardt goes on to suggest that 
implicit in the labour theory of value is an 'ethical theory of inheritance', a view of the 
indebtedness of those who employ means of production to those whose labour-power 
is congealed or expended in it. Lenhardt echoes a point made critically by Adorno in 
discussion with Benjamin, that the reification of the commodity is a forgetting of the 
human element in it, 21 but here the argument is given a spiritual and ethical meaning 
not present in Adorno's formulation. 
Lenhardt's arguments (together with ideas drawn from Metz) are subsequently 
developed by Helmut Peukert, who concurs that Benjamin's idea of 'remembrance' is 
a crucial yet neglected concept of critical theory. Peukert's reflections on anamnestic 
solidarity form part of a wider project to question the putative incommensurability of 
Habermas' universal pragmatics with fundamental theology, whilst at the same time 
pointing to the limiting cases which circumscribe universal pragmatics itself. 
18 Ibid., p. 142. 
19 Ibid., p. 14 1. 
20 Ibid., p. 144. 
21 GS 1, p. 1134. 
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Referring both to Metz's notion of 'dangerous memory' and the debate between 
Benjamin and Horkheimer over the finished or unfinished nature of the past ('one of 
the most theologically significant controversies of this centuryl, 22) Peukert argues that 
the postulates of interaction found in the Habermasian theory of communication - 
'unconditional equality, reciprocity, and solidarity' are not fulfilled in the case of our 
rLation to past generations. Mobilising Lenhardt's tripartite typology he suggests that 
the freedom projected in the idea of communicative action may be contingent or 
parasitic upon forgetting the suffering of past generations, precisely those whose 
struggles realise that freedom. ID 
The question of the possibility of historical freedom in the framework 
of a theory of communicative action is made even more acute in the 
attempt to exist in universal solidarity, when solidarity is extended to 
those who have been destroyed or annihilated as victims of historical 
processes. Can we simply exclude the question of a reality to which 
communicative action in solidarity is directed? Precisely at this point, 
does not the theory of communicative action pose the question of the 
reality that is the subject matter of theology, the question of a reality 
witnessed for the other in the face of his death by acting in solidarity 
with him? 23 
Several points can be made concerning Lenhardt's and Peukert's understanding of 
Benjaminian 'remembrance' and how it impinges upon their ethics of solidarity. 
Firstly, the meaning of the redemption which remembrance enacts is for both Lenhardt 
and Peukert the redemption of 'mankind', a category which includes 'both living and 
dead' with the result that despite the concern expressed by each to give secular 
currency to their reflections, they rest upon theological presuppositions. Benjamin's 
own concepts of redemption (Rettung, Erldsung) are always less literal, less confined 
to their religious meaning, than both Lenhardt and Peukert imply, because materialism 
22 Helmut Peukert, Science, Action, and Fundamental Theology, op. cit., p. 206. 
23 Ibid., p. 214. 
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always qualified the theology found in these late writings (and particularly in the 
debate with Horkheimer upon which Peukert draws). That Benjamin thought of 
redemption as the critical practise of a 'materialist historian' shows that caution is 
needed before any theological retranslation of the concept is attempted. It is not 
insignificant that Benjamin's response to Horkheimer warns against the use of 
'immediately theological' concepts in the writing of history: he indicates that an 
exclusively theological reading of the 'Theses' is as misplaced as an exclusively 
Marxian interpretation. Secondly, in transposing Benjamin's reflections on history 
into the framework of moral philosophy, both Lenhardt and Peukert have neglected 
the stakes involved in Benjamin's own choice of language and style: the 'Theses' are 
a rich interweaving of forms and techniques which nowhere exhibit the didactic or 
hortative tone often attributed to them. Thirdly, the terms of this reception remain 
undertheorised, especially in relation to Benjamin's own terminology: whilst Lenhardt 
recognises that the notion of solidarity with past generations is complicated by 
Benjamin's own critique of Diltheyan 'empathy', 24 Peukert does not see the 
significance of this conflict of allegiance for any attempt to empathise with the past, 
with the result that he often elides solidarity and empathy. The problem he then faces 
is how to derive the universal character of solidarity whilst retaining Benjamin's 
conflictual view of history. The concept of empathy could be made servicable for 
universal pragmatics (even Peukert's qualified version of that philosophical outlook) 
bnly by rendering it conflict-free. For Benjamin, empathy with the past is conflict- 
ridden because the historical object is itself conflict-ridden; historical struggles entail 
a struggle for how history is understood. Empathy is, as Peukert's comments 
recognise, to be wrested away from apologetics, but not in favour of an unspecified 
universality. 
Peukert believes that the 'aporia' left by the limiting case of solidarity with past 
generations, is to be remedied by fundamental theology, by faith in the salvation of the 
dead, a faith in turn inspired by the resurrection of Christ. Here he comes close to 
Metz for whom memory involves a projected universalisation of Christ's own 
resurrection. Agreeing with Horkheimer's characterisation of Benjamin's view of the 
24 Lenhardt, 'Anamnestic Solidarity', op. cit., p. 141. 
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unfinished nature of the past ('ultimately you are making a theological statement') and 
differing from Horkheimer only in his enthusiasm for this characterisation, Peukert 
has failed to understand both the interplay of theology and materialism in Benjamin's 
side of the debate, and the subsequent qualification he makes by means of the concept 
of remembrance: 'in remembrance we have an experience which forbids us to 
conceive of history as fundamentally atheological, just as little as we are allowed to 
attempt to write it in terms of immediately theological concepts. 125 Peukert writes 
history with the aid of just those immediately theological concepts terms forbidden by 
Benjamin. The oversight is significant in that Peukert's theological rendition of 
Benjamin performs the argumentative labour in his critique of the postulate of 
universal solidarity, and in his wider argument that Habermas' universal pragmatics 
requires fundamental theology if it is to be consistent. 
Memory as Self-Reassurance and as Suspicion: Habermas 
Habermas himself has responded to Peukert both implicitly and explicitly, addressing 
his criticisms of the aporia of solidarity and taking on board his formulations 
concerning memory. The call for anamnestic solidarity has become a recurring theme 
in Habermas' own recent work, and has been incorporated into his revisions and 
restatement of the theory of communicative reason. That he takes the idea of 
anamnestic solidarity seriously is confirmed when in one such restatement, he sets out 
(citing Peukert and Lenhardt) a possible 'skeptical' criticism of his discourse ethics, 
and in so doing clarifies his relation to Benjamin. 
Discourse ethics does not see fit to resort to an objective teleology, 
least of all to a countervailing force that tries to negate dialectically the 
irreversible succession of historical events - as was the case, for 
instance, with the redeeming judgment of the Christian God on the last 
day. But how can we live up to the principle of discourse ethics, which 
25 GS 5, p. 589 (N8,1); 'Konvolut 'N", p. 61 (amended). 
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postulates the consent of all, if we cannot make restitution for the 
injustice and pain suffered by previous generations or if we cannot at 
least promise an equivalent to the day of judgment and its power of 
redemption? Is it not obscene for present-day beneficiaries of past 
injustices to expect the posthumous consent of slain and degraded 
victims to norms that appear justified to us in light of our own 
expectations regarding the future? 26 
The objection is left unanswered, but Habermas' formulation of it is instructive. Here 
discourse ethics names itself (citing Horkheimer) 'a materialist theory of society', an 
antidote to 'the utopian character of Kant's idea of the perfect constitution'. Yet this 
qualified religion within the limits of reason is paradoxically more theological and 
less materialist than Benjamin's reflections towards which it alludes; it is curious that 
Habermas gives credence to Peukert's theological rewriting of his essentially 
humanist model of communicative action. The result is that, despite the alleged 
materialism of Habermas' position here, the 'all' who are to be restituted are 
redeemed (even if only in the form of a postulate) in a purely theological way, one 
which, moreover, is at odds with Benjamin's more dialectically nuanced 'redemption'. 
For the latter it is the thought (the 'image') of past suffering which is to inspire 
political action in the present, not the actual redemption of the dead, least of all their 
postulated 'consent'. This is the meaning of the 'weak Messianic power' ascribed to 
remembrance. 27 When Habermas concurs with Horkheimer's view of the closed (here 
the 'irreversible') character of the past and declares against faith in last judgment, he 
(like Horkheimer) takes Benjamin's formulations in an exclusively theological way 
(diýspite noting the 'weak' character of redemption), and thus overlooks Benjamin's 
subsequent elaboration of redemption as a power of remembrance (Eingedenken), the 
contention that it is remembrance which makes the ostensibly complete into 
something unfinished and vice versa. Habermas seeks to contrast his own 
'materialism' with Benjamin's theology but in the last instance it is theology which 
26 Habermas, 'Morality and Ethical life' in Moral Consciousness and Human Action, trans. Christian 
Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholson (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), p. 2 10. 0 
27 GS 1, p. 694; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 254. 
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holds sway over this attempt to extend the compass of discourse ethics, because it is 
never questioned how the dead might, through our empathy or solidarity, participate in 
a community of interlocuters. Benjamin's idea of remembrance has a different 
meaning: it sets out an attitude towards history and an historiography which would 
keep alive a sense of what is at stake in the actions and suffering of past generations; it 
sees the concerns of those ancestors as present dangers. This is the only sense in 
which 'justice' is done to the dead; it is, as Benjamin acknowledged, a 'weak' 
eschatology. 
In apparently conceding to Peukert, Habermas reveals a wish to retain in his 
discourse ethics something of what was meant by eschatology, a belief that its ethical 
character may be rescued in secular form as anamestic solidarity. Divine judgement 
and justice can be brought within the sphere of practical reason when understood as 
the action of solidarity upon past suffering; past generations are thereby included 
within the community of discursive actors. Yet the fact that his universalism is 
thereby extended beyond the compass of the secular to include the dead militates 
against what otherwise presents itself as an Enlightenment-humanist and critical 
project - the theory of communicative action. 
The idea of anamnestic solidarity is developed further in Habermas' political 
writings, and here the influence of Benjamin becomes even more marked. In an essay 
first published in Die Zeit entitled 'Vom offentlichen Gebrauch der Historie [On the 
Public Use of History]' and as part of a critical survey of the German Historikerstreit 
or 'historians' dispute', a set of debates over revisionism in accounts of Germany's 
Nazi past, Habermas draws upon Benjamin and the discourse of 'anamnestic 
solidarity' in order to set out what he sees as the responsibility both of historians and 
of his own nation in thinking about the Holocaust. Benjamin is enlisted for Habermas' 
foray into these debates because he is seen to have anticipated the political ends to 
which historiography is used in the Historikerstreit. According to Habermas, 
Benjamin in his late work 'was thinking of the public use made of history by national 
movements and nation states in the nineteenth century - the kind of historical writing 
with a broad influence that could serve as the medium for the self-reassurance of a 
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nation, a people becoming conscious of its own identity. 128 For Habermas, Benjamin's 
insight proves prophetic because contemporary 'neo-conservative' thought (of which 
historical revisionism is one extreme) recommends precisely that 'empathy with the 
victor' shown up in the 'Theses'. 29 Habermas takes from Benjamin an insight into the 
dual character of a historiography which can serve both as a self-reassuring and 
legitimising narrative with which nation-states may dignify their actions or as a 
'suspicious' form of remembrance which would attempt to do justice to those whose 
suffering is concealed in those same narratives. To counter historical revisionism and 
its attendant complicities means mobilising the second characteristic of historiography 
ac, ainst the former. 0 
There is the obligation incumbent upon us in Germany - even if no one 
else were to feel it any longer - to keep alive, without distortion and not 
only in an intellectual form, the memory of the sufferings of those who 
were murdered by German hands. It is especially these dead who have 
a claim to the weak anamnestic power of a solidarity that the later 
generations can continue to practice only in the medium of a 
remembrance that is repeatedly renewed, often desperate, and 
continually on one's mind. 30 
Clearly this 'Benjaminian legacy', as Habermas describes it, is focused through the 
lens of the 'anamnestic solidarity' debate and incorporates many of its philosophical 
assumptions. The title of the essay conjures up Kant's call for a 'public use of reason' 
from his 'What is Enlightenment? '; 31 similarly reminiscent of Kant, the phrase 
'incumbent obligation' suggests that Habermas, like Metz, has understood memory in 
terms of practical reason, as an injunction whose force is independent of its actual 
observation. 
28 Eirgen Habermas, 'Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity' in The New 0 
Conservatism, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), p. 252-3. 
29 Habermas, 'Neo-Conservative Cultural Criticism' in ibid., p. 43. 
30 Habermas, 'On the Public Use of History' in ibid., p. 233. 
31 Kant, 'What is Enlightenment? ' in On History, op. cit., p. 5. 0 
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For Habermas there is a sense in which the ethical continuity between generations 
implies not just that solidarity can bridge an historical divide (or a divide between this 
world and the next) but that moral responsibility is incurred by the living with respect 
to the crimes of their ancestors. Replaying Karl Jaspers' question (posed in the 
immediate aftermath to the war) as to what collective responsibility was borne by 
Germans who had not resisted Nazism, Habermas contends that responsibility extends 
even to those who were not yet born at the time, that a moral liability is incurred by 
successive generations. This liability stems from the common 'form of life' which the 
living share with their immediate ancestors, a continuity of historical identity reflected 
in the fact that Germany itself claims historical continuity as a state and nation whilst 
distancing itself from its wartime atrocities. For Habermas Germany's post-war 
generation were born into many of the same political and intellectual traditions which 
characterised its Nazi period. 'There is the simple fact that subsequent generations 
also grew up within a form of life [Lebensform] in which that was possible. Our own 
life is linked to the context of life in which Auschwitz was possible not by contingent 
circumstances but instrinsicOy. 132 A6cording to Habermas the difficulty faced by 
post-war Germans is that disavowing these traditions and the barbarism which taints 
them would mean disavowing their own identity. However, he admits that the 
question of ascribing guilt has changed from a time when Jaspers could indict both the 
perpetrators and those who failed to act against the regime. Although a form of life is 
shared between generations, for the post-war generation moral responsibility is 
correspondingly lessened: 'for those born later, only a sort of intersubjective liability 
arises', 33 and yet such a moral debt remains and cannot be renounced. In so far as it 
can ever be discharged, this could only be by taking up a solidaristic and suspicious 
memory of Germany's past: 'Is there any way to bear the liability for the context in 
which such crimes originated, a context with which one's own existencd is historically 
interwoven, other than through remembrance, practiced in solidarity, of what cannot 
be made good, other than through a reflexive, scrutinizing attitude towards one's own 
identity-forming traditions. 134 
32 Habermas, 'On the Public Use of History' in The New Conservatism, op. cit., p. 232-3. 
33 Habermas, 'Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity' in ibid., p. 262. 
34 Habermas, 'On the Public Use of History' in ibid., p. 236. 
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The most problematic element of Habermas' 'Benjan-iinian' reflections - this idea 
of inherited liability - is also the most undertheorised, perhaps because it aims to give 
de jure status to a de facto sense of guilt or bad conscience which permeates German 
collective identity in the post war period, when that phenemenon might be better 
served and understood by a genealogy, an approach undertaken by Adorno in an essay 
to which Habermas refers. 35 As Adorno pointed out, the persistence of guilt has not 
coincided with greater comprehension of possible complicitics between German 
society past and present. With Habermas' approach comes the danger of exacerbating 
that guilt to the point where it could actually hinder an understanding of why Nazism 
and the Holocaust were possible. The image of past suffering which Benjamin thought 
capable of engendering and informing present political action would then risk 
fostering only conscience-stricken anxiety, a melancholy36 (Habermas' own term) 
fixation upon an irreparable past. It is not only certain political uses of history that can 
issue in conservative outcomes but also the substitution of a political by a moral use 
of the memory of past sufferings. 
Eingedenken and Vigilance 
For many contemporary commentators and in many of the most significant 
Appropriations of the concept, Eingedenken is often assumed to have the character of 
an injunction or commandment to remember. It translates the Judaic commandment 
Zakhor (Handelman), or it provides a deontological account of historical justice 
(Lenhardt), or it extends the compass of discourse ethics (Peukert, Habermas). But the 
multifarious ways in which Benjamin has been shown to employ the idea of 
redemptive memory should now reveal the one-sided nature of these exclusively 
religious or ethical readings. Such readings are misguided because the imperative 
nature of the injunction attributed to Benjamin is belied by the always-threatened 
35 Adomo, 'What Does Corning to Terms With Past Mean? ' in Geoffrey Hartman (ed. ), Bitburg in 
Moral and Political Perspective (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 114-129. 
36 Habermas, 'Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity' in The New Conservatism, p. 
263. 
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nature of the remembrance with which he deals. The ethics of comernmoration that 
has been proposed in Benjamin's name is misguided in its attempt to make of 
remembrance a categorical imperative or an infinite and inexhaustible task. In this 
light Metz's comments on the 'eschatological' aspect of dangerous memory, the sort 
of memory he finds in Benjamin, prove more faithful than the interpretations of 
Lenhardt or Habermas, even if in the last instance Metz describes memory as a basic 
category of practical reason. The Kantian heritage of each of these appropriations is 
visible not only explicitly (as in Metz) but implicitly in Lenhardt whose notion of 
'anamnestic solidarity' names a subjunctive demand to act as if commemorating the 
dead. Lenhardt's criticism of 'instrumental' 'amnesic means-end thinking'37 only 
underlines the deontological structure of the ethics that is being propounded in 
Benjamin's name. Similarly, Peukert's and Habermas' rewriting of eschatology as the 
inclusion of the dead within the discursive community works (more or less critically) 
with the postulate of a just God, what for Kant was a neceesary requirement of this- 
worldly justice. The mistake common to each of these interpretations is this - the role 
of remembrance in Benjamin's late work is misunderstood when taken normatively 
rather than descriptively, as ethics rather than philosophy of history. 
For Benjamin it is never a question of a commandment to remember, even if this 
does seem to be the implication of the last of his 'Theses'. Any suggestion that in his 
hands remembrance becomes prescriptive needs to be qualified by recognition of the 
6verwhelmingly descriptive nature of his use of Eingedenken. Thus his numerous 
references to days of remembrance (Tage des Eingedenkens) always denote an event 
which has both a religious role - the holy day as a time of prayer and retrospection - 
and political significance -a testament to the wresting of disposable time from labour 
time. Here Benjamin is engaging- in an anthropology of socially-lived time, not a 
series of prescriptions. However, once days of remembrance become construed as 
days of commemoration, it is only a short step to the ethical interpretations seen 
above. In this translation the political role of days of remembrance in history is 
inevitably downplayed. 
37 Lenhardt, op. cit., p. 147,148. 
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That Eingedenken does not take the form of an endless task also highlights the 
problems inherent in rendering it as an act of 'vigilance', another common thread 
within contemporary readings. This version of a Benjaminian theory of the Holocaust 
(in fact indebted more to Blanchot38) sees remembrance as an act of mourning but one 
which, unlike its Freudian form, eschews 'closure' or 'finality': it is instead a 
$continual opening' without 'moment of completion'; 39 a 'patient' act of 'vigilance. 40 
However, 'vigilance' - originally the period of wakeful anticipation on the eve of a 
festival or holy day - has connotations which make its use in the present context 
infelicitous. There is a sense in which, in rejecting the element of work essential to the 
process of mourning, it also neglects the cognitive moment of that mourning, the hope 
of comprehending that which is mourned, a process Adorno called 'coming to terms' 
(Aufarbeitung) with the past, an exercise in which the element of work (Arbeit) is, as 
it was for Freud, paramount. 41 The danger is that a vigilant memory will merely 
replicate in all but name the economics and temporality of melancholy. And indeed 
the invocation of vigilance has typically gone hand in hand with a denial that the 
Holocaust as an event is capable of being cognised or comprehended; an important 
way of doing justice to the event is found in the relinquishment of any search for an 
explanation which might bring it (in philosophical terms) within the sphere of 
conceptuality or representation, or (in historical terms) within a framework of 
continuity or causality. But when expressed in Benjamin's name42 this privilege of 
ethics over cognition commits a significant distortion: remembrance is for him always 
38 Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln & London: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1986), esp. p. 51: 'In the work of mourning, it is not grief that works: grief keeps 
watch. ' 
39 Andrew Benjamin, 'Shoah, Remembrance and the Abeyance of Fate: Walter Benjamin's 'Fate and 
Character' in Laura Marcus & Lynda Nead (eds. ), The Actuality of Walter Benjamin, op. cit., pp. 106 & 
116. 
40 Amis Fioretos, 'Contraction (Benjamin, Reading, History)', Modern Language Notes, vol. 110, no. 3 0 
(April 1995), p. 549, n. 15; cf. Rebecca Comay, 'Benjamin's Endgame' in Andrew Benjamin & Peter 
Osborne (eds. ), Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: Destruction and Experience, op. cit., p. 266. 
41 Adorno defines his term thus: 'Essentially, it is a question of the way in which the past is called up 
and made present: whether one stops at sheer reproach, or whether one endures the horror through a 
certain strength that comprehends even the incomprehensible. ' ['What Does Coming to Terms With 
Past Mean? ' in Geoffrey Hartman (ed. ), Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective, op. cit., p. 1261. 
42 See for example Jacques Derrida, 'Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority" in 
Drucilla Cornell & David Gray Carlson (eds. ), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, op. cit., 
pp. 61-2. 
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just as much a question of historical knowledge - it is the medium through which one 
comes to know the past - as it is a means of doing justice to past suffering, something 
which is made clear in the very passage (the twelfth of the 'Theses') upon which those 
exclusively ethical readings often draw. 43 Admittedly, Benjamin himself at one point 
compares Eingedenken to 'awakening', 44 but it would be misleading to equate this 
with vigilance, since vigilance implies by contrast the insomnia which Nietzsche saw 
as inimical to a truly critical historiography; it connotes hypertrophied rumination, not 
the sudden moment of recognition, the 'presence of mind' (Geistesgegenwart), which 
Benjamin equated with historical insight. There is a sense in which (paradoxically) 
this presence of mind which allows historical knowledge can emerge only from a 
lowering of attention, the abandonment of an all-too-wakeful consciousness. Critical 
historiography is to be understood as 'an image taken from the involuntary memory 
[unwillkfirlich Eingedenken]1.45 
Another conceptual point is raised by a particular translation of Benjaminian 
'remembrance'. The discourse of 'anamnestic solidarity' in Metz, Lenhardt and 
Peukert is actually a misnomer when expressed in Benjamin's name, since as has 
already been shown, the model of memory as anamnesis is one with which Benjamin 
had no truck: it is already criticised in the prologue to the Trauerspiel book where it is 
seen at work in the Platonic derivation against which Benjamin sets his own 'eccentric 
induction' (Adorno); anamnesis carries with it none of the transformative capacities 
Benjamin will ascribe to remembrance; it denotes memory as repetitive, not 
redemptive. Eingedenken, the term to which the debate on anamnestic solidarity 
alludes (Metz's confusion of Erinnerung and Eingedenken nothwithstanding), is not a 
memory of forms inscribed in the cosmos, nor of a vie antdrieur, but inheres in 
tradition and history as the means by which each may be handed-on or, alternatively, 
placed in critical question. 
It is undeniable that there are places in these late works (for instance in the 
Passagen-Werk, and the 'Theses' and its drafts) where support n-dght be found for the 
reading given by Metz, Lenhardt and Peukert. Benjamin writes of the danger which 
43 GS 1, p. 700; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 260. 
44 GS 5, p. 1058. 
45 GS 1, p. 1243. 
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affects 'both the content of tradition and its receivers .... Only that historian will have 
the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly convinced that even the 
dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins'. 46 The particular 'enemy' alluded to 
in this metaphorical Final Conflict is Nazism with its 'infernal' rewriting of history, a 
series of revisions against which 'redemptive' criticism battles: it is not the dead but 
the memory of the dead kept by the living which a Nazi victory would erase. Yet if 
one takes the passage literally and supposes that the living owe a debt of gratitude to 
previous generations then the questions arises, as Axel Honneth has noted, 'how this 
moral debt can ever be settled, given that the victims to be atoned belong, 
irretrievably, to the realm of the dead. 47 Replaying Horkheimer's criticism of the 
unfinished past, Honneth points out that this would require belief in Last Judgement 
and with it 'a transcendent 'deity'. Honneth proposes a less literal and more 
consistently materialistic interpretation in which 'the act of redeeming' has instead a 
'symbolic character': 'a 'Messianic power' falls to us today to the extent that we 
represent [vergegenwdrtigen] the historical process in such a manner that its losers 
again appear as interacting partners in our present experiences and thereby become 
members of the moral community'. 48 Yet despite this attempt to rescue the idea of 
redemption by rendering it symbolic, it still remains unclear how the dead might 
become 'interacting partners' in a moral community, and doubts must remain as to the 
'moral community' into which they are to be enrolled, that this abstraction might itself 
by sleight of hand mend the conflicts which Benjamin saw still operative in history, 
and whether, more fundamentally, his reflections have again been saved from 
theology by placing them within just that Kantian ethical framework against which he 
so strongly protested. 49 
46 6S 1, p. 695; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 255 (amended). 
47 Axel Honneth, 'A Communicative Disclosure of the Past: On the Relation Between Anthropology 
and Philosophy of History in Walter Benjamin' in Laura Marcus & Lynda Nead (eds. ), The Actuality of 
Walter Benjamin, op. cit., p. 9 1. 
48 Honneth, op. cit., p. 92. 
49 It may be countered with some plausibility that the strength of this opposition belies a certain 
proximity between Benjamin and the Kantian ethical view of history. On this score it is interesting to 
note comments of Dilthey summing up Lotze's (broadly Kantian) philosophy of history bearing in mind 41 
Benjamin's own interest in, and considerable sympathy for, Lotze: Lotze 'applies the method by which 
Kant justified belief in God and immortality to the systematic structure of history and thus tries to 
demonstrate participation of the deceased in the progress of history as a condition of that systematic 
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The element of truth in Honneth's interpretation is that for Benjamin 
remembrance of the dead serves no purpose if it is not undertaken in order to clarify 
the stakes in present struggles. It is in this sense that one must read apparently 
eschatological statements such as the following from the Passagen-Werk: 'Those who 
are alive at any given time see themselves in the midday [Mittag] of history. They are 
obliged to prepare a banquet for the past. The historian is the herald who invites those 
who are departed to the table. 150 The meaning of this statement is subsequently 
elucidated in the drafts of the 'Theses': 'The task of history is not only to give the 
oppressed access to tradition, but also to create it'. 51 The historiographical task is to 
disturb the sedimented tradition of the oppressed releasing its effect for present 
historical understanding and present political action. Conversely, the past must be 
understood as still at stake in present struggles such that whilst their success would 
have a redemptive effect upon past suffering, their failure would seal its futility: as 
Benjamin wrote in his exchange with Horkheimer, 'the war or the trial are not the 
entry into a dispute, but rather the decision concerning it. 152 
Further evidence for the view that commemoration is the subject matter of the 
'Theses' might be gleaned from a passage where Benjamin suggests that 'it is more 
difficult to honour the memory of the nameless than that of the farnous, the 
celebrated'. 53 But much turns on how the word 'honour' (ehren) is construed here. 
The 'nameless' are the subject of a concealed or suppressed past which can be 
retrieved or reactivated only by a destructive historiographical or political 
structure. "No education of humanity is thinkable unless its results will someday be the common 
property of those who have been left behind at various points of this earthly career; no development of 
an idea has meaning unless it will be manifest to everyone at the end what he previously suffered 
unknowingly as the bearer of this development ....... [T]his elegiac conception of a contemplative share I 'ihe dead in that which we struacle throuah here - reminiscent of the old pictures showing angels' of CIO 0 
heads gazing down from the clouds of heaven on the martyrs and the suffering they still had to bear - 
seems to us too much when we are soberly critical but as too little when we are dreaming, because we 
can possess the result of the development of mankind only in lived experience and not in idle musing. ' 
(Wilhelm Dilthey citing Lotze's Mikrokosmos in his Introduction to the Human Sciences: An Attempt 
to Lay a Foundationfor the Study of Society and History, trans. Ramon J. Betanzos (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1988), p. 138]. 
50 GS 5, p. 603 [NI5,21; Tonvolut'N" in Smith (ed. ), p. 74. 
51 GS 1, p. 1246. 
52 GS 2, p. 1338. 
53 GS 1, p. 124 1. 
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intervention. Honouring the nameless is thus a task and a capacity shared by 
materialist historiography and revolutionary action. If this amounts to 
'commemoration' then it is indeed one of the projects of Benjamin's later work, but 
equally, in his hands the term is shorn of its eulogistic and contemplative meaning. 
That 'commemoration' appears appropriate may be due to a certain naivety on 
Benjamin's part in his belief that 'days of remembrance' represent one contemporary 
remnant of a critical or 'destructive' encounter with the past. 54 Days of remembrance 
typically serve less to foster a critical consciousness, one which recognises the 
conflictual structure of past history, than the opposite -a temporary suspension of 
political anatagonisms. It is this collective spirit of thanksgiving which is perhaps 
more appropriately termed 'commemoration'. It may be the consequent lack of 
dialectic in Benjamin's anthropology of remembrance which leaves him susceptible to 
the latent conservatism of the ethics proposed in his name; to use Habermas' 
distinction, memory as suspicion has been inadequately differentiated from memory as 
self-reassurance. 
The Limits of Commemoration 
Any injunction or commandment or obligation to remember is compromised by the 
fact that memory itself will not be commanded. This is so because it is always 
accompanied by, threatened by, forgetting. It is a point which Nietzsche makes 
forcefully in his essay 'On the Use and Disadvantages of History for Life', and it is 
something which Freud and indeed the very project of psychoanalysis verified. It is no 
coincidence that Benjamin quotes from Nietzsche's essay in his final work. In the 
same tradition of thinking, Adorno urged that to preserve a memory artificially, to 
attempt to place the past at the service of voluntary memory is paradoxically to 
jeopardise that which is to be preserved. The argument is made in one of the most 
Benjaminian passages of Minima Moralia where Adorno reflects upon Jean Paul's 
idea that memories are the only inalienable possessions. 
54 GS 1, pp. 701-2; 'Theses' in Illuminations, pp. 261-2. 
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Precisely where they become controllable and objectified, where the 
subject believes himself entirely sure of them, memories 
[Erinnerungen] fade like delicate wallpapers in bright sunlight. But 
where, protected by forgetting, they keep their strength, they are 
endangered like all that is alive. This is why Bergson's and Proust's 
conception, intended to combat reification, that the present, immediacy 
[Unmittelbarkeit], is constituted only through the mediation of memory 
(Geddchtnis], has not only a redeeming but also an infernal aspect. Just 
as no earlier experience is real that has not been loosed by involuntary 
remembrance [unwillkiirliches Eingedenken] from the deathly fixity of 
its isolated existence, so conversely, no memory [Erinnerung] is 
guaranteed, existent in itself, indifferent to the future of him who 
harbours it; nothing past is proof, through its translation into mere 
imagination, against the curse of the empirical present. The most 
blissful memory [Erinnerung] of a person can be revoked by later 
experience. 55 
, 
'It is foolish and sentimental, ' concludes Adorno, 'to try to keep the past untainted by 
the present's turbid flood. ' Nothing that has happened is safe from this 'curse of the 
empirical present'. This is true not only of the most blissful memories to which 
Adorno refers, but also the* most painful and traumatic. Adomo's argument can be 
seen to confirm a quality which Benjamin found not only in memory but in history as 
well. The historical ramifications of this point can be shown by means of an example. 
In . 1993 discussions began over whether the camps at Auschwitz should be restored to 
their original design as testament to the horrors which occurred there or whether they 
should be left to erode or disintegrate with the passing of time. At stake is the 
implication of that 'half-life' or tendency towards degradation inherent in memories, a 
transience which in this case mirrors, the weathering to which human constructions are 
55 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflexionen aus dem beschddigten Leben, Gesammelre 
Schriften, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 187-8; Minima Moralia: Reflectionsfrom Damaged Life, op. cit., p. 166 
(amended). 
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subject - the destructive work of nature. Should this destruction be halted so that the 
memory of the events might itself be better preserved? Is there not a travesty in letting 
a site of genocide such as Auschwitz slowly disappear? On the other hand, is there not 
a travesty in rebuilding its murderous architecture, in reconstructing a gas chamber, in 
making Birkenau look, in the words of one commentator, 'as good as new'? 56 Other 
issues conspired to make this a contentious debate. The fact that some rebuilding work 
had already taken place by Russians and Poles between 1945 and 1946 had been used 
by Holocaust deniers such as David Irving to exploit ambiguity over the original 
architecture of the camp. Something of the infernal aspect of historical interpretation 
is revealed here. With such revisionism in mind, Jean-Claude Pressac, an author of 
books rebutting Irving and his sympathisers, called for the gas chambers and 
crematoria to be rebuilt so as to show irrefutably the precise mechanism of mass 
death. Taking a different line, and coming closer to Adorno and to Benjamin, the 
scholar of Holocaust literature James Young suggested that to search for an 
undisturbed authenticity in the ruins is misguided. With full knowledge of the irony of 
his words he urged that Auschwitz be allowed to 'age giacefully'. 57 
What can be learned from this exarnplisýthat those who have used Benjamin's 
concept of remembrance to develop a Holocaust ethics have obscured or effaced an 
important element of his own thinking of memory. What is eclipsed is the extent to 
which Benjamin's reflections upon memory share (in admittedly qualified form) a 
Kierkegaardian, Nietzschean and Freudian antipathy to encumbered memory. The 
point is significant in that 'the ethical imperative of remembering the "Shoah... (Saul 
Friedldnder's phrase)58 which is proposed as a means of doing justice to the genocide, 
resembles just such an encumbered memory. It denotes memory as hypertrophied 
conscience, a memory which, in its perpetuity, resembles the temporality of 
melancholy. For Benjamin, such an unconditional memory must always conflict with 
'the 
unavoidable physiological tendency towards forgetting. It is not simply that such 
an unconditional vigilance should not be recommended, it cannot. All means by 
56 David Cesarini, 'Preserving a Death Camp', The Guardian, 29.11.93, p. 5 
57 James Young cited in David Cesarini, op. cit., p. 5 
1 
58 Saul Friedhinder, 'Trauma, Memory, and Transference' in Geoffrey Hartman (ed. ), Holocaust 
Remembrance: The Shapes ofMemory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 258. 
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which the past would be preserved inviolate risk hypostasising memory in the form of 
mnemotechnics. To attempt such a preservation today assumes the continued presence 
of the type of tradition-bound memory which is itself to be created by that act of 
monumentalisation. The wish to monumentalise memory, to make it into an act of 
perpetual vigilance has something pre- or anti-modem about it. There is thus a sense 
in which no monument can be 'modem'. 59 The monument (like the act of vigilance to 
which it corresponds) seeks to secure tradition against destruction; it does so by 
reifying memory in the form of a static, ossified object. To recognise that with 
modernity the basis for such a secure and static memory no longer obtains means to 
recognise the need for a different way of thinking commemoration, a way other than 
monumentalisation. Where memory has itself become fleeting and transient, where it 
flares up only in the moment where it threatens to disappear irretrievably, 60 a 
monument risks serving only as an illusory reassurance that the past is safe from 
danger. Again, the conservative dimension of the ethics of vigilance becomes clear. 
ý: 
What Young's considered proposal shares with the ideas of memory in Adomo 
and Benjamin is the insight that commemoration needs to be theorised in terms other 
than the imperative, that commemoration need not involve monumentalisation, 
vigilance or moral injunctions in order to do justice to 'the image of enslaved 
ancestors', 61 and that memory cannot eschew the necessity of a certain forgetting if it 
too is to endure. In Young's reflections on the idea of the memorial one finds a greater 
awareness of the interrelation of tradition and memory (and a more faithfully 
Benjaminian approach to these phenomena) than in the entire ethics of anamnestic 
solidarity. 62 
59 Lewis Mumford cited in James E. Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and 
Meýning (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 4. 
60 GS 1. p. 1247. 
61 GS 1, P. 700; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 260. 
62 Exploring the limits of Holocaust cominemoration, Young has written of attempts at a 'self- 
destructive memorial' which would question the efficacy of monumental isation and its reification of 
memory, instead throwing questions of memory and remembrance back upon the spectator. [The 
Texture of Memory, op. cit., Ch. 11. Jane Kramer, like Young, refers in particular to the sculptor Jochen 
Getz 'who built a memorial in Hamburg, using columns that sank, little by little, into the ground, and 
materials that disappeared - materials that acknowledged the tragic fact that commemoration, like 
memory, is fragile and ephemeral, and in no way adequate to the "history" of what happened. ' ['The 
Politics of Memory', The New Yorker, 14th August 1995, p. 62-3]. 
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The Holocaust, as Habermas' 'Benjaminian' reflections correctly show, gives rise 
to a conflict of memory - memory as self-reassurance (and it is in just such terms that 
revisionism can be understood) or as suspicion, a suspicion which would remain 
aware of the historiographical anamorphosis by which those who might have testified 
to. the events were themselves to be erased from memory. The Holocaust, as the 
producer of the testamentary film Shoah Claude Lanzmann noted, can be seen as 'a 
crime to forget the name', or as Primo Levi, put it, '... the victor is the master even of 
truth and can manipulate it as he pleases'. 63 Yet there is another form of self- 
reassuring memory (this time opposed to the comparative method typical of 
revisionist historiography) which is perhaps even more pervasive today, one which 
sees the event of the Holocaust as a singular aberration which could never be repeated. 
Writing in 1940, and very possibly with some presentiment of the impending 
genocide, Benjamin already warned against the sort of complacency to which such a 
view of Fascism gives rise. His inversion of Aristotle's alignment of philosophy and 
wonder is designed to dislodge us from just such false comforts. 'The current wonder 
[Staunen] that the things we are experiencing are 'still' possible in the twentieth 
century is not philosophical. This wonder is not the beginning of knowledge - unless it 
is the knowledge that the view of history which gives rise to it is untenable. 164 A 
philosophical approach to history begins not so much in naive horror at, as in 
hardened familiarity with, catastrophe. Not that this in turn normalizes the event in the 
game way as revisionist comparisons with other genocides. An historiography which 
did justice to the dual character of memory would of necessity walk a difficult path 
which recognised the exceptional status of the Holocaust whilst remaining aware of 
the still-obtaining conditions for Fascism's recrudescence: holding to both insights 
may be essential to any updating of what Benjamin called 'a theory of history from 
which Fascism can become visible'. 65 
The revisionism which emerged in accounts of the Holocaust consisted in 
historians, nationalists and conservatives seeking a usable past in order to portray the 
63 Primo Levi, 'The Memory of the Offence' in The Drowning and the Saved, trans. Raymond 
Rosenthal (London: Abacus, 1989) p. 7. 
64 GS 1, p. 697; 'Theses' in Illuminations, p. 257 (amended). 
65 GS 1, p. 1244. 
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present in a specific ideological light. Yet the usability or revisability of the past is 
something which Benjamin himself thought a defining and ineliminable quality of the 
historical object. The incompleteness of history implies not only a redemptive but also 
an infernal quality to past time. It is not as if there is some unusable past which could 
be set against the possibility of historical revision. As Habermas has convincingly 
argued there is a sense in which past history cannot be anything other than public 
because its meaning is always at stake in social disputes and conflicts. The meaning of 
this, necessary 'publicity' of history must be clarified however, since, contra 
Habermas, the field upon which the reconstitution of the past occurs is not limited to 
an ostensibly democratic space of communication. Just as present conflicts play out 
divergent interpretations of the past, so our understanding of the past has political 
ramifications, something which Charles Maier has highlighted in the Historikerstreit: 
'historical interpretations must simultaneously be political interpretations in that they 
support some beliefs about how power works and dismiss others. But they need not be 
politicized interpretations; they need not be weapons forged for a current ideological 
contest. For leading adversaries in the contemporary West German debate, however, 
they have become politicized. They are stakes in a struggle. 166 
As the example of the Historikerstreit shows, Benjamin's thinking, taken 
retrospectively, can give us insights into the role of the Holocaust in history, and it is 
no coincidence that he is invoked in discussion of the complicities risked in writing 
About the genocide. 67 But as this chapter has sought to make clear, there are ways in 
66 Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past. History, Holocaust, and German National Identity 
(Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard U. P., 1988), p. 32. 
67 From a very different standpoint, Benjamin has been invoked in discussion of the Holocaust, not this 
time as someone who, anticipating the genocide, provides means for critical reflection upon it, but as 
someone who was himself implicated in anti-Semitism. Jeffrey Mehlman's contentious interpretation of 
a series of narratives written by Benjamin between 1929 and 1933 employs psychoanalytic and 
deconstructive modes of reading to show that against his explicit intention Benjamin displayed an 
uncritical naivety in the face of the rise of Fascism, and that indeed some his texts from this period 
exhibit important features of a 'Jewish self-hatred' complicit with discourses of anti-semitism. [Jeffrey 
Mehlman, Walter Benjamin for Children: An Essay on His Radio Years (Chicago & London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993)] The way in which Benjamin is here brought to testify for the 
Holocaust as complicitous accessory, links Mehlman's argument closely, both in terms of textual 
approach and political agenda, to Jacques Derrida's speculations on a possible Benjaminian account of 
the Holocaust. [See his 'Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority", op. cit., esp. pp. 57- 
63]. Whilst these retrospective interpretations lead beyond the bounds of the present chapter's focus 
upon remembrance and commemoration, it is important to note that this logic of 'contamination' by a, 
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which the particular legacy and retrospective interpretations of Benjamin found in 
contemporary thought have involved considerable distortions and misunderstandings 
of his philosophy of memory, often detracting from its philosophical and political 
radicality. Recurring misapprehensions have been found in each of the discourses of 
'dangerous memory', 'anamnestic solidarity', Shoah 'commemoration' and mnemonic 
6vigilance' proposed in Benjamin's name. Each of these renditions of Benjamin's 
concept of remembrance have been found wanting. There are - as should be clear from 
the criticisms offered above - more helpful (and more faithful) ways of showing the 
topicality and relevance of Benjamin's thinking, and a critique of what have today 
become the predominant interpretations can serve to open the way (if only negatively) 
to such a re-presentation of Benjamin's work, something which, it should also be 
clear, is an important and urgent task. 
which Fascism is said to infect even its most staunch enemies is a strongly anti-Benjaminian logic, one 
which paradoxically disallows evaluation of similarities and differences between political positions, of 
the complicity of political ideas professedly opposed to Nazism. It is a theory of history from which 
Fascism becomes - paradoxically - invisible. 
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Condusion 
In a letter from May 1940, written just a few months before his death, Benjamin 
reveals in the form of an anecdote the genealogy of his philosophy of experience. In 
the process he confirms the intimate relation between experience and memory. 
There is no reason to make a secret of the fact that I trace the roots of 
my 'theory of experience' to a childhood memory. My parents naturally 
took walks with us wherever we spent our summer. There were either 
two or three of us children. The one I have in mind is my brother. After 
we had visited one of the obligatory tourist attractions around 
Freudenschaft, Wengen, or Schreiberhau, my brother used to say, 
"Now we can say that we've been there. " This statement made an 
unforgettable impression on me. 1 
It is not difficult to see why his brother's statement made such a unforgettable 
I- mpression upon the young Benjamin. The type of experience it describes is one lived 
solely for the purposes of voluntary memory, an experience undertaken for the sole 
intent that it could later be recalled at will. Here events are experienced not as ends in 
themselves but always with a view to their future recollection. In such an experience 
the present is lived as a future past. In fact the present is not experienced at all. Ircre 
an atrophied mode of experience appears as an impoverished form of memory, an 
impoverished form of memory gives rise to an atrophied mode of experience. 
Benjamin's anecdote tells us something of the internal relation he assumed 
between memory and experience, and the importance of memory to his critical 
engagement with modernity. In diagnosing modernity's destruction of experience his 
I Briefe, p. 848; Correspondence, p. 629. 
development of a taxonomy of memory allows him to pinpoint the deterioration in the 
subject's experience of time, history' and tradition. It is memory which expresses the 
forms of that atrophy of experience and it is memory which is capable of articulating a 
critical response to it. One particular term in Benjamin's taxonomy of memory 
exhibits the privileged capacity to respond to this process, not by means of a 
conservative return to an earlier mode of experience but by making use of modernity's 
own destructive tendencies. This form of memory is able to effect a 'redemptive' 
encounter with the past, exposing both the abstraction to which experience succumbs 
under modernity, and the misguided conceptions of time and history to which this 
process gives rise. The power to effect this critical or redemptive encounter with the 
past is 'remembrance' (Eingedenken) and its ability to open a seemingly closed or 
concluded past and uncover the illusions attending the historical object leads it to 
assume a key role in Benjamin's thinking. 
The Copernican Revolution in the historical mode of viewing is this: 
one used to consider the 'past' [Gewesene] as the fixed point, and saw 
the present as attempting to lead knowledge gropingly toward this firm 
ground. Now the relationship is to be reversed, and the past becomes 
the dialectical turning, the dawning of awakened consciousness. 2 
Benjamin calls this the 'Copernican Revolution of remembering [Eingedenkenl'3 
indicating the radical alteration it represents to the way the relation between past and 
present is normally conceived. What was a paradigmatic change in scientific thinking 
and, when used as a metaphor by Kant, a destructive transformation of the 
philosophical tradition, here names the revolutionary implications of rccognising the 
present as the locus of the past's consitution and reconstitution, what happens when 
the meaning of past events is taken as a responsibility of the present. Remembrance 
plays the pivotal role in this about-turn, placing historical knowledge in the hands of 
the apprehending subject rather than in the historical object purified of its subjective 
2 GS 5, p. 1057 (h*, 2). 
3 GS 5. p. 1058 (h", 4). 
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moment. However, the subject of historical knowledge is not thereby to be construed 
(as the Copernican metaphor might sug est) as an isolated individual but is by C19 
contrast intrinsically plural and social. The radical leap into the past which 
remembrance enacts can be found not just in the procedure of historiography but 
equally in collective observations of calendar time or in political insurgence. 
Benjamin's exchange with Horkheimer, discussed in Chapter One, highlights not 
only the vital role played by memory in articulating the historical past, but also the 
very distinctive picture of history which emerges when this mnemonic character of 
history is taken into consideration, when history is understood in its 'original 
vocation' as 'remembrance'. For Benjamin this means recognising the ability of 
remembrance to confer a sense of completeness and incompleteness upon the past, but 
also the fact that historical time is defined not by the chain of causal sequence but by 
the ecstatic structure of the instant. The element of memory which is transformative 
rather than repetitive, and which points towards 'moments' and 'discontinuities', is 
Benjamin's touchstone in his critique of homogeneous time, and it is often the 
distinctive temporality of remembrance which is invoked when he is questioning the 
supposed linearity of time or the continuity of history. The exchange with Horkheimer 
makes comprehensible Benjamin's subsequent methodological formulations 
concerning his own critical practise, in works such as 'Konvolut 'N" and the theses 
'On the Concept of History'. What it shares with these works is the idea that 
icmembrance makes it possible to effect in historico-philosophical or 
historiographical terms the opening or fulfilment of the past stored up in the 
theological idea of redemption, to enact a destruction of the past or, equally, to 
construct the past in a new way. Insight into the 'affection' by which the past is 
constituted and continually reinterpreted provides the foundation of a 'redemptive' 
critical practise. Remembrance can make use of this constitutive relation in the cause 
of a critical transformation of received history. The exchange with Horkheimer over 
the complete or incomplete, closed or open character of the past, sets out not only the 
fundaments of Benjamin's critical historiography but also makes clear the central role 
played by remembrance in this radical encounter with history. 
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Chaper Two explored the implications of this posited link between history and 
remembrance and looked at its role in Benjamin's development of an historiographical 
method. The intimate link he finds between remembrance and history allows him to 
express an historiographical practise and a theory of history in terms of the dual 
quality (by turns, destructive and constructive) of remembrance. The discussion went 
on to highlight the presence within this historiographical method of elements of 
Enlightenment philosophy of history, here retrieved and reinterpreted in a critical way. 
Against a common misconception of Benjamin's project is was argued that he actually 
wishes to retain the epistemological goals of the philosophy of history, seeking only 
to rid this approach of its 'apologetic' tendency. This is to be achieved by rewriting 
universal history as monadology. Such a revision does not relinquish the universal 
aspirations of this approach to history but merely alters the way in which universals 
are to be apprehended. Monadology captures the latent 'fore-' and 'after-history' 
contained within particular instants of historical time, so that a constructive procedure 
may then draw out the whole represented in each historical event. Universal history 
becomes in Benjamin's hands not an epic vista upon the past, subsuming events under 
a predefined schema, but precisely the opposite -a micrological analysis of particular 
historical phenomena which looks for the trace of the universal expressed therein. 
Drawing further resources from universal history (although again radically 
reinterpreted), Benjamin defends the methodological principle of progress, grounding 
It not in the continuity of a temporal sequence but in its moments of interruption. 
Progress properly understood institutes a radical 'new' that breaks with the 
homogeneous continuum in which existing concepts of progress occur. 
Chapter Three showed how this engagement with Enlightenment philosophy of 
history develops in the particular case of Benjamin's critique of Kant and nco. 
Kantianism. Again it was monadalogy which was seen to inform these criticisms and 
to ground an alternative concept of history: the monad's 'intensive infinitude' was 
employed against the merely postulated infinite of the Kantian view of history. A 
monadological view of history allows an alternative to the bad infinity of history 
germinal in Kant and brought out in nco-Kantianism. Benjamin rinds a paradigm for 
the monadological view of history in Heilsgeschichte or redemptive history, and it is a 
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eschatology which informs his criticisms of the unbounded history of Kantian and 
neo-Kantian thought. But Benjamin's own proximity to neo-Kantianism meant that 
this critique would always be ambivalent. This emerged in his appropriation of 
Lukdcs' criticism of Kant. Here Benjamin fails to follow through the Hegelian source 
for his critique of the 'bad infinite' and the abstractly quantitative series upon which 
that bad infinity rests, and as a result bases his objections to it on the idea of 
transcendence rather than the (more dialectical) transition. 
Chapter Four looked in more detail at the monadological method and cmphasised 
how Benjamin's preoccupation with the fragment is not intended as an alternative or 
an antidote to an engagement with the totality, but is meant as a response to a problem 
of induction in a situation of objective illusion. Adomo's reproach against the idea of 
the monad, that it is itself historically and socially produced, was shown to have 
already been conceded by Benjamin, and turned to critical ends. Benjamin's 
contention that historical materialism and dialectics are theories of the monad rewrites 
Marx's idea that capitalist society typically appears in its most 'elemental' form, 
namely as an immense collection of commodities. He admits, following Marx, that the 
self-sufficiency of this elemental substance may be illusory or fetishistic, but it is 
nonetheless 'real' in its historical specificity. What Adorno criticised as a fetishism of 
immediacy therefore turns out to be a consistently Marxian intent to begin 
methodologically with the abstractions which commodity-producing society itself 
6reates. The monadological focus upon the most elemental stakes itself on the belief 
that such simple substance contains, in however partial form, the social totality. From 
the most simple social and historical phenomena, the social relations constituting 
them can be induced. But for Benjamin the traditional Marxian approach is 
complicated by the second nature to which both social and historical illusions have 
succumbed; any reconstruction of the whole now requires not so much an induction 
from isolated phenomena as their radical and shocking juxtaposition. Whilst Adorno 
worries about the 'surrealist' complexion this gives to Benjamin's philosophy, he 
recognises in it a laudable attempt to rescue induction by anothei name. Rather than 
undermining this project, Adorno's criticisms actually sophisticate and redeem the 
idea of monadology. 
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As the third and fourth chapters moved from memory to history, so the fifth 
moved from history back to memory, discussing another series of objections to 
Benjamin's project, a set of criticisms directed not only at the procedure of his 
engagement with the history, but at the very desire to orient critical energies towards a 
redemption of the past. This chapter sought to question the very project of cultivating 
memory as critique. The problem such a cultivation of memory encounters is one of 
the consciousness or subjectivity involved in this engagement with the past. It 
emerges most clearly in the extreme case where a wish to transform the past comes to 
compromise action oriented towards the present and the future. This problem is 
expressed eloquently in the genealogical and sceptical criticisms of memory one finds 
in Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Freud. Each portrays a pathological extreme of 
retrospection where the will becomes fixated and paralysed. Benjamin himself draws 
upon this diagnosis in his commentary on Baudelaire, but only by blurring the 
distinction between Baudelairean melancholy and his own 'redemptive' critique of it. 
Might his own project be implicated in the very criticisms he levels at Baudelaire's 
melancholy memory, a memory burdened by the weight of the past? Might the 
necessity of a certain forgetting have been surreptitiously dropped from Benjamin's 
'problem of memory (and of forgetting)', with serious consequences? Might 
historiography be better- served not so much by a melancholy disatisfaction with the 
past but by an affirmation of it, one which relinquishes the will to redemption. To 
dnswer this question involved examining Benjamin's own relation, explicit and 
implicit to these sceptical criticisms of memory. However, any genealogical or 
sceptical critique of Benjamin's project soon becomes complicated by virtue of his 
familiarity with, and employment of, those very criticisms. More than this, he can be 
seen to turn many of these criticisms against their proponents, drawing attention to the 
weaknesses in those alternatives contrasted with memory, whether in the form of 
active forgetting, affirmation or repetition. 
This discussion of the melancholy extreme courted by remembrance clarificd 
what it means to 'bear in mind' (eingedenk), and shows that whilst the past which fills 
the mind in mindfulness risks weighing it down and disabling it, mindfulness need not 
necessarily issue in a melancholy outcome. It is just this lesson of Benjamin's own 
185 
genealogical studies, his (often explicit) incorporation of many of the criticisms aimed 
at hypertrophied memory by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Freud, which is neglected in 
the attempt to derive an ethics from his concept of remembrance, whether in the name 
of 'dangerous memory', 'anamnestic solidarity' or 'vigilance'. Whilst these 
translations of remembrance have recognised the importance of Benjamin's concept 
they have done so at the cost of diluting its critical aims. The legacy of remembrance 
was examined in the final chapter by way of an assessment of these various ethical 
and theological renditions. In each case the problems to which they gave rise were 
found to be closely linked to repeated misapprehensions of Benjamin's thought. The 
idea of 'dangerous memory' attempts conservatively to halt the decline of tradition, a 
process characteristic of modemity; it seeks to secure faith against secularisation via 
the sort of narrative memory which has long since disappeared. It would fend-off, 
rather than (as 'remembrance') work with, processes of secularisation. The discourse 
of anarrinestic solidarity culminates in a 'Marxian religion' which overlooks 
Benjamin's more complex interweaving of theological and secular motifs. Habermas' 
use of anarrinestic solidarity attempts to ethically ground the burden of guilt bome by 
present generations with respect to the crimes of their ancestors. Incorporated into the 
universal structure of discourse ethics, it writes-out the conflicts which cut across 
present remembrance of past suffering. A similar privilege of ethics was found in the 
idea of 'vigilance', but this time it coincided with a refusal to comprehend the past, 
bverlooking Benjamin's employment of Eingedenken as part of a theory of historical 
knowledge. Each of these versions of the concept of remembrance failed to appreciate 
its complexity. 
A critical assessment of these interpretations and appropriations serves to clarify 
the meaning of remembrance and to elucidate the more general themes of Benjamin's 
thinking. It confirms an argument which has run throughout this thesis, that the role 
played by the concept of remembrance in Benjamin's 'theory of the knowledge of 
history' and in his corresponding rescue of Enlightenment universal history, is a 
crucial one. At the same time this thesis has attempted to determine what is valid and 
what is problematic both in this concept of remembrance and in the theory of 
historical knowledge which it informs, by subjecting both to the most cogent 
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criticisms which can be levelled at them. What emerges is not only the importance of 
this concept for an understanding of Benjamin's philosophy but the philosophical 
pertinence and strengths of this concept per se, above and beyond the context in which 
it appears. Whilst the preceding discussion has kept as much as possible to the context 
of Benjamin's own philosophy, it has also sought to show along the way the more 
general relevance of his concept of remembrance. Any philosophical analysis of 
memory could do worse than to draw upon the resources he provides. 
The topicality of this concept is clear from the various appropriations examined in 
the final chapter. But it is also clear that the source of its appeal for contemporary 
philosophy and theology has often been the source of its misapprehension, and the 
element in remembrance which is intended as a way of doing justice to past 
generations has provided material for a resurgent ethics and a revitalised soteriology. 
The fact that this concept never appears in Benjamin's works in the form of an ethical 
imperative gives the lie to these interpretations; alongside the power remembrance 
exhibits in redeeming the past, there is equal emphasis on its fragility and the 
endangered historical situation in which it arises. Certainly remarkable powers are 
ascribed to Eingedenken: it is 'a muscle strong enough to contract the whole of 
historical time. 14 Yet it is also 'the straw at which the drowning man clutchcs'. 5 a 
description which underlines the perilous context of its invocation. The enormous 
strength required to call up and transform the past stands alongside the fragility of 
inemory itself in a situation of general historical erasure. There is a sense in which this 
investment of memory may serve to provide little more than consolation in desperate 
times; Benjamin himself defines consolation as 'a way of making unhappcncd what 
has happened'. 6 Something of this desperation of remembrance is revealed in one 
particular vision he provides of Proustian memory, interpreting it as the sort of 
presence of mind which arises in the face of death, where the involuntary 
reminiscence grants insight into the individual's past, but only where that life is at its 
most vulnerable: 'it is in fact the most important images, those developed in the 
darkroom of the lived moment, which it enables us to see .... And that 'entire life' 
4 GS 5, p. 600 (N I 3a, 1); 'Konvolut 'N', op. cit., p. 7 1. 
5 GS 1. pp. 1243,1244. 
6 GS 6, p. 609. 
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['ganze Leben'] which, as we often hear, passes before the eyes of the dying or the 
person in danger of dying, is composed precisely of these tiny imageS. '7 Here, 
rnicrologically and monadologically, reminiscence conjures up an entire life in the 
form of fleetingly lucid pictures, particular lived moments returned finally to the 
subject at the point of extreme need. Yet this 'entire life' is also a 'complete lifC', and 
only now, when it may be too late, do all the images fall into place. 
In 1940 Benjamin notes that it is 'the war and its corresponding constellation' 
which have led him to 'the problem of memory (and of forgetting)'. But already in 
1931 he talks of a 'war weariness', euphemistically referring to his own destructive 
state of mind. 8 It may be no coincidence that it is from this time on, in a situation of 
recurrent danger, that he begins to develop the concept of remembrance. Where 
history and life-history coincide the measure of each can be found in memory, an 
insight whose force may be clearest at the point where the boundaries of both are most 
keenly felt. 
The true measure of life is memory. Looking back it traverses the 
whole of life like lightning. As fast as one can turn back a few pages, it 
has travelled from the next village to the place where the traveller took 
the decision to set out. Those for whom life has become transformed 
into writing ... can only read the writing backwards. That is the only way 
in which they confront themselves, and only thus - by f1ceing from the 
present - can they understand life. 9 
7 GS 2, p. 1064. 
8 GS 6, p. 423; On this see Bernd Witte, Walter Benjamin, op. cit., p. 132. 
9 GS 6, p. 529-30; 'Conversations with Brecht', Aesthetics & Politics, op. cit., 91 
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